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THE FORMATION OF INSURANCE CONTRACT IN LONDON MARKET
by JINLEI ZHANG
The processes involved in the formation of a marine insurance contract are different 
from the processes by which other types of contracts are formed. The formation of 
insurance contracts in London Market typically takes the following course: a 
prospective assured who is seeking the insurance cover approaches a Lloyd’s 
accredited broker. The broker prepares the slip and takes it around the market seeking 
subscriptions. Then the underwriter, who wishes to participate in the insurance, will 
initial the slip, stating the percentage and the proportion of the risk he is prepared to 
underwrite. Once the broker has obtained the desired level of subscriptions, the slip is 
closed. A formal policy is frequently issued later.
In general, the formation of a contract of marine insurance is governed by the 
ordinary principles of contract law. The purpose of this thesis is to analyse the 
application of contract law principles to the legal issues that arise at the formation 
stage in marine insurance contracts and to investigate whether these principles are 
suitable to dealing with the practical difficulties that arise in the London insurance 
market.
The main body of the thesis is divided into three parts. The first part is about the legal 
issues arising before the marine insurance contract is concluded. The second part 
concentrates on the insurance broker who is playing a significant role during the 
process of contract formation. Legal issues on the duties, rights and liabilities of the 
insurance broker will be discussed. The third part focuses on legal issues arising after 
the marine insurance contract is concluded. Although the issues to be discussed arise 
in the post-contractual stage, they can often be traced to the processes involved at the 
formation stage.
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION
1.1 AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LONDON INSURANCE MARKET
The "London Insurance market" is a distinct, separate part of the UK insurance and 
reinsurance industry centred on the City of London. It comprises insurance and 
reinsurance companies, Lloyd's syndicates, P&I clubs and brokers who handle most 
of the business.1
London is a geographically highly concentrated market with many underwriters and 
brokers located in the City. Thus brokers can know personally the strengths, 
specialisms and reputations of the underwriters with whom they deal. Similarly the 
assured can meet underwriters, and market information is spread rapidly among all 
participants in the market. It can be said that the London insurance market that 
possesses the capacity and expertise required for the underwriting of virtually any 
type of risk, and that brokers will be able to obtain the best terms for their clients, the 
assured.
The London insurance market has got a strong international character. This character 
is reflected both in the sources of its business and in the nationalities of its 
participants. A majority of the companies underwriting in the London market are 
foreign companies or foreign-owned ones. Two important features of the London
insurance market should be emphasized; first, this market is largely a “subscription
0  * * market”; and secondly the insurance brokers control most of the business placed in
1 The legal position of main players operating in this market will be further discussed at p 5 below.
2 The London market operates generally on a subscription basis, with underwriters each accepting a percentage 
of the risk. How the process operates and potential legal problem that can arise will be elaborated at p 18 
below.
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the market.
In broad terms, the London insurance market is composed of two elements: Lloyd's 
of London and the Companies market.
1.2 LLOYD’S OF LONDON
1.2.1 History of Lloyd’s of London
Lloyd's of London is a British insurance market. The actual date when Lloyd's was 
originally established is not known, but records show that Lloyd's started from 
Edward Lloyd's coffee house, along the Thames in Tower Street, London. By 1688, 
there is evidence to suggest that Lloyd's coffee house was well known by businesses 
in London.
Edward Lloyd did not deal with insurance himself but provided the coffee house, 
reliable shipping news and other services to facilitate the business of marine 
insurance. Certain marine risks would present themselves for insurance and a number 
of wealthy individuals would choose to insure a certain proportion of the risk, until 
the entire risk was covered. This process of signing the policy by placing one name 
under another gave rise to the term 'underwriter', which is still used today.
Edward Lloyd died in 1713, but the coffee house was carried on and the wealthy 
individuals still continued to underwrite shipping risks. By the end of the 18th 
century, the underwriters elected a committee and moved to new premises in the 
Royal Exchange. Strict business rules remained in force and only members of 
Lloyd's were permitted to accept insurance business. In 1871, the Lloyd's Act was 
passed and the Society of Lloyd's (the Society) was incorporated, which provided the
3 The role of the brokers, who play a significant role during the formation of insurance contract in London 
market, will be further discussed in Chapter 3 below.
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legal basis for Lloyd's. This legislation formalised and promoted the development of 
the Lloyd’s market.4
The Royal Exchange building was destroyed by the fire of 1838 and Lloyd's moved 
again, but only temporarily, to South Sea House before returning back to the re-built 
Royal Exchange in 1844. By the 1900s, Lloyd's had evolved into the international 
insurance market, providing insurance almost for every type of risk. In 1928, the 
Society moved to Leadenhall Street, which was the first building it owned. Further 
growth necessitated another move to a second building in Lime Street in 1958. 
However, even the Leadenhall Street premises were outgrown, and in 1978 the 
architect Richard Rogers (now Lord Rogers) was commissioned to redevelop the 
site. In 1986, HM The Queen officially opened the new spectacular building at One 
Lime Street, which Lloyd's continues to occupy. Now, Lloyd's of London is a 
self-regulating organisation operating under the provisions of the Lloyd's Act 1982.
1.2.2 Lloyd's of London as a Market rather than a Company
Lloyd's of London is the world's best known insurance organisation. Lloyd's is not an 
insurance company itself but rather is best understood as a market place where the 
underwriting syndicates compete for business. These same competing syndicates 
work together to offer a vast amount of choice, knowledge, experience and 
specialism in one place.
The London insurance market is the world's leading centre for international 
insurance and reinsurance, and Lloyd's accounts for 52% of its gross premium.
4 In 1871 the members of the Lloyd's underwriting community were united by Act of Parliament into a society 
and corporation and incorporated by the name of Lloyd's. The objects of the society are as follows:
“The carrying on by members of the society of the business of insurance of every description including 
guarantee business; The advancement and protection of the interests of members of the society in connection 
with the business carried on by them as members of the society and in respect of shipping and cargoes and 
freight and other insurable property or insurable interests or otherwise; The collection publication and 
diffusion of intelligence and information; The doing of all things incidental or conducive to the fulfilment of 
the objects of the society.” (Lloyd's Act 1911, s. 4.)
Insurers from all over the world do businesses at Lloyd's, including Munich Re 
(Germany), Mitsui (Japan), AIG (USA) and ACE (Bermuda). The business of 
Lloyd's is traditionally divided into four principal categories: marine, non-marine, 
aviation and motor. Nowadays, Lloyd's underwrites a huge range of businesses and 
projects internationally, including oil rigs, underground transport networks, airlines 
and the world's top five manufacturers of personal computers.
The considerable strength of Lloyd’s derives from itself being a market. When 
compared with other insurance or reinsurance companies, it is difficult to understand 
the manner in which Lloyd’s conducts its business and the way it structures its 
organizations. Generally, Lloyd's itself does not underwrite insurance business, 
leaving that to its members.
1.2.3 The Structure of Lloyd’s Market
As stated earlier, Lloyd's of London is not an insurance company. It is an insurance 
market. As the oldest continuously active insurance marketplace in the world, 
Lloyd's has retained some unusual structures and practices that differ from all other 
insurance or reinsurance companies today.
Structurally Lloyd's is governed by the Council o f  Lloyd's,5 an 18 member body 
roughly equivalent to the board of directors of a company. The Council administers 
the Corporation o f  Lloyd's which runs its various services and administrative 
operations.. The Council delegates most of its responsibilities for the day to day
5 The Council of Lloyd's is the body charged with the management and superintendence of the affairs of the 
society and the power to regulate and direct the business of insurance at Lloyd's (Lloyd's Act 1982, s. 6(1)). To 
that end, the Council is empowered to: (i) make such byelaws as from time to time seem requisite or expedient 
for the proper and better execution of Lloyd's Acts 1871-1982 and for the furtherance of the objects (Lloyd's 
Act 1911, s. 4, set out in fn 4 above) of the Society, including such byelaws as it thinks fit for any or all of the 
purposes specified in Sch. 2 of the Act; and (ii) amend or revoke any byelaw made or deemed to have been 
made thereunder (Lloyd's Act 1982, s. 6(2))
4
oversight of Lloyd’s and this delegation, of course, is necessary to ensuring that the 
market operates efficiently and successfully.
Who are the main players in Lloyd’s market?
1.2.3.1 Lloyd’s Members
Members of Lloyd’s provide the supporting capital on which the market is built. 
Lloyd’s members include corporate members and individual members. Corporate 
members include investment institutions and international insurance companies. 
Individual members are known as “names”.
For most of Lloyd's history, names were those rich individuals who backed policies 
written at Lloyd's from their personal wealth and with unlimited liability. Since 1994, 
Lloyd's has allowed corporate members into the market, with limited liability. The 
losses in the early 1990s devastated the finances of many names. By that time 
upwards of 1,500 out of 34,000 names were declared bankrupt and this scared away 
others. Today, individual names provide only 10% of capacity at Lloyd's, with 
corporations accounting for the rest. No new names with unlimited liability are 
admitted, and the importance of individual names will continue to decline as 
individual names slowly withdraw, convert (generally into Limited Liability 
Partnerships) or die.
1.2.3.2 Underwriting Syndicates
An insurance syndicate is a group of Lloyd’s members, corporate or individual, who 
provide capital to back the liabilities they insure. Syndicates are annual ventures. 
Syndicates operate as independent business units within Lloyd’s market and are run 
by managing agents, who appoint the underwriting team which writes risk on behalf 
of the syndicate membership.
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The membership of a syndicate at Lloyd's is not like owning shares in a company. 
An individual can join for one calendar year only and this is known as the famous 
'Lloyd's annual venture'. At the end of the year, the syndicate as an ongoing trading 
entity is effectively disbanded although it is common for the syndicate to re-form for 
the next calendar year with more or less the same membership and the same 
identifying number. In this way, a syndicate can appear to have a continuous 
existence going back fifty years or more when in reality it does not. There would 
have been fifty separate incarnations of the syndicate, each one a unique trading 
entity that underwrote insurance for one calendar year only.
1.2.3.3 Managing Agents
Syndicates are run by managing agents who now have a franchise to operate within 
Lloyd’s market. Some managing agents are quoted companies listed on the stock 
exchange, others are private companies. In some instances, managing agents act as 
capital providers to the syndicates they manage and so have a multi-faceted role as 
corporate members of the market, agents and franchisees.
The main functions of the managing agent are to employ the active underwriter and 
to manage the business of the syndicate; the services provided can include general 
management, accounting, business development, computer services and other shared 
services. Managing agents may run more than one syndicate.
1.2.3.4 Lloyd’s Brokers
A Lloyd's broker is a partnership or corporate body permitted by the Council to broke 
insurance business at Lloyd's on behalf of its clients. Most of the largest broking 
firms in the world own a Lloyd's broking subsidiary. Outsiders, whether individuals
or other insurance companies, cannot do business directly with Lloyd's syndicates. 
They must hire Lloyd's brokers, who are the only customer-facing companies at 
Lloyd's. They are therefore often referred to as “intermediaries”. Lloyd's brokers do 
not place all of their business through the Lloyd's market. They also deal with UK 
insurance companies and overseas insurance markets.
Lloyd's brokers must be approved in order to place business with Lloyd's 
underwriters on behalf of their clients. Only the accredited (registered with the 
General Insurance Standards Council, or equivalent) Lloyd’s Brokers are entitled to 
place risks in the Lloyd’s market on behalf of clients. These Brokers use their 
specialist knowledge to negotiate competitive terms and conditions for clients. To 
protect investors, Lloyd’s performs a careful assessment of all applicant Brokers, 
affirming their reputation and financial standing and investigating the character and 
suitability of officers and employees before making the decision to accredit. Firms 
receive provisional accreditation for three years before becoming entitled to use the 
term “Lloyd’s Broker”.
1.2.3.5 Integrated Lloyd's Vehicles (ILVs)
It also should be mentioned that following the admission of corporations to Lloyd’s 
membership some changes in the traditional structure of Lloyd’s resulted. In 
particular, insurance companies did not want to rely on the underwriting skills of 
syndicates they did not control, so they started their own. An integrated Lloyd's 
vehicle is a group of companies that combines a corporate member, a managing 
agent, and a syndicate under one ownership. Some ILVs allow minority contributions 
from other members, but most now try to operate on an exclusive basis.
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1.3 THE COMPANIES MARKET
The London Insurance market is comprised of Lloyd's of London alongside the 
companies market, providing an alternative source of cover. The companies market 
has its origin in the ILU (Institute of London Underwriters) which was formed in 
1884 to represent the interests of London marine insurance companies. It was later 
expanded to include the emerging aviation and energy markets. By the 1980s, the 
non-marine sector in the companies market had grown to match the Lloyd's market. 
And to further strengthen the companies market, in 1991, the LIRMA (the London 
International Insurance and Reinsurance Market Association) was created.
In 1996, LIRMA formally adopted an international approach to its constitution. 
Membership was opened to companies throughout the European Union and the 
European Economic Area. The creation of the International Underwriting 
Association of London ("IUA"), with its global outlook, was the next logical step. 
The IUA came into being on 1 January 1999, following the merger of the ILU with 
LIRMA. Bringing together marine, non-marine and reinsurance interests and uniting 
two separate traditions, the creation of the IUA gave the company market a single 
voice for the first time.
Marine insurance cover may be obtained either at Lloyd’s of London or in the 
companies market. In the companies market, a company will grant insurance upon 
the same terms, rules of contract and agency law, and at similar rates to Lloyd’s. 
However there is an important difference in the insurance regimes: when insurance 
cover is obtained, on the companies market it is the assured who must bear the risk 
that the company’s liability will be limited, by definition. There will be little recourse 
beyond the company’s assets after a liquidation has taken place. A policy of 
insurance effected at Lloyd’s, on the other hand, entitles the assured to obtain all the 
assets of those members of Lloyd’s who have subscribed to the contract through their 
authorized agent. The contract is between the assured and many members, each of
whom is individually liable for his own agreed share, but not the shares of others.6
1.4 THE MAIN LEGAL ISSUES TO BE ANALYSED IN THE THESIS
In general, the formation of a contract of marine insurance is governed by the 
ordinary principles of contract law. However, the application of these principles must 
be considered, in the context of certain, sometimes unique, practices of the London 
insurance markets. Placing a risk at the Lloyd’s market entails taking the following 
steps: the prospective assured approaches a Lloyd’s accredited broker with a risk to 
be insured. The broker prepares a “slip” with the details of the insurance. The Broker 
then approaches underwriters with a view to obtaining written lines of insurance 
which total 100% or more of the risk. If the underwriter is interested, he will sign on 
the slip to accept a percentage of the total risk. When the subscription reaches the 
desired level, the slip is closed and later the insurance policy is issued.
The purpose of this thesis is: (1) to analyse the application of contract law principles 
to the legal issues that arise at the formation stage in marine insurance contracts and 
(2) to investigate whether these principles are suitable in dealing with the practical 
difficulties that arise in the London insurance market. The main body of the thesis is 
divided into three parts.
6 Christopher Henley, The Law o f  Insurance Broking (2nd ed, Sweet & Maxwell, 2004) at p 423.
9
PART 1: the legal issues arising before the marine insurance contract is 
concluded.
It is well established that once a slip has been fully subscribed, there is a binding 
contract of insurance between the assured and the underwriter who has initialed it. 
However, the issue often becomes more complicated in practice. In practice, a slip 
will normally be partially subscribed by several underwriters and there are some 
doubts about the legal status of a partially subscribed slip. It is important to discuss 
the legal significance of the process of subscription. The primary question to be 
considered in this chapter is whether the subscription on the slip should be 
considered as an acceptance by the underwriter or an offer from the underwriter.
When analysing the legal status of partial subscription, the rules of offer and 
acceptance in general contract law should be applied. However, when a reinsurance 
contract is formed, the analysis of the rules of offer and acceptance cannot fit easily 
into the traditional understanding of these concepts. Particular problems arise 
where a contract of reinsurance is formed before the original insurance contract. 
Accordingly, it is important to analyse the issue again under the specific conditions 
of reinsurance. The question of when the contract of reinsurance should be regarded 
as concluded and the duty of utmost good faith under these circumstances will be 
discussed.
The slip plays an important role at the formation stage; it is the main document in the 
Lloyd’s system. However, in the past, when the broker prepared the slips, they could 
use different formats and there was no restriction on the format to be adopted. These 
various formats were frequently unclear and open to misinterpretation. Since the 
policy is normally drafted on slip wording, the above situation could affect the 
efficiency of policy preparation and signing and it could also cause delay and errors. 
An attempt has been made in the market to address the problem caused by the use of 
various types of slip formats which will be analysed in this chapter.
Generally speaking, in cases where the underwriter initials the slip without adding 
conditions, the subscription amounts to an acceptance and a contract that is binding 
on both parties is established. However, when the underwriter subscribes the slip but 
puts some kind of qualification on it, will that subscription be an acceptance 
amounting to a contract between two parties at that point? These issues will be 
considered in light of contract law principles.
The most important clause which appears in most marine policies is a “leading 
underwriter” clause. The purpose of such clauses is to permit the broker and the 
leading underwriter to agree modifications to the terms of cover which will bind all 
the following underwriters without them being consulted. It can solve various 
possible difficulties arising out of the contract formation procedure. However, it also 
introduces some important legal questions such as: the legal nature of a leading 
underwriter clause, the power of the leading underwriter to vary or amend the terms 
of the insurance contract, the affect on the pre-contractual duty of utmost good faith, 
and the practical operation of the leading underwriter clause. All these issues will 
be debated in this chapter.
There is a common practice in the Lloyd’s market known as the signing down 
process. Under this practice, brokers will not necessarily close the slip upon 
obtaining 100 percent subscription. Rather the broker is entitled to continue 
collecting subscriptions with the end result that the cover reflected by the slip 
exceeds that which the broker has been authorized to obtain. However, by virtue of 
market custom, on the closure of the slip, each subscription is automatically subject 
to a pro rata reduction so that the aggregate of all subscriptions totals exactly 100 
percent. The reasons why ‘signing down’ exists and the manner it operates in practice 
will be considered.
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PART 2: the role of the broker during the formation stage of marine insurance
contracts.
At the formation stage, it is the broker who will prepare the slip on behalf of the 
prospective assured; it is the broker who will take the slip around the market 
searching for subscriptions and again it is the broker who will prepare the policy 
wording at the later stage. It is clear that, the broker plays a significant role in placing 
insurance at the Lloyds. This Chapter will focus mainly on legal issues about the 
duties, rights and liabilities of the broker.
An insurance broker is the agent of the principal who employs him to obtain a 
contract of insurance for a required term. Accordingly, this chapter will start by 
analysis the legal nature of the broker’s duty to his principal.
Where the duty is set out in specific contractual terms, the broker is under a duty to 
exercise his duties in accordance with contractual terms; where the duties of the 
broker have not been contractually agreed, the broker is under an obligation to take 
“reasonable care”. It is vital at this stage to evaluate what can reasonably be expected 
of the broker.
The broker owes duties to the insurer by virtue of the relevant statute. Generally 
speaking, there are two primary duties owed by brokers to the insurer, the first is the 
duty to pay the premium and the second is the duty of utmost good faith. The duty of 
utmost good faith owed by the broker to the insurer will be analyzed in detail under 
the headings of the duty of disclosure, the duty not to make misrepresentations. 
Recent attempt, to reform the law in this area will also be considered briefly..
There is of course the possibility that a broker may act in a dual capacity, as the agent
for both the assured and the underwriter. This may occur, for example, in the
context of reinsurance, where the broker places the reinsurance for the assured and
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accepts the risk on behalf of the underwriter under a “binding authority”. A binding 
authority is a contract between insurer and broker, which delegates some 
underwriting powers to the broker. By using a binder, the broker can obtain the cover 
in circumstances that reflect both the interest of the insurer and the assured.
The potential conflicts of interest that may arise through the operation of the binder 
system and the possible solutions to these conflicts will be discussed.
The main right of the broker is to claim his commission once the contract is made. 
Legal questions such as: who should pay the broker’s commission, when should he 
be paid, what happens if the contract is cancelled at a later stage, is the broker 
entitled to retain the commission, will be considered at this stage. It will also be 
important to analyse the liabilities of the broker when he is in breach of his duties to 
the principal, e.g. where he fails to obtain proper insurance or breaches his duty of 
disclosure under the duty of utmost good faith. Once the liabilities are considered, it 
will then be important to determine the nature of damages that can be claimed; for 
example whether the applicable damages are (1) the amount, which the assured could 
have been able to claim under the policy, if the policy provided the required cover, or
(2) the cost of finding alternative cover or (3) wasted costs. Of course, in some 
circumstances, the broker may be able to limit or exclude his liabilities and these 
possibilities will also be discussed. For instance, if the broker can prove that the 
damage was contributed to by the negligence of the assured, he can limit his liability 
and further, the broker can exclude his liability if he can prove that there exists an 
independent ground for the insurer to disclaim his liability.
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PART 3: The legal issues that arise after the marine insurance contract is
concluded.
Although the legal issues to be discussed here no doubt arise in the post-contractual 
stage, they can often be traced, nonetheless, to the processes involved at the 
formation stage.There are two important documents at the formation stage of the 
marine insurance contract, known as the “slip” and the “policy”. When there is a 
discrepancy between a slip and a policy, the question that arises is whether the policy 
supersedes the slip or the slip prevails over the policy. The first issue focused on in 
this chapter is the relationship between the slip and the policy. When there is 
discrepancy between the slip and policy, the answer to the question of which 
document supersedes the other depends on the parties’ intentions. Accordingly, the 
method of establishing what the parties’ intention actually is, becomes a key issue 
that needs to be analyzed in further detail.
Another issue to consider in this chapter is the role of held cover clauses. A “held 
covered clause” is a contractual term, under which the insurer’s liability will be 
expanded. The effect of a held covered clause is to extend the original policy cover. 
When the situation stated in the term occurs the assured remains covered provided 
any specified conditions are fulfilled, usually notification of the event by the assured 
to the insurer and agreement upon any appropriate additional premium and change of 
terms. The legal importance and significance of these clauses to post contractual 
issues, the nature of such clauses and the applications of the duty of utmost good 
faith under held covered clauses will be analysed in further detail.
In summary, this chapter will attempt to consider issues which relate to contract 
formation even though they might arise at a later stage.
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CHAPTER 2
FORMATION OF MARINE INSURANCE CONTRACTS:
A LEGAL ANALYSIS
INTRODUCTION
The processes involved in the formation of a marine insurance contract are different 
from the processes by which other types of contracts are formed. This Chapter 
commences analysis by comparing the formation of a typical marine insurance 
contract in the London market with the formation of a non-marine insurance contract.
The Lloyd’s broker plays a significant role during the formation stage of insurance 
contracts in the London market. He prepares the slip and takes it around the market 
seeking subscriptions. Then, underwriters, who wish to subscribe the risk, initial the 
slip. Once the broker obtains the desired level of subscriptions, the slip is closed. At 
this stage the insurance contract is concluded. The current Chapter will focus on 6 
important legal issues that arise during the formation stage of a marine insurance 
contract.
First, it is well established that once a slip has been fully subscribed, there is a 
binding contract of insurance between the assured and each underwriter who has 
initialed it. In practice, normally a slip is not subscribed by only one underwriter; it is 
partially subscribed by several underwriters. The legal status of a partially subscribed 
slip will be analysed in this chapter.
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Secondly, in cases where a reinsurance contract is formed before the original marine 
insurance contract, the question of when the contract of reinsurance comes to 
existence and the nature of the duty of utmost good faith at this stage requires further 
deliberation.
Thirdly, in the past, brokers used various slip formats for various types of risks 
causing interpretation difficulties and uncertainty. An attempt has been made in the 
market to address the problem caused by the use of various types of slip formats. The 
effect of this new practice needs to be considered in full.
Fourthly, during the process of formation of marine insurance contracts, the 
underwriter may put some kind of qualification on the slip when he subscribes it. 
This creates interesting legal disputes, for example, whether such a subscription 
amounts to an acceptance and creates a contract between the two parties. The issue 
will be further analysed in the light of principles emerging from the general contract 
law.
Fifthly, there will be a consideration of clauses which parties invariably insert into 
contracts with a view to clarifying their legal positions at formation stage. The most 
important clause of this nature is a “leading underwriter” clause. The purpose of such 
clauses is to permit the broker and the leading underwriter to agree modifications to 
the terms of the cover which will bind all the following underwriters without them 
being consulted. It can solve various possible difficulties arising out of the contract 
formation procedure. However, it also raises some questions in practice, which will 
be debated in this chapter.
At last, but not least, there is a common practice in Lloyd’s market known as the 
“signing down” process. The justification of the process and the manner it operates in 
practice will be discussed.
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2.1 THE FORMATION OF MARINE INSURANCE CONTRACTS 
COMPARED TO THE FORMATION OF NON-MARINE INSURANCE
CONTRACTS
2.1.1 Formation of a non-Marine Insurance Contract
A contract of insurance is a contract between an insurer and an assured. The 
relationship between the two parties is primarily a contractual relationship with the 
mutual obligations and rights of the parties defined in the terms of the contract. In 
law, the contract is complete when the offer, normally provided by the assured, is 
accepted by the other party, the insurer. The typical process of formation of such a 
contract is as follows:
A prospective assured who is looking for insurance cover from an insurer, will 
normally make a proposal, an offer, to the insurer. If the insurer accepts the offer, 
there will be a concluded insurance contract between the two parties. However, if the 
insurer is not willing to accept the offer, he may respond with policy terms which are 
not part of the offer. The response is considered as a counter-offer. The counter-offer 
is left to the prospective assured to accept or reject. If the prospective assured accepts 
the response, the insurance contract will be concluded. If the prospective assured 
rejects the insurer’s counter-offer and comes back with a further proposition, the 
assured makes a further counter-offer. The insurer may accept it or reject it, and so
j
on. In the case of CTI Inc v. Oceanus Mutual Underwriting Assn (Bermuda) Ltd, LJ 
Kerr stated that:8
“When the negotiations extend over a period, the principle is that the whole 
course of the negotiations must be considered in order to see whether or
7 [1984] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 476.
8 Ibi d, at p 505.
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not full agreement on all the material terms was reached at any stage, and if 
it is contended that this happened at a particular point, then the Court must 
also have regard to the subsequent events in order to determine whether or 
not this contention has been established.”
Accordingly, it may be said that the negotiation of an insurance contract will not 
continue indefinitely. Rather the court will look at the entirety of the negotiations to 
determine at which point a relevant agreement has been reached. If no agreement can 
be deemed to have taken place there is simply no contract to talk of.
2.1.2 Formation of Marine Insurance Contracts in the London 
Market
In the formation of marine insurance contracts in the London market, a proposed 
assured may not approach Lloyd’s underwriters directly, but must act through the 
medium of a broker9 who is normally recognized by Lloyd’s. The formation of 
insurance contracts at Lloyd’s typically takes the following course:
Placing insurance in the London market commences with an instruction from the
proposed assured who is seeking the insurance cover. The instruction is sent to the
Lloyd’s broker, who should first confirm the instructions to avoid later dispute.10
Once the instructions have been accepted and confirmed or clarified, the broker
should prepare a brief document, known as the slip.11 The slip is a document which
1 0must be in standard form for the Lloyd’s market and it sets out a brief and
9 The Institute o f  London Underwriters: An Introduction (The Institute of London Underwriters, 1987) puts it, 
“The London market is the part of the British insurance industry which specializes in covering major or complex 
risks- that is, almost exclusively, risks incurred by business and not by private consumers. It is characterized by 
the use of brokers, who are the commercial marketing arm of the industry and whose function is to seek out the 
best cover to answer their customers’ needs.”
10 The duty of brokers and Ihe corresponding issues will be further discussed in detail in Chapter 3.
11 A slip is one of two key documents for marine insurance. The other one is the policy. Issues regarding the 
relationship between these two documents will be further discussed in Chapter 4.
12 e.g. LMP slip and LMP BRAT slip. This will be further discussed below at p 44.
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abbreviated statement of the subject matter of the risk and the proposed insurance 
1conditions. This document contains all the particulars of the proposal, necessary to 
allow underwriters to make a decision whether or not the risk is acceptable and at 
what premium. Some standard terms may also be included in the slip, such as 
“leading underwriter clauses”.14 The slip forms the basis of any negotiations which 
may take place between the broker and the underwriter.
After preparing the slip the broker determines which underwriters are most likely to 
wish to subscribe to the risk, and submits the slip to them in turn. Then the 
underwriter, who wishes to participate in the insurance, will initial the slip, stating 
the percentage and the proportion of the risk he is prepared to underwrite. The above 
process is known as “scratching”. Once the broker has obtained the desired level of 
subscriptions, the slip is closed. A formal policy is frequently not prepared until 
some months later.
The point at which the contract of marine insurance is concluded is an issue that 
should be clarified in the first instance: is it concluded, at the time the subscription is 
finalised or at the time the policy is issued? The Marine Insurance Act 1906 draws a 
distinction between a contract and a policy of marine insurance. Section 21 of the 
MIA 1906 provides that "A contract of marine insurance is deemed to be concluded 
when the proposal of the assured is accepted by the insurer, whether the policy be 
then issued or not; " Accordingly, the marine insurance contract is concluded at the 
time of subscription, even if the policy is not issued. The policy remains of 
significance as section 22 of the MIA 1906 provides that a marine insurance contract 
is inadmissible in evidence unless embodied in a policy, and section 22 further
13 There is one issue should be noted regarding the abbreviated provisions in the slip. Various aspects of the 
proposed contract are abbreviated on the slip, but these should be in common use and capable only of one 
meaning if later dispute or liability of the broker for negligence are to be avoided. Any non-standard provision 
which the broker wishes to incorporate into the contract should be attached in full to the slip, but standard 
clauses or wordings need only be identified by title, number and date of issue, especially if the broker intends 
to use an old wording which may have been superseded.
14 This will be further discussed below at p 47.
19
provides that the policy “may be executed and issued either at the time when the 
contract is concluded, or afterwards.”
2.1.3 Some Other Differences between the Process of Formation 
of Marine Insurance Contracts and non-Marine Insurance Contract
2.1.3.1 Slip and Proposal Form
In the formation of non-marine insurance contracts, the form used to present a risk to 
the underwriter is known as a “proposal form”. “In US practice, the document used 
to proffer a wish to obtain insurance seems more usually to be named an application 
form where UK usage tends to be a proposal.”15 This document is completed by the 
person or body who is seeking insurance. While forming a marine insurance contract, 
the form used by the broker is known as a “slip”.
There are considerable differences between a slip and proposal from. First, the slip in 
its terms spells out the shape of the policy which underwriters will issue if the 
insurance proceeds, while, in the proposal, normally no undertaking as to the type of 
policy appears. Secondly, the slip is proffered by the broker on its own slip form 
while the proposer signs the proposal on a form prepared and printed by the insurer. 
Thirdly, until the policy is issued the slip constitutes a contract of insurance in its 
own right while the proposal constitutes an invitation to the insurer to make an 
offer.16
15 Gordon Shaw, The Lloyd's Broker (Lloyd’s of London Press Ltd. 1995) at p 71.
16 Ibi d, at p 88.
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2.1.3.2 Cover Note
In a non-marine insurance context, the proposal form will be considered by the 
insurer and further information may be required or terms imposed before any 
contract of insurance is concluded. This process might take time. Temporary 
insurance may, therefore, be issued to the assured in the form of a cover note. The 
cover note provides fully effective cover from the date of application, and is 
particularly useful in cases of compulsory insurance, such as motor insurance. The 
temporary cover will expire after a specific period, or when the policy is issued or 
cover refused, or when revoked. The policy will replace the cover note but only if the 
insurer wishes to contract; the date of the insurance will usually be retroactive to the 
inception of the insurance in the cover note, but the cover note will remain in force 
until the policy is issued so that any claim arising in the period prior to its issue will 
be determined according to the terms of the cover note.
However, in the marine insurance context, a broker’s cover note has no contractual 
effect and is no more than a representation by the broker that he has obtained cover 
on certain terms. If he has not, he will be liable to the assured. A cover note will only 
have contractual effect where the broker is authorized by the assured to find an 
insurer for the contract of insurance, in which case the cover note will be the contract 
of insurance, enforceable by the assured against the insurer.
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2.2 THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE SUBSCRIPTION
As discussed above, in the formation of insurance contracts in the London market, 
the Lloyd’s broker prepares the slip and takes the slip around the market seeking the 
subscription. Once the broker has obtained the desired level of subscriptions, the slip 
is closed. The insurance contract is concluded. It is well established, if there is only 
one underwriter who wishes to participate in the insurance and subscribes up to 100 
percent of the risk, there is a binding contract of insurance between the assured and 
that underwriter who has initialed it. Neither the assured nor the underwriter may 
resile from it.
However, the issue often becomes more complicated in practice than the above 
simple scenario suggests. In practice, a slip will normally be partially subscribed by 
several underwriters. The partially subscribed status can cause some difficulties. The 
following are some examples:
(1) The broker may obtain subscription for 50 per cent of the risk, and be unable to 
obtain any more;
(2) The broker may obtain subscriptions for 50 per cent of the risk, and then his 
client may decide that insurance is not required;
(3) The broker may obtain subscriptions for 100 per cent of the risk and then his 
client may decide that insurance is not required;
(4) The broker may obtain subscriptions for more than 100 per cent of the risk;
(5) Underwriters other than the leading underwriter may want to alter the terms of 
the slip;
(6) A loss giving rise to a claim arises after the partial, and before the complete, 
subscription of the slip.
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Accordingly, there are doubts as to the legal status of a partially subscribed slip and 
the following questions arise:
(1) When is the contract of marine insurance concluded, at the time the whole slip is 
closed or following each individual subscription?
(2) What will happen if the loss occurs after the partial subscription of the contract 
but before the full subscription?
(3) What is the contractual position after the slip has been partially subscribed and 
before it has been subscribed to the extent of 100 percent?
(4) Is there a binding contract between the assured and each underwriter when each 
participating line is written?
(5) If each line results in a binding contract does the assured nevertheless have an 
option to rescind such a contract?
In order to seek the answers to the above questions, it is important to discuss the 
significance of the subscription. The basic principles of offer-acceptance in contract 
law may be useful in the marine insurance context but the question that then needs to 
be considered is whether the subscription on the slip should be considered as an 
acceptance by the underwriter or an offer from  the underwriter. There are different 
views as follows:
2.2.1 The Traditional Rule
1 7In Ivamy's General Principles o f Insurance Law, the traditional rule was explained 
as follows,
• 152"The initialing of the 'slip' by the underwriter is the acceptance of the
17 Ivamy's Genera I Principles o f  Insurance Law, (2nd ed. 1970) at p 85.
18 Emphasis added
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assured's proposal. He thereby binds himself to sign a policy in accordance 
with the 'slip' when tendered to him for signature, and he cannot refuse to 
do so except on grounds which call into question the validity of the 
acceptance. The signing of a policy is, however, a mere formality; it may 
take place even after loss, and the underwriter cannot refuse to sign the 
policy on the ground that the broker failed to tender it within a reasonable 
time after the initialling of the 'slip'. The contract is complete upon the 
initialling of the 'slip', and, if there is no formal policy in existence, the 
underwriter may be sued upon the 'slip'. The 'slip' is not a mere honorary 
undertaking to issue a policy; it constitutes in itself a binding contract of 
insurance".
According to this traditional rule, the action of the broker to present the slip to the 
underwriter for signature should be considered as an offer and the action of the 
underwriter to initial the slip should be considered as an acceptance. The contract is 
concluded at the point when the subscription is completed.
2.2.2 Donaldson’s Approach
In Jaglom v. Excess Insurance Co. Ltd.19 the legal position on the time of formation 
of an insurance contract was considered and Mr. Justice Donaldson brought forward 
his new approach regarding the nature of subscription which is against the traditional 
rule.
Jaglom Case
In this case, J asked his insurance broker to obtain insurance for his wife's jewellery. 
The broker sent a "slip" to underwriters, who took "lines" on it. At various stages 
amendments were made by underwriters to the terms and conditions on the slip. 
After the slip had been fully subscribed, but before a policy had been drawn up, a 
loss occurred, and a dispute arose as to the terms of the contract of insurance, if any, 
in force at the moment of the loss. It was held that the true legal analysis of the slip
19 [1971] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 171.
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procedure was that each underwriter who agreed to take a line was making an offer 
on the terms of the slip as they were when he signed it, retaining the right to modify 
that offer to accord with different terms inserted by underwriters taking subsequent 
lines. Once the risk is fully subscribed a contract is formed on the terms of the slip in 
its final form.
Judgment
Mr. Justice Donaldson first stated the traditional rule in his judgment and then cited 
an example of the absurd situation which may occur following the traditional rule 
above. If there is only one underwriter, or just few of them had been prepared to 
make the subscription, and only 20 percent of the risk had been undertaken, the 
assured has to be compelled to accept a policy for only 20 percent, despite the fact 
that in the absence of 100 per cent cover, he might well wish to make different 
arrangements. Then Mr. Justice Donaldson gave the following judgment and 
provided his own point of view,20
“These absurd consequences leave me in no doubt that the underlying legal 
analysis is fallacious. The true analysis is that each underwriter who
agrees to take a line is making and not accepting an offer21 I think
that business efficacy requires that it be treated as an offer by the 
underwriters.”
According to Mr. Justice Donaldson’s approach, the subscription from the 
underwriter should be considered as an offer from the underwriter, but not an 
acceptance. If the view expressed by Donaldson J., should be applied in market 
practice there will be difficulties caused accordingly.
201 bid, at p 257.
21 Emphasis added.
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2.2.3 Difficulties caused by Mr. Justice Donaldson’s Approach
If the view of Donaldson J., is correct that in the initialling of the slip, an offer is 
made by the underwriter, in order to convert that offer into a contract there must be 
an acceptance from the assured, and a subsequent communication by the assured 
through the broker. However, in a case where no amendments were made and the 
slip was consequently not resubmitted to each underwriter, there would be no such 
communication at all. Indeed it is the usual course of practice at Lloyd's for no 
amendments to be made to the slip.
Another difficulty is that, according to the view of Donaldson J., the offer made by 
the insurer is one from which the insurer cannot, or would not, resile because to do 
so would be contrary to the understanding of the market at Lloyd's. But the rules of 
offer and acceptance do not permit the adoption of the solution proposed in the 
Jaglom case. This is the case because if the underwriter makes the offer to the 
assured by initialling the slip, like any other offeror, the underwriter should have the 
right to withdraw his offer, pending communication of acceptance from the assured's 
broker.
2.2.4 The Fennia’s Approach
Donaldson’s approach was firmly rejected both by Staughton. J., at first instance and 
by the Court of Appeal in General Reinsurance Corporation and Others v. 
Forsakeringsaktiebolaget Fennia Patria.
22 [1971] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 171.
23 [1982] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 87, and [1983] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 287.
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Fennia Case
Here the defendant, Fennia, was the marine insurer of a cargo of paper and board, 
and had reinsured its liability under two facultative policies; a whole account cover, 
providing all risks protection; and a specific account cover, providing protection only 
against fire and floor damage to the goods while warehoused. The precise 
relationship between these insurances had never been resolved, and on February 14, 
1997 Fennia instructed its brokers to effect an amendment to the specific cover 
reinsurance by virtue of which the excess under that policy was to be increased to 25 
million Finmarks. The result as between the policies was as follows: without the 
amendment, a loss of 27 million Finmarks would have been distributed, 15 million 
Finmarks to the specific loss reinsurers and 10 million Finmarks to the whole 
account reinsurers. With the amendment, a loss of 27 million Finmarks would have 
been distributed, 2 million Finmarks to the specific loss reinsurers and 20 million 
Finmarks to the whole account reinsurers.
The amendment slip prepared by Fennia’s brokers had been presented to the 
remainder. I It became clear that a serious loss had taken place on the night of 
February 11 to 12, 1977, at which point Fennia instructed its brokers to withdraw the 
amendment slip. The two specific loss reinsurers who had scratched the slip argued 
that they had entered into a binding amending agreement with the assured, so that the 
slip could not be withdrawn as against them. Fennia asserted that either they were not 
bound by the amendment slip until it had been initialled by all 28 of the reinsurers on 
the specific cover, or they had the right to cancel it until this had been done. The 
right to cancel is said to arise as an implied term, either to give business efficacy to 
the contract or by reason of the custom and practice of the London insurance market.
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The main issue to consider is whether the first plaintiffs were entitled to rely on the 
amendment slip, or whether Fennia by their brokers were entitled as of right to 
cancel it.24
Judgment
By holding that the subscription by the insurer was the acceptance, Staughton. J.,
0 crejected the Donaldson approach at first instance and stated that,
“Two propositions were in my judgment clear from the evidence, and I do 
not think that they were in dispute: first, that as soon as an underwriter 
has put his initials on a slip, he is bound by what he has subscribed. If 
a loss occurs the next day, he must pay. The second is that, in the 
event of over-subscription as in case (D) above, the broker is entitled to 
reduce proportionately the subscriptions of all, until they total no more
than 100 per cent With the greatest possible respect to those who hold
the contrary opinion, in the light of the evidence that the market considers 
underwriters bound and the difficulty of finding any later stage when the
oncontract can be said to be concluded, I hold it to be an acceptance. ”
This part of the judgment was approved in the Court of Appeal. Lord Justice Kerr 
stated that28
“I am in no doubt that Mr. Justice Staughton was right in the present case in 
concluding, that the orthodox understanding of the position is correct, viz.
24 [ 1982] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 92 at p 93, “This particular dispute concerns a risk placed on the non-marine market, 
with companies as opposed to Lloyd's underwriters, for reinsurance rather than direct insurance. However it was 
not suggested that there was a material distinction, in any of those three respects, between this case and others 
that might arise. The authorities which I was referred to, and the evidence which I heard of custom and practice, 
would not support any such distinction, save in one or two minor respects which I shall specifically mention.”
25 Ibi d, at p 97.
26 Emphasis added.
27 Emphasis added.
28 [1983] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 287 at p 290.
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the presentation of the slip by the broker constitutes the offer, and the 
writing of each line constitutes an acceptance of this offer by the 
underwriter pro tanto29
But Staughton. J., held in the first instance that when an original slip is going round 
the market and is not yet subscribed for 100 percent, there can be some instances that 
exist where the contract can be varied unilaterally on behalf of the assured. Those 
underwriters who have subscribed may require time-on-risk premium if the cover has 
already commenced. The reason for the above judgment is the existence of the 
signing down process. The signing down process was stated to be one instance of 
when the contract must be capable of being varied. The variation exists by reason of 
custom and practice and reflects the need for business efficacy. The judge also 
believed that that this would be the reasonable solution to the absurd situation stated 
by Mr. Justice Donaldson in Jaglom31 case that “the assured could be compelled to 
accept insurance for 20 per cent of the risk only when he was unable to obtain any 
more cover.”
However, the Court of Appeal rejected the notion that there could be instances where 
the contract can be varied unilaterally on behalf of the assured. According to Lord 
Justice Kerr,32
“With the greatest respect to Mr. Justice Staughton, I cannot begin to accept 
that any of this evidence goes anywhere near to establish a binding custom 
entitling an insured or reinsured, as of right and at his unfettered opinion, 
to cancel the contract resulting from the writing of a line which - as
everyone agreed - is immediately binding on the underwriter For these
reasons I am left in no doubt that this appeal must be allowed and that 
Fennia's counterclaim for payment on the basis of the original unamended
29 Emphasis added
30 This process will be further discussed below at p 58.
31 [1971] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 171.
32 [1983] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 287 at p 295.
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slip must be dismissed. They had no right to require cancellation of the line 
written by Mr. Hollis on the endorsement slip.”
As a result of the above discussion and the Court of Appeal decision in Fennia case , 
answers to the various possible questions raised at the beginning of this part can be 
given in the following manner:
a. Each subscription constitutes an individual contract
Are the obligations under the slip enforceable against individual underwriters, or 
must such enforcement be collective? The House of Lords held in Fennia,34 that a 
slip and the subsequent policy constitute a bundle of individual contracts. A further 
consequence of the binding nature of a slip is the principle that each subscribing 
underwriter accepts individual, rather than collective, obligations to the assured. 
Therefore, where a slip is subscribed by more than one underwriter, there is 
established a distinct and separate contract with each underwriter. There is no 
interrelationship between the various contracts. Each underwriter is severally liable 
and there exists no joint or joint and several liabilities.
i
33 What is going to be the possible solution to the absurd situation referred to by Mr. Justice Donaldson (that 
“the assured could be compelled to accept insurance for 20 per cent of the risk only when he was unable to 
obtain any more cover.”) The Court of Appeal proposed solution is not the only one. Actually there are two 
alternative possible way to resolve it, the first of which is the “quotation slip”. Where a broker wishes to test 
the market, it is always open to him to circulate a “quotation slip”, which makes it plain that he is merely 
seeking a quotation rather than a contract, so that he can then decide whether or not to proceed by means of an 
unqualified slip on the same or different terms. After using the quotation slip, the assured can reduce the 
chances to make himself fall into the above absurd situation. Secondly, there is no doubt that such situations 
would in practice be readily resolved by the agreement of both parties, possibly subject to any “time on risk” 
premium which may be due, if and when requests for cancellation are made.
34 [1982] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 87.
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b. Both the assured and the underwriter are bound to each subscription before 
full subscription.
The assured has no right of cancellation before full subscription. Each signature 
gives rise to a distinct binding contract between each underwriter and assured, which 
can subsequently be cancelled only by the agreement of both parties. So the 
underwriter who has initialed the slip is bound to the assured before the slip has been 
fully subscribed in the event of a loss taking place prior to full subscription. And the 
assured is not permitted to change his mind and withdraw the slip after some 
underwriters have initialed it but before full subscription.
c. The assured cannot resile from the contract where the slip has been fully 
subscribed.
The broker may obtain subscriptions for 100 per cent of the risk and then his client 
may decide that insurance is not required. Where the slip has been fully subscribed 
and the assured subsequently decides that he wishes to resile from the insurance, he 
has no entitlement to do so in law, except that the insurer agrees to cancel. According 
to Staughton, J., “They may require time-on-risk premium if the slip has commenced; 
and they may agree more readily if the assured can point to some change in 
circumstances or other good reason for his wish to cancel.” But the assured has no 
right either of market practice or implied term so to do.
d. The underwriter is liable for the loss prior to full subscription
Where the loss occurs prior to the broker having obtained full subscription to the slip
35 The Fe nnia [1982] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 87 at p 89.
36 The Fe nnia [1983] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 287 at pp 295-297.
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the underwriter is liable for his stated proportion of the total amount on the basis of 
the principle that an underwriter is bound by his initialing of a slip.
e. Each underwriter may be bound to the assured on different terms
The following situation might occur: after the slip has been subscribed by some 
underwriters and it comes to a particular underwriter, it may unacceptable to that 
underwriter in the absence of some alterations. If there are alterations in the slip, can 
those amendments operate to the benefit of such underwriters who have previously 
initialed the slip? The Court of Appeal, in Fennia?1 did not give full consideration to 
the problem of alterations to the slip. The general tenor of the judgment in that it 
regards a scratched slip as a binding agreement between each underwriter and 
assured would nevertheless indicate that unilateral variations are not possible, so that 
the position is indeed that each underwriter may be bound to the assured on different 
terms. If the slip is unacceptable to particular underwriters and alterations to it are 
made, these amendments do not, it seems, benefit such underwriters who have 
previously initialed the slip.
37 Ibid.
32
2.3 COUNTEROFFER
The legal analysis carried out at the beginning of the chapter is based on the 
assumption that the underwriters initial the slip without adding new conditions. 
However, this is not always the case in practice. Accordingly, the consequences of 
adding conditions to the slip need to be considered. In the straightforward situation 
the subscription amounts to an acceptance and establishes a contract that is binding 
on both parties. However, when the underwriter subscribes the slip and puts some 
kind of qualification on it, will that subscription be an acceptance and will there be a 
concluded contract between the two parties at that point?
Most contracts of insurance are contracts between the underwriter and the assured. In 
law, their contract is made when the offer normally provided by the assured is 
accepted by the other party, the insurer. However, if the underwriter is not willing to 
accept the offer, he may respond with a counter-offer, which may then be accepted by 
the assured. And, further, the assured may meet the counter-offer with a further offer 
of his own, for acceptance by the underwriter. This process continues until the 
counter-offer of one or other is finally accepted or rejected.
Where the assured has made an offer to the underwriter, the response of the 
underwriter may be considered a positive one in two situations; either where the 
underwriter accepts the offer or where a counter offer is made. If the terms of 
“acceptance” differ from the terms of the offer, it may be considered as a counter 
offer, but it may not in some circumstance. Whether or not there is a counter offer 
depends on the answer to the question whether there is any real inconsistency 
between the offer and the “acceptance”.
When there is no real inconsistency, the difference between the offer and the 
“acceptance” will not cause a counter offer and such “acceptance” brings the contract
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into existence. For example, in Coheeney v Westgate Ins Co Ltd, an insurer 
responded to a proposal of liability insurance for a sole trader with a standard policy 
which was wide enough to cover persons in his employment. Here there was no real 
inconsistency; the wider cover was “surplus to requirements”, was clearly in excess 
of the cover that the proposer had paid for, and was ignored. If there is real 
inconsistency, the “acceptance” is not a real acceptance in law, it is a counter offer. 
But the situation will be a little different, when the insurer only makes a tentative 
move to see if the assured who provides the offer can accept the difference. If the 
assured rejects the difference, the insurer will withdraw it and accept the original 
offer. There is no counter offer in this situation.
A counter offer is normally exemplified by the situation in which a condition is 
imposed by the insurer on binding acceptance. The conditional acceptance is a 
counter offer; the “acceptance” can be regarded as conditional in the sense that it 
contains terms not found in the offer. Here there is real inconsistency, the 
“acceptance” does not correspond with the offer. In Canning v Farquhar, 
Canning’s proposal was “accepted” by the insurer but with a clause not found in the 
offer, that “No assurance can take place until the first premium is paid”. Canning 
died and his agent tendered the premium to the insurer. The Court of Appeal held that 
there was no contract. Lindley LJ said:40
“It is true that there has been an acceptance of Canning’s offer, but he had 
not at this time assented to the company’s terms; and until he had assented 
there was no contract binding the company. The company’s acceptance of 
Canning’s offer was not a contract but a counter offer.”
There is one important issue that needs to be discussed in more detail, regarding the 
offer, acceptance and counter offer, which is whether silence can constitute
38 High Court, 1989 unreported.
39 (1886) 16 QBD 727.
401 bid, at p 733
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acceptance.
Generally speaking, when the insurer actually accepts the assured’s offer, it is 
necessary to request notification of the fact that there is an acceptance. There will be 
no question when positive notification is given. However, difficulties arise when 
there is no such kind of positive notification. Whether silence can constitute 
acceptance is of particular significance in the insurance context, for there may be 
cases in which the insurer, having received a proposal, either fails to act on it or 
neglects to notify the assured of a decision to accept it.
General contractual principle dictates that mere silence by the insurer cannot amount 
to acceptance.41 To be acceptance of an offer, conduct must be positive: silence, 
generally, is not normally sufficient. However, there are several exceptional 
situations in which the silence will be considered as acceptance. The first one is 
when there is a previous agreement that silence shall be regarded as consent; here 
silence does amount to acceptance. In a further example of silence being adequate to 
constitute acceptance, it is unlikely that an insurer who sits upon a proposal for an 
inordinate length of time will be estopped from denying the existence of an 
agreement.42 Furth ermore, it may be that silence will amount to acceptance where 
the insurer has imposed upon himself an obligation to notify the assured within a 
given period in the event of the proposal being rejected: in such a case, silence as a 
method of acceptance is normally accepted.
In New Hampshire Insurance Co v MGN Ltd,43 a slip for fidelity insurance was 
agreed between insurers and brokers acting for the assured, and subsequently a 
policy differing in material respects from the slip was tendered. As the terms of that
41 Felth ouse v Bindley (1862) 11 CBNS 869.
42 Rust v Abbey Life Assurance Co. [1979] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 334.
43 [1997] LRLR 24.
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policy had not been agreed at an earlier stage, the policy was classified as a 
counter-offer, and the only question was whether the counter-offer had been accepted 
by the assured by failing to object to the differences between the policy and the slip. 
The Court of Appeal, recognized that the general rule that silence does not constitute 
acceptance no longer had the same sanctity as in the nineteenth century, and that a 
party could agree that his silence should be assent Nonetheless it held that in the 
present case there was no such agreement as there had not been any requirement for a 
policy to be issued to replace the slip, and, in any event, a court was to proceed with 
some caution before giving too large a licence to one party to a proposed contract to 
thrust terms on the other without his explicit approval. The counter-offer in this case 
was not, therefore, to be regarded as having been accepted.
2.4 REINSURANCE
According to the Fennia approach discussed above, the rules of offer and acceptance 
in general contract law should be applied in the formation of marine insurance 
contracts in the following manner: the contract commences with the broker taking 
the slip around the market seeking signatures; this should be considered as an offer 
from the broker on behalf of the prospective assured. Once the underwriter who 
wishes to participate in the cover scratches on that slip, the insurance contract 
between the assured and that particular underwriter is concluded. So the subscription 
by the underwriter should be considered as an acceptance to the offer. However, 
when a reinsurance contract is formed, the analysis of the above rules of offer and 
acceptance could be quite different particularly where the reinsurance contract is 
formed before the original insurance contract. Accordingly, it is important to analyse 
the legal issue again from the perspective of reinsurance contracts.
There are two primary scenarios:
In the first scenario the reinsurance is formed after the insurance contact is concluded.
Under such circumstances, the underwriter for the original insurance contract will 
ask his broker to present a slip to the reinsurer for signature. After the reinsurer 
initials the slip, the contract is concluded. Unless the slip is qualified or is expressly 
circulated to obtain a quotation, it then contains the contract of reinsurance in the 
same way as original insurance does. In this case the reinsurance contract is formed 
by a conventional offer and acceptance in correspondence. The broker who acts for 
the reinsured will present slip to the reinsurer and this action should be considered as 
an offer. The reinsurance contract is formed by the reinsurer initialing that slip and 
the reinsurer’s action should be considered as an acceptance.
However, the procedure is more complicated where the reinsurance is formed in the 
manner envisaged by the second scenario i.e. before the original insurance contract is 
concluded. One example of how this may occur is where the underwriter for the 
original insurance has subscribed to a “line slip”. Line slips are a facility whereby a 
group of underwriters give a leading underwriter authority to accept proposals for 
insurance of risks within a defined class on their behalf. These underwriters will 
obtain reinsurance in advance against their liability on insurances to be concluded on 
their behalf by the leading underwriter. The reinsurance slip may be initialed before 
conclusion of the primary insurance contract, so that by the time when the reinsurer 
signs on the slip, he may not know who will be the reinsured.
The question raised under this circumstance is again when the contact of reinsurance 
is concluded. Should the signature of the reinsurer on the slip still be considered as 
an acceptance? If so, the broker’s slip will be considered as an offer to the reinsurer 
and the contract of reinsurance is concluded at the time the reinsurer signs the slip. 
However, the difficult question is “who will be the offeror in the above case”.
Another issue regarding the second scenario under the reinsurance contract is about
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the duty of disclosure.44 The duty to act with the utmost good faith applies to 
reinsurance contacts because a reinsurance contract is still by its nature a contact of 
insurance. The duties of the reinsured to the reinsurer ought to be measured by the 
same standard expected of the original assured. Accordingly the duty of disclosure in 
reinsurance is the same as in primary insurance; the reinsured must disclose to the 
reinsurer all facts known, or deemed in law to be known, to him and which are not 
known or deemed to be known to the reinsurer, which are material to the risk in the 
sense that the prudent reinsurer would take them into account when deciding whether 
or not to take the risk and what to charge for it. According to sections 17, 18 and 19 
of the MIA 1906, the duty of disclosure comes to an end before the insurance 
contract is concluded.
Obviously, under the first scenario when the reinsurance contract is concluded after 
the original insurance, the duty of disclosure on the broker and reinsured comes to an 
end when the reinsurer signs on the reinsurance slip. However, under the second 
scenario when the reinsurance is formed before the original insurance contract, the 
question about when the duty discussed above should be exhausted need some 
further analysis.
In the case of Bonner v. Cox45 the question of the duty of utmost good faith owed by 
a reinsured when the reinsurance is made in advanced of insurance was considered.
Bonner: relevant facts
The Claimants are all Lloyd's Syndicates [Nos. 535, 62, 187 & 228] whose business 
included writing risks in the energy market. The defendants are reinsurers - Cox 
Syndicate, Euclidian, Lloyd's Syndicate No. 1688, Tryg and the insurance broker
44 The duty of utmost good faith will be further discussed below at p 81.
45 [2005] Lloyd's Rep IR 569.
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AON.
The Claimants and Euclidian jointly participated in an Open Cover-77 Cover which 
was not itself a contract of insurance but rather a standing offer by the subscribing 
Cover Underwriters to be bound to risks accepted by the leader, 535, within the 
terms of the Cover. Prior to 1999, the year of the 77 Cover, the Cover Underwriters 
arranged their own reinsurance. For about two years prior to 1999 both the insurance 
and reinsurance markets in the energy field were weakening. In order to facilitate 
their brokering task, AON decided that they would seek reinsurance for the Cover 
which could then be offered to those insurers who were prepared to subscribe to the 
77 Cover for 1999.
The terms of the reinsurance were set out in a slip, and were finalized on 23 
November 1998 when 1688 wrote a 50 per cent line and scratched the slip. On 7 
December 1998 Tryg (fronted by Euclidian) scratched for the remaining 50%.
When Aon approached the Cover underwriters at the beginning of December 1998 to 
invite them to renew their participation in the Cover for the 1999 year, Aon was 
armed with 1688's offer of reinsurance. The dates on which the various underwriters 
agreed to participate on the Cover for 1999 and purchase the reinsurance were as 
follows:
(i) On 3 December 1998, 535 scratched an endorsement to the Cover renewing 535's 
50 per cent leading line on the Cover for 1999.
(ii) Also on 3 December 1998, Syndicate 62 agreed to renew their 25 per cent line on 
the Cover for 1999, and at the same time accepted the reinsurance offered by 1688
(iii) Syndicates 187 and 228 each agreed to renew their lines (for 8.34 per cent and
6.66 per cent respectively) on the Cover and to purchase the reinsurance offered by 
1688 either on Friday 4 December or on Monday 7 December 1998
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On 23 November 1998 there was a well blow-out (Elk-Point loss) the risk of which 
was covered by the 77 Cover. The insurance cover was limited to US$20 million on 
any one accident or occurrence in excess of US$5 million.
AON became aware of this on 1 December 1998, having received newspaper 
cuttings from the US. On 8 December AON received a preliminary report from loss 
adjusters suggesting a reserve of US$10m, although by 11 December AON had 
become aware that the loss could potentially reach US$20m.
The basic issue in the present case was whether the Elk Point loss ought to have been 
disclosed to the reinsurer by AON.
Judgment
\ It is common ground between the parties that
I (1) the duty of utmost good faith owed by a broker on behalf of his client ends when
| the contract of insurance has been made; (2) the Elk point loss was a material fact
> which the brokers on behalf of the Cover Underwriters were under a duty to disclose
once they became aware of it;
However, there were a few difficult questions raised in this case.
First, when was the contract of reinsurance concluded?
Second, when did the brokers become aware of the Elk Point loss so that they were 
under a duty to disclose the facts about it to the prospective reinsurers-was it as from 
1 December or 8 December?
I
i
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If we look at the second question first, the answer can be found from the Judgment as 
follows: 46
“In my judgment, as at 8 December AON were aware of a loss which 
was material to be disclosed to any prospective Cover Underwriter or 
Reinsurer. I reject the submission that AON had that knowledge as 
from 1 December 1998. At that date there were simply two newspaper 
cuttings and although there may have been telephone calls there was 
nothing sufficiently concrete to ‘go on’ to require disclosure in the 
context of a broker. Until there was some hard factual material, such as 
a loss adjuster's report and estimate, whether the insurance written to 
the Cover for the 1998 year was going to be hit was unknown. The 
un-contradicted evidence of Mr Outhwaite and Mr Holmes was clear 
on this point and I unhesitatingly accept it.”
Accordingly, Morison J held that AON had acquired the relevant knowledge of the 
Elk Point loss on 8 December 1998, the earlier information being too anecdotal and 
imprecise to amount to specific knowledge.
This meant that if Syndicate 1688 had become bound to the reinsurance before 8 
December 1998 the duty of disclosure had come to an end and there would be no 
right to avoid. The first question about when the contract of reinsurance was 
concluded should be considered next.
During the original insurance contact formation, the broker’s slip will be considered 
as an offer and the underwriter’s signature on the slip will be taken as the acceptance. 
Can the signature of the reinsurer on the slip be also considered as an acceptance at 
this point?
The essential issue here was exactly what the legal consequences had been of the 
scratching of the slip by Syndicate 1688 on 23 November 1998.
The analysis of Hobhouse J in The Zephyr47 is applicable here.
46 Ibi d, at para 88.
47 [1984] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 58.
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In this case, the broker obtained reinsurance cover before the underlying insurance 
had been placed. With the assistance of the reinsurance slip signed by the reinsurer, 
the broker obtained insurance cover. The Court held, amongst other things, that the 
broker was acting throughout on behalf of the assured; that a binding contract 
between insurer and reinsurer was concluded even though the insurers' acceptance of 
the reinsurance was not communicated to the reinsurer; the fact that at the time when 
the reinsurer signed the slip the identity of the reinsured was not known did not affect
i • • 48the position.
In market practice, it is frequently the case that, a broker will try and get a promise of 
reinsurance before attempting to place the original insurance. The fact that 
reinsurance is available is likely to make a material difference to the underwriter’s 
decision whether or not to undertake the risks.
This practice was described by Mustill LJ as he then was in The Zephyr49 as follows,
“ ... a practice has developed whereby a broker instructed to obtain a 
primary cover will on his own initiative approach potential reinsurers to 
obtain from them in advance a binding promise to provide reinsurance for 
whatever person may subsequently write a line on the primary cover and 
desire to reinsure the whole or part of that line. The reinsurer conveys this 
promise by initialling a percentage line on a slip, which identifies the 
subject-matter, the nature of the risk and the value. The slip does not, 
however, identify the reassured and could not do so: for at the stage when 
the potential reinsurer is approached, it is not known whether the primary 
insurance will ever be written at all, and if so by whom; or whether any of 
the primary insurers will desire to effect reinsurance; or whether any insurer 
who does desire to reinsure will be willing to do so with the reinsurer whom 
the broker has approached, and on the terms which he has offered. With this 
promise “at large” in his pocket, the broker can offer to an underwriter a
48 The analysis that reinsurance placed in advance of insurance takes effect as a standing offer of the type
recognised in Carlill v Carbolic Smoke Ball [1893] 1 QB 256, so that as soon as an insurer agreed to accept the 
underlying risk, then a contract of insurance with that insurer — even though not identified at the time of the 
offer —  would come into existence.
49 [1985] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 529 at p 532.
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package consisting of the opportunity to take a line on the primary cover, 
and at the same time to place an order for reinsurance.”
In The Zephyr consideration was given to the question as to when a binding contract 
of reinsurance came into existence. The Court of Appeal noted not simply that 
market practice could indicate when a binding promise occurred, but that on a strict 
contractual analysis in law there was a binding contract once the reinsurance had 
been accepted, and even without communication of that acceptance to the reinsurers. 
This was the analysis that Morison J adopted in the Bonner case. He held that once 
the reinsurer had scratched the slip offering the reinsurance there was an open offer 
capable of acceptance simply by the offeree renewing the Cover for the year 1999.
Thus, the slip signed by 1688 on 23 November 1998 was an offer addressed to Cover 
Underwriters. The duty of disclosure only existed during the period up to the 
conclusion of the binding contract of insurance or reinsurance. Once concluded there 
is no such further duty. So, the outstanding question was the date on which the 
insuring syndicates had accepted the reinsurance, as the duty of disclosure came to 
an end at that point. Morison J was satisfied that most of the acceptances were in 
place before 8 December 1998, so that there had been no breach of any duty of 
disclosure.
Accordingly, it should be concluded as follows:
When the reinsurance is placed after the original insurance, the broker who presents 
the reinsurance slip to the reinsurer will be the offeror just like in the original 
insurance contract formation stage. The reinsurer who wants to take the risk will 
sign on the slip and his signature will be construed as an acceptance of the offer. The 
duty of disclosure will come to the end when the reinsurer signs on the slip.
However, when the reinsurance is placed before the original insurance, the offer and 
acceptance rule operates in a different manner and the duty of disclosure will not 
come to an end when the reinsurer signs on the slip. Because the signature of the
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reinsurer on the slip is considered to be the offer of reinsurance, the contract of 
reinsurance is concluded when the reinsured accepts this offer. Accordingly, the duty 
of disclosure can only be exhausted when the reinsured signs on the slip.
2.5 THE REGULATORY ASPECTS OF THE SLIP SYSTEM AT LLOYD’S
As examined above, the slip plays a significant role at the formation stage of 
insurance contracts at the London market. It is the basis of the contract of insurance 
negotiated between the underwriter and the broker and it documents the intentions of 
the parties to the contract. However, in the past, when the broker prepared the slips, 
they could use different formats and there was no restriction on the format to be 
preferred. Those various formats were frequently unclear and open to 
misinterpretation. Since the policy is normally drafted on slip wording, the above 
situation could effect on the efficiency of policy preparation and signing and it could 
also cause delay and errors. Accordingly, there was a need for a standard slip format 
to resolve these difficulties.
2.5.1 Lloyd’s Standard Slip
The Standard Slip was first introduced into the Market in March 1970. From 
September 1971 it became mandatory for all slips submitted to LPSO (London 
Policy Signing Office) for signing purposes to be in the standard slip format. At that 
time, the relevant page in the Lloyd’s Policy Signing etc Manual read as follows:
“2.2 Types of Standard slip
The following slips should be used for the particular class of business
(A) Non-treaty Standard Slip
This is to be used for all business both direct and reinsurance other than 
treaty scheme and excess of loss reinsurance business.
(B) Treaty Standard Slip
This is to be used for all treaty and excess of loss reinsurance business, ie
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other than facultative reinsurance. It is an adaptation of the non-treaty 
Standard Slip and basically follows the Standard Slip format but with 
different sub-headings for placing detail... In recognition of the difficulty of 
producing the above Standard Slips by modern methods, the option of 
producing Standard Slips in each of the above instances, based upon A4 size 
stationery, is available to Brokers...
NB Where the term ‘Standard Slip’ is used in this chapter it refers to the 
non-treaty and treaty Standard Slips. The term “Standard A4 Slip” is used 
when referring to the Standard Slips based on A4 size stationery.
2.3 Format of the Standard Slip
Each has a standard format which must be followed exactly by Brokers 
in preparing the layout of their slip.”
2.5.2 LMP Slip
The LMP (London Market Principles) slip was introduced in October 2001 and was 
first registered in Feb 2002. Now it accounts for the majority of slips placed in the 
London market.
The “London Market Principle 2001” emerged from a review by Lloyds of its 
procedures. “LMP 2001” represented a rationalization of these procedures with the 
aim of allowing Lloyds to maintain its market position. The reforms to the market 
systems were intended to allow for,
(1) clarity in contractual terms leading to certainty of coverage and fewer disputes
(2) faster premium payments
(3) earlier production of insurance documentation,
(4) streamlining the scheme for claims into one structure
(5) faster claims processing and settlement
(6) streamlining the way in which changes to contracts are handled
(7) improving processing by synchronizing it with international practice.50
Among the benefits to the market of mandating the LMP slip are first, the 
standardized LMP Slip format does improve clarity and sets out the post placing
50 Christopher Henley, The Law o f Insurance Broking (2nd edn Sweet & Maxwell 2004) p 425.
administration and processing requirements; secondly, the LMP Slip format enables 
improvement of client service and reduces the cost of processing in London; finally 
the use of the LMP slip is an important step in improving contractual certainty and in 
documenting contractual terms. This is important for processing efficiency.
2.5.3 LMP BRAT Slip
Recently, at the start of 2004 Lloyd's has released its first report on slip quality since 
mandating the use of the LMP (London Market Principles) slip. In light of this 
experience brokers and underwriters have agreed to an enhanced LMP slip referred 
to as the LMP BRAT (Broker reform Action) Slip. The Lloyd’s Franchise Board has 
agreed that the LMP BRAT Slip will be mandatory for all slips from 2nd January 
2004.
LMP slips must contain four sections entitled as Risk Details; Subscription 
Agreement; Information; Fiscal and Regulatory.
One of the key aims of the LMP programme is to ensure certainty at inception so that 
the LMP BRAT slips do not include any TBA (or "to be agreed") provisions that do 
not indicate the appropriate action to be taken by whom and by a specific date or 
which are ambiguous. The other of the main aims of the LMP reforms and the BRAT 
slip is faster premium payment, ensuring monies are paid to underwriters earlier and 
within the agreed terms. Because the slip includes payment terms and brokerage, 
there is room for stipulating particular terms on which the premium payments must 
be made and for determining who should settle them.51
51 Tim Goodger “Avoiding the traps i f  brokers go bust” [21 Jan 2004] Insurance Day
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2.6 LEADING UNDERWRITER CLAUSE
According to Fennia’s52 approach, a binding contract is concluded at the moment 
that the underwriter makes the subscription on the slip which is submitted to him by 
the broker on behalf of the assured. However, in order to satisfy the demands or 
needs of a subsequent underwriter, there are occasions when a slip is amended after 
being initialled by one underwriter. Such cases may happen when the subsequent 
underwriters insist on different terms to which the broker may agree, albeit 
reluctantly, or when there may be some other intervening event, such as a change of 
circumstances or a change of mind by the insured, or when the broker is not able to 
procure completion of the slip up to 100 percent on any terms which are acceptable 
to him. Accordingly it may happen that different underwriters will have become 
bound on different terms. The position was acknowledged by Mr. Shaw in his 
evidence: “market practice abhors a slip on different terms; it is possible, but daft.”
“A slip on different terms” may cause some considerable difficulties. Here are some 
instances. First, when the policy is prepared, it would have to show which 
underwriters were bound by which terms and this can be a difficult process itself. 
Secondly, claims and recoveries might require different accounting treatments for 
different underwriters. Thirdly, it has to be accepted that cases could arise where 
some underwriters could be liable and some might not under such a system. Where 
the brokers had not re-submitted the slip to those underwriters who had initialled the 
slip before amendments to the terms were inserted, it is likely that such underwriters 
would alone be liable for those claims excluded by the terms imposed by following 
underwriters.54
52 [1983] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 287
53 Ibi d, at p 289.
54 Cockerell and S haw, Insurance Broking and Agency, The Law and the Practice (London : Witherby, 1979) at p 
124.
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However, in practice, the problem will rarely arise because the underwriters do not 
take an equal role in the negotiating process. The above various possible difficulties 
arising out of the contract formation procedure and the prospect of different contracts 
are rendered unlikely by the use of “leading underwriter clauses”.55
A “leading underwriter” clause is the most important device used in Lloyd’s market 
to ensure that the obligations of all subscribing underwriters are concurrent.
In practice the market is happy to follow the judgment of leading underwriters on the 
terms of cover and also as to any renegotiation of terms that may become necessary. 
There is no standard wording for this type of clause but the general purpose is to 
permit the leading underwriter to agree amendments to the slip and thereby to bind 
the following market.56 The purpose of such clauses is to permit the broker and the 
leading underwriter to agree modifications to the terms of the cover which will bind 
all following underwriters without their being consulted. The leading underwriter is 
often the first subscribing underwriter, and it is irrelevant that that underwriter had 
taken only a small part of the risk in comparison to underwriters in the following 
market.
55 An alternative solutio n to the difficulties arising out of the contract formation procedure is line slips.
A line slip is more or less an authority conferred upon one syndicate by a number of other syndicates, 
authorizing that syndicate to accept risks of a specified description and up to a specified amount on their 
behalves. Accordingly, by approaching a single syndicate, a broker may be able to obtain a substantial 
proportion of the necessary placement without the need to approach individual subscribing underwriters. Line 
slips are the agreement between the underwriters, so, the syndicate which is pointed out by the others is only 
the agent of the other syndicates. The terms of the line slips only bind the syndicates, not the assured, for the 
assured is not a party to the line slips. This was made clear by the House of Lords in Touche Ross v Baker, 
[1192] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 207, in which line slips, arranged by brokers, authorized the leading underwriter to issue 
liability policies on behalf of himself and the subscribers to the line slip. The House of Lords ruled that the line 
slips, not being any form of agreement between the assured and the underwriters, were not admissible as 
evidence as to the meaning of the policies issued under these arrangements.
56 The following is a typical leading underwriter clause: “All alterations, additions, deletions, extensions, 
agreements, rates and charges in conditions to be agreed by the leading Lloyd’s Underwriter. Such agreement to 
be binding on all underwriters subscribing hereon”
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2.6.1 Nature of a Leading Underwriter Clause
From the above statement, the general effect of a leading underwriter clause in the 
slip is to require each subscribing underwriter to delegate decision making to the 
leading underwriter in respect of the matters falling within the scope of the clause. It 
is important to analyse the nature of such a clause and in particular to discuss the 
relationship between the leading underwriter and the following market.
The issues surrounding leading underwriter clauses were considered by Andrew 
Smith J in Unum Life Insurance Co o f America v Israel Phoenix Assurance Co Ltd.51
Unum v. Israel Facts
Reinsurer, Unum was the claimant who had subscribed to a reinsurance slip with the 
defendant, Israel Phoenix. The reinsurance slip was circulated in 1995, stating that 
the wording was to be agreed by the leading underwriter only. Liberty was the first 
company to sign the slip, and signed an endorsement in September 1998. On 5 
December 2000, Liberty agreed a provision for arbitration. The claimant brought a 
claim against the defendant for declarations that he had on 19 July 2000 validly 
avoided contracts of this quota share reinsurance of personal accident business for 
the reason of the defendant was in breaches of the duty of utmost good faith.
The defendant argued that Liberty was the leading underwriter and had agreed to 
arbitration on behalf of all of the subscribing reinsurers, including the claimant, so 
the proceedings should be stayed in accordance with the arbitration clause, under 
section 9 of the Arbitration Act 1996. The claimants argued that the Liberty was not 
the leading underwriter, and that even if it was, it had not entered the arbitration 
agreement on behalf of the following market.
57 [2002] Lloyd’s Rep IR 374.
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Judgement
Andrew Smith J held that,58
“...the provision of the slip is not, in my view, wide enough for this to be 
the effect of an arbitration agreement entered into by Liberty Mutual. In the 
absence of special circumstances — and, in my view, there are none here — 
general words of incorporation do not have the effect of incorporating an 
arbitration agreement.. .The argument here is that if the reinsurance has been 
validly avoided, that ended the power of the leading underwriter to bind to 
treaty wording...On the limited evidence that I do have ... the claimant has 
shown on the balance of probabilities that the agreement has been validly 
avoided.”
According to Andrew Smith J, the clause was ineffective for two reasons. First, the 
general rule was that an arbitration clause could not be incorporated into an 
agreement without specific reference to arbitration in that agreement, so that a 
general clause conferring authority on the leading underwriter to agree terms did not 
extend to arbitration. Secondly, and quite independently, even if the leading 
underwriter did have authority to agree to arbitration, that authority could be derived 
only from the reinsurance slip. However, the slip had been avoided in July 2000, 
with the effect that it was to be treated as never having existed: accordingly, the 
leading underwriter could not rely upon the slip as the basis of any power to agree to 
arbitration.
The Court of Appeal held that Andrew Smith J was right on the second ground that if 
there had been a valid avoidance of the reinsurance on 19 July 2000 then the leading 
underwriter Clause could no longer bite on 5 December 2000 when the leading 
underwriter agreed a wording; however, the judge had been wrong on the first point.
58 Ibi d. at p 377.
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Lord Justice Mance stated that,59
“It seems to me that the cases on incorporation have little if anything to do 
with the scope of a leading underwriter’s capacity to bind the following 
market under a Clause such as the present Clause ‘wording to be agreed by 
Leading Reinsurer only’. That capacity is either to be defined in terms of 
agency which is Mr Edwards’ preferred approach and which is certainly 
thoroughly arguable for present purposes, or in terms of a trigger 
mechanism whereby the leading underwriter, although not an agent in legal 
terms, acts as a trigger in a way which has the effect that the following 
market is bound to follow his action. ”
Perhaps the most important aspects of the judgments are the comments made by 
the courts on the effects of the leading underwriter clause. The following point is 
worthy of mention.
What is the nature of the obligation imposed by a leading underwriter clause? On 
this point, there is a conflict of authority.
2.6.1.1 Agent View - traditional analysis of the position as being one of agency
i[
!
| The generally accepted view, which flows from Roadworks Ltd v Charman, is that
| the leading underwriter clause is not just an agreement between the assured and
!
s underwriters but also an agency agreement between the leading underwriter and the
following subscribers. In that case, Judge Kershaw held that the slip constituted both 
the terms of the contract between the underwriters and the assured, and evidence of
| an agreement between subscribing underwriters themselves whereby the leading
underwriter is designated as having authority to vary the contract on behalf of the 
following market. Judge Kershaw further accepted that where the leading
j  59 Ibid. atp380.
60 [1994] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 99.
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underwriter accepted a variation in the terms of the slip, the leading underwriter 
clause did not have the effect of binding the following market automatically if it was 
the intention of the leading underwriter simply to vary the terms of the slip for his 
own syndicate.
According to this ‘agency’ view, if the acts of the leader are within the scope of his 
authority, those acts are automatically binding on the following market. This analysis 
achieves the obligation to follow, but it also raises the possibility that the following 
markets are owed duties of care and skill by the leader and also that the leader may 
face liability to the assured if he agrees to something beyond his powers.
2.6.1.2 Trigger View
In Mander v Commercial Union Assurance Co pic,61 the issue was whether a leading 
underwriter who purported to act in excess of his mandate might be liable for breach 
of warranty of authority to the person with whom he was dealing. Rix J. was keen to 
avoid this possibility thus tentatively suggested that a leading underwriter is not the 
agent of the following market but that his actions are simply the “trigger” by which 
the following market become bound. On this analysis, any action beyond the leading 
underwriter’s mandate may be effective to bind him, but does not bind the following 
market as there is no triggering event which causes the underwriters in the following 
market to be bound; in the same way, the leading underwriter cannot be in breach of 
any warranty of authority, as he has not held himself out as having the authority to 
bind the following market.
2.6.1.3 Which View should be Applied
Whether the leading underwriter acts as the agent of the following market or only as
61 [1998] Lloyd’s Rep IR 93 relying upon dicta of Steyn J. in The Tiburon [1990] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 418 at p 422.
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the “trigger” discussed above, actually depends upon the scope and terminology of 
the clause. In Barlee Marine Corporation v Mountain, the marine slip in question 
covered three cases of interest: hull; time and charter hire; and loss of earnings. The 
leading underwriter extended the slip by accepting endorsements lengthening the 
duration of the insurance. Hirst J. held that the leading underwriter clause- which 
covered “amendments, additions and deletions”- was sufficiently widely worded to 
cover extensions of time affecting all three interests.
2.6.2 Can the Leading Underwriter Vary or Amend the Terms of the 
Insurance Contract under the Leading Underwriter Clauses?
Under a leading underwriter agreement, the underwriters who follow the lead may 
agree to accept any minor amendments or additions to the policy without the need for 
their specific approval or authority, as long as the leader has agreed to accept the 
alteration.
When there is no such agreement, every later amendment must be agreed by every 
underwriter before it can bind him. Following underwriters may also refuse to be 
bound by the leader, or request that they are advised of all amendments.
When there is such agreement in the insurance contract, because it is clearly an 
efficient way of effecting changes to the contract without renegotiating with every 
subscribing underwriter, it effectively constitutes the leading underwriters as the 
agent of the following underwriters with specified and limited authority to amend 
their contract with the insured.
Generally, the leading underwriter agreement will authorize the leader to agree:
“(1) any item which is stated in the slip “to be advised” or “to be agreed”, such as the
62 [1987] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 471.
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attachment date or premium;63
(2) additional premiums where the assured is held covered, i.e. where cover can be 
continued or widened under the contract;
(3) settlements of claims, or not;
(4) amendments of an administrative nature.”64
However, the leading underwriter cannot agree to a material alteration of the risk 
even if there is a leading underwriter agreement. The leader’s authority must be 
limited to prevent a following underwriter discovering that the risk that he agreed to 
write has not metamorphosed into something quite different as a result of any 
changes agreed between the broker and leader. The broker must know of the relevant 
restrictions, since if he purports to obtain the leader’s agreement to an alteration 
which should have been agreed with all underwriters because it falls outside the 
leader’s authority, he may be liable to the assured who will believe that this is 
covered by a different insurance and may act accordingly, subject to any claim 
against that leader for breach of warranty of authority. Such a claim will be rare 
because the broker is or should be aware of the extent of the leader’s authority but it 
could occur if the leader were to misrepresent the position.
In Barlee Marine Corporation v Mountain (The “Leegas ”) ,65 an argument that the 
leading underwriter clause could be “pumped up” to permit infinite variation was 
rejected by Hirst J. partly upon a construction of the clause and its application to the 
amendment in question, and partly on the basis that:66
63 The terms of the agreement will usually be followed in the slip by the abbreviation “tba 1/u” i.e. “to be agreed 
by leading underwriter”. The phrase usually means that a contract has been concluded and that the underwriter 
will be liable if a loss occurs before the term has been finally agreed, provided that the contract is not void for 
uncertainty.
64 Christopher Henley, The Law o f  Insurance Broking (2nd edn Sweet & Maxwell 2004) at p 426.
65 [1987] 1 Lloyd’s 471.
661 bid, at p 475.
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“...any notion that a marine policy could be converted into, say, an aviation 
policy is fanciful in the extreme. Equally fanciful is the notion that the 
following underwriters could be saddled willy-nilly with indefinite 
extension without their knowledge, since they would continue to receive 
premium and could, in any event, have recourse, if they wished, to the 
termination clause. Underlying the whole relationship between the leading 
underwriter and the following underwriters, furthermore, is the former’s 
manifest duty of care.”
2.6.3 Can the Following Underwriter Vary or Amend the Terms of the 
Insurance Contract under the Leading Underwriter Clauses?
In The Zephyr , Hobhouse, J., observed that “a following underwriter in practice has 
no scope to vary or amend the terms of the insurance contract he is being offered. 
Therefore his exercise of judgment goes principally to the size of line he will write.” 
“In law, therefore, the following underwriters have ample scope, but the expertise of 
the leader and the market dislike of policies embodying contracts on different terms 
are powerful constraints on its practical operation.”68
2.6.4 Pre-contractual Duty of Utmost Good Faith under the Leading 
Underwriter Clause
It is clear that the assured’s duty of utmost good faith at the pre-contractual stage 
comes to an end as soon as the slip has been fully subscribed, whether or not a policy 
has been issued by the relevant authorities at Lloyd’s. What is less clear is the extent 
of the duty of utmost good faith where circumstances have changed after the slip has 
been scratched by the leading underwriter but before it has been scratched by any 
following underwriter.
67 [1984] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 58 at p 66.
68 Howard N. Bennett, The Role o f  the Slip in Marine Insurance Law [1994] Lloyd’s Maritime and Commercial 
Law Quarterly at p 95.
First, as discussed above, because each underwriter has a separate contract with the 
assured, the duty of utmost good faith applies to each underwriter. Secondly, when 
there is a false statement made to the leading underwriter which allows him to avoid 
the contract, but is not deemed to have been repeated to the following market, due to 
the absence of a causative link between the statement and the decisions of the 
following market, the following market cannot avoid the contract in the same way. 
However, it may be that, if the broker is aware of his misrepresentation, he is under a 
duty to disclose it to the following market.69
It seems that the following conclusion can be drawn from the above scenario: A 
binding contract exists between the assured and the leading underwriter, so that the 
duty of utmost good faith is broken as it applies to the leading underwriter, but 
remains good for the following market.
2.6.5 How does the Leading Underwriter Clause Work in Practice?
Here is an example. The broker takes the slip in the first instance to an underwriter 
whom he has selected to deal with as leading underwriter, i.e., one who has a 
reputation in the market as an expert in the kind of cover required and whose lead is 
likely to be followed by other insurers in the market. The broker and the leading 
underwriter go through the slip together. They agree on any amendments to the 
broker’s draft and fix the premium. When an agreement has been reached the leading 
underwriter initials the slip for his proportion of the cover and the broker then takes 
the initialled slip round the market to other insurers who initial it for such proportion 
of the cover as each is willing to accept. For practical purposes all the negotiations 
about the terms of the insurance and the rate of premium are carried on between the 
broker and the leading underwriter alone. For instance, clause 42 of the International 
Hull Clauses (01/11/03) states as follows that,
69 See ss. 19 and 20 of the MIA 1906
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“42.1. Where there is co-insurance in respect of this insurance, all 
subscribing underwriters agree that the Leading Underwriter(s) designated 
in the slip or policy may act on their behalves so as to bind them for their 
respective several proportions in respect of the following maters (in addition 
to Clause 35.5)
42.1.1 the appointment of surveyors, experts, average adjusters and lawyers, 
in relation to matters which may give rise to a claim under this 
insurance
42.1.2. the duties and obligations to be undertaken by the Underwriters 
including, but not limited to, the provision of security
42.1.3 claims procedures, the handling of any claim (including, but not 
limited to, agreements under Clause 43.2) and the pursuit of 
recoveries
42.1.4 all payments or settlements to the Assured or to third parties under 
this insurance other than those agreed on an ‘ex-gratia’ basis.
Notwithstanding the above, the Leading Underwriter(s), or any of them, 
may require any such matters to be referred to the co-subscribing 
Underwriters.”
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2.7 SIGNING DOWN PROCESS
Finally, in this chapter, an important practice during the formation of insurance 
contracts at Lloyd’s, known as the signing down process, should be discussed. It is 
common on Lloyd’s market that brokers will not necessarily close the slip on 
obtaining 100 percent subscription. The broker is entitled to continue collecting 
subscriptions with the end result that the cover reflected by the slip exceeds that 
which the broker has been authorized to obtain. However, by virtue of market custom, 
on the closure of the slip, each subscription is automatically subject to a pro rata 
reduction so that the aggregate of all subscriptions totals exactly 100 percent. This 
process is called “signing down”.70 In reported cases, the level of subscription has 
reached as high as 300%.71
2.7.1 The Reasons Why “Signing Down” Exists
When there is a binding contract between the assured and each underwriter, any 
reduction or signing down is a breach of contract. Thus, on the face of it signing 
down is not permissible. However, as alluded to earlier in this Chapter, the signing 
down process was first given detailed consideration by Staughton J. in Fennia,12and
70 The following is an example of the process. After preparing the slip a Lloyd’s broker takes the slip around the 
market seeking £100 pounds for the subject matter of insurance. Underwriter A wishes to participate in the 
insurance and initials the slip, stating that he is preparing to take 60 percent of the risk which is £60. 
Underwriter B wishes to take 30 percent of the risk which is £30 pounds. However, when the slip is closed the 
broker obtains another 60 percent of subscription from Underwriter C. So 150 percent of subscription is 
obtained at the end of the day. According to the singing down process, the final subscription of A is reduced to 
60percent x 100percent/150percent = 40percent = £40; the subscription of B is reduced to 30percent x 
100percent/150percent =20percent = £20 and the subscription of C is reduced to 60percent 
xl00percent/150percent = 40percent= £40. All subscriptions total £100, exactly 100 percent.
71 Malcolm Clark, The Law o f  Insurance Contracts,{4th ed, LLP, 2002) at p 286.
72 [1983] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 287.
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the learned judge accepted that Lloyd’s custom and practice had conferred legal 
status on signing down. These views were subsequently approved by the Court of 
Appeal . A clear legal basis for signing down is now established
A number of reasons for the practice of signing down may be given. The practice, 
first, enables brokers to show their business to more underwriters and these larger 
lines make the risk appear more attractive to following underwriters. In this way 
signing down enables the broker to reach 100 per cent subscription, (and therefore 
full subscription) for the assured, more quickly. Secondly, if the assured subsequently 
wishes to increase the value insured, the initial commitment of underwriters to a 
larger percentage than ultimately obtained provides an indication of where some 
spare capacity may be found.
2.7.2 If the Broker Made no or little Attempt to Over-subscribe the Slip or 
Otherwise Failed to Make His Target, is there any Remedy the 
Underwriters can Get and if so What is Legal Basis for that Remedy?
2.7.2.1 Signing Indication
It is quite difficult for the underwriter to subscribe the slip if his subscription may be 
reduced to an uncertain extent. Consequently, the broker will generally be asked to 
provide a “signing indication”. The underwriter will take heed of such indication 
given in deciding the size of line to write, judging the proportion of the risk he 
considers prudent to assume not by reference to the size of the line he actually writes 
but by reference to that line proportionally reduced according to the indication of the 
broker.
73 The Fe nnia [1983] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 287
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2.7.2.2 Indication- a Promise Given by the Broker
It is readily apparent, however, that a signing indication which proves to be 
erroneous will cause some loss to the underwriter: if the degree of over-subscription 
is greater than indicated, the underwriter will receive proportionately less of the risk 
than he had hoped for; if, on the other hand, the degree of over-subscription is less 
than indicated by the broker, the underwriter may face a greater proportion of the risk 
than he may have judged prudent. So the indication could amount to a promise given 
by the broker for which the underwriter provides consideration by entering into a 
contract of marine insurance. A remedy for these eventualities is clearly desirable.
2.1.23 Remedy
The underwriter may be able to have an action against the broker in tort for a 
misleading signing indication. This kind of remedy was considered at length by 
Hobhouse J. and the Court of Appeal in General Accident Fire and Life Assurance 
Corporation v Tanter (the Zephyr) 74 Hobhouse J. denied the existence of any 
collateral contract between the broker and the leading underwriter on the terms that 
his liability on the slip would be reduced to one-third, but held that the broker had 
been negligent in giving the signing indication and was thus liable to the leading 
underwriter in tort.
There was no appeal to the Court of Appeal on the finding of liability towards the 
leading underwriter, but the Court of Appeal nevertheless expressed the view that 
questions of his nature ought to be analyzed in terms of contract rather than in terms 
of tort and that, conceptually, it would have been more satisfactory to hold the broker 
liable for breach of an implied undertaking to use his best endeavours to ensure that 
there would be a 300% subscription on the slip. The negligence alleged lay in failure
74 [1984] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 58.
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to exercise the best endeavours to achieve the signing down indication; it was 
assured that the lack of best endeavours could be equated with lack of reasonable 
care. The following observations are from the Court:75
“There are therefore no legal reasons why a legal duty of care of a broker to 
take reasonable steps to see that the signing down indication is achieved 
should not be recognized. There are no practical or business reasons why it 
should not be; indeed the business reasons are strongly in favour of 
recognizing it. The market appears itself to recognize the existence of such a 
duty...”
75 Ibi d, at p 75.
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CHAPTER 3
THE ROLE OF BROKERS AT THE FORMATION 
STAGE OF MARINE INSURANCE CONTRACTS
INTRODUCTION
As stated in the previous Chapter, during the formation of marine insurance contracts, 
it is the broker who prepares the slip for the prospective assured and takes the slip 
around the market searching for subscriptions. Once the contract is concluded the 
broker prepares the policy wording at the later stage. Accordingly, it is clear that the 
broker plays a significant role in placing insurance at the London market. As Shaw 
states,
“The London market is the part of the British insurance industry which 
specialises in covering major or complex risks- that is, almost exclusively, 
risks incurred by business and not by private consumers. It is characterised 
by the use of brokers, who are the commercial marketing arm of the industry 
and whose function is to seek out the best cover to answer their customers’ 
needs.”76
According to the practice in the London market, the insurance contract with a 
Lloyd’s member is normally arranged by a Lloyd’s broker.77 The Lloyd’s broker is a
76 Gordon Shaw, The Lloyd’s Broker, (1st ed. Lloyd’s of London Press Ltd. 1995) at p 71.
77 The privileged position of Lloyd’s brokers was examined by Sir Henry Fisher in 1980 who concluded that 
they should be entitled to retain their monopoly as a result of:
(a) their specialised knowledge and experience;
(b) the additional financial capacity required to discharge their strict liability to Lloyd’s underwriters for 
premiums;
(c) the additional administrative infrastructure required to enable them to fulfil the additional duties which
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member of the Lloyd’s community. There is a special bonding relationship between 
the Lloyd’s broker and Lloyd’s community. The Green Book78 sets out the basis for 
this relationship in the first paragraph of its foreword as follows: “Lloyd’s brokers 
have a special relationship with Lloyd’s in that Lloyd’s provides both a market place 
and a regulatory authority for them”. Toward the end79 of the Green Book the 
following passage appears: “ ...Lloyd’s should reserve the right to test the character 
and suitability of individual members of a Lloyd’s broker’s staff’. Accordingly a 
prospective Lloyd’s broker must satisfy the Council of Lloyd’s that they are a 
suitable partnership or body corporate to negotiate business at Lloyd’s, through their 
integrity, financial status and market experience and ability.
If the assured’s broker is not accredited at Lloyd’s, he will have to contact a Lloyd’s 
broker to obtain the insurance at Lloyd’s and share the commission with the Lloyd’s 
broker. The broker who produces the proposal to the Lloyd’s broker is called the 
“producing broker”. The Lloyd’s broker who actually “places” the insurance is called 
the “placing broker”.
The current Chapter will focus mainly on legal issues about duties, rights and 
liabilities of the broker. The duties of the broker include his duties to his main 
principle, the assured, and the duties of brokers to the third party, the insurer, when 
the broker is playing a dual role. Among the duties of the brokers to the insurer, the 
duty of utmost good faith is the most important one and this will be analyzed in more
do not usually fall upon non-Lloyd’s brokers, such as the preparation of a policy;
(d) the personal relationships that are built between underwriters and brokers which would be diluted by 
opening the Room to all brokers; and
(e) the commitment that the Lloyd’s broker has to Lloyd’s and his central role there, in particular his crucial 
part in the marketing of Lloyd’s around the world.
The position of the Lloyd’s brokers has not of yet attracted the attention of the authorities dealing with the 
competition law issues within the EU.
78 Cons ultative Document: The Regulation of Lloyd’s Brokers, November 1987.
79 The Regulation of Lloyd’s Brokers, November 1987, p B 10.
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detail, including the duty of disclosure, the duty not to make misrepresentation and 
the recent reform of insurance law.
3.1 DUTIES OF THE BROKER
3.1.1 Duties of Brokers to Assureds
An insurance broker is the agent of the principal who employs him to carry out a 
specific piece of business, namely, obtaining a contract of insurance for a required 
term. Accordingly, the starting point in the legal analysis is that the broker is the 
agent of the assured.80
The extent of broker’s obligations depends on the nature of the relationship between 
the broker and the assured. There are two main scenarios: first where the duty is set 
out in specific contractual terms and secondly where are no such terms in the 
contract.
If the contract contains express terms and sets out express rights and duties of the 
assured and the broker, e.g. the broker agrees to obtain insurance for a specific risk 
for a specific period at a specific rate, the duties of the broker to the assured can be 
found in the agreement. The broker in that case is under a duty to exercise his duties 
in accordance with contractual terms. He must follow every single step set in the 
contract. He cannot exercise any discretion unless there is specific authorization in 
the agreement.
In the first scenario the duties of the broker to the assured are clearly defined in the 
contract. The broker must exercise his duties according to the contract terms.81
80 There are also instances which the broker acts in dual capacity which will be further discussed below at p 111.
81 In Strong v. S. Allison [1926] 25 Lloyd’s Rep 504, the broker was held to be in breach of his duty to fail to 
make the contracts o f insurance according to instructions of assured. In Talbot Underwriting Ltd v. Nausch Hogan
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However, in the second scenario the duties of the broker have not been contractually 
agreed. Perhaps the best short statement of the duty of the broker to the assured in 
this scenario is as follows “It is the broker’s responsibility to arrange as wide a cover 
as is required at the most economical rate to his client, bearing in mind the financial 
security and service provided by the underwriter.” In a broader sense these 
requirements represent an obligation on the broker to take “reasonable care”. 
However it is necessary to define further the detailed nature and extent of the 
broker’s duty of care. It is vital at this stage to evaluate what can reasonably be 
expected of the broker under the heading of “reasonable care”.
3.1.1.1 Duty to Obtain Sufficient Cover
During the process of obtaining insurance, an insurance broker owes a duty to the 
assured to obtain sufficient cover. In Yuill & Co v. Robsonu  cattle were purchased at 
Buenos Ayres, at a price including cost, freight, and insurance, for shipment to 
Durban; by the contract of sale the seller was to insure the cattle "against all risks." 
The broker of the seller obtained and handed a policy of insurance, which was an 
ordinary "all risks" Lloyd's policy, to the buyer but which, in accordance with the 
usual practice among insurance brokers and underwriters with regard to such policies, 
contained a warranty against "capture, seizure and detention, and the consequences 
thereof." Disease broke out among the cattle on the voyage, and on arrival at Durban 
the authorities forbid their landing and the cattle were consequently slaughtered. The 
seller was held to be liable to the buyer in damages for breach of contract because his 
broker obtained insurance cover only for certain risks.
& Murray Inc (The Jason 5) [2006] Lloyd’s Rep IR 531, the assured instructed the broker to obtain a 
shipbuilders’ all risks policy of insurance on the vessel’s hull and machinery, including specifically the shipyard 
as co-assured. The broker managed to place the risk in London market but the shipyard was not named as a 
co-assured. It was held that the assured and the shipyard had suffered loss from the broker’s failure to included 
the shipyard as a co-assured under the policy, the broker was reliable.
82 Chartered I nsurance Institute Journal No. 10/1.
83 Christopher Henley, The Law o f Insurance Broking, (2nd ed, Sweet & Maxwell, 2004) at p 25.
84 [1908] 1 KB 270.
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or
In Yuill & Co v. Robson, the legal analysis is very straightforward. However, in 
some other cases, courts have extended the duty further.
o /
In Youell v Bland Welch & Co Ltd, where the reinsurance cover expired before the 
primary insurance that it was supposed to protect. The brokers knew that the insurers 
(the reassured) were unaware of the time limit on the reinsurance cover, and that it 
was not part of their orders for reinsurance. It was held by Philip J. that the broker’s 
failure to inform insurers and to obtain the appropriate extension of reinsurance were 
breaches of the duty to take reasonable care. The insurers were negligent in failing to 
check that the reinsurance contract protected them as they wished. On the facts and 
the evidence, the brokers were liable for 80 per cent of the insurer's liability. In this 
case an insurance broker not only owes the assured the duty to obtain appropriate 
cover and but also owes the assured the duty to inform him of limitations in the 
insurance cover. This extension of the duty should be construed in all types of 
insurance contracts, since the limitation of the insurance cover is one of the 
important elements in the extent of the insurance cover. It will directly affect the 
sufficiency of the insurance cover.
Similarly in Aneco Reinsurance Underwriting Ltd. (in liquidation) v. Johnson & 
Higgins LtdF the duty of care was extended to giving advice as to the availability of 
cover. The insurer was invited by the broker to subscribe to a particular risk. The 
insurer agreed but stated that he would subscribe only if the broker obtained 
reinsurance cover on similar terms. The broker obtained reinsurance cover but not for 
the whole risk as the market turned against the risk. The insurer suffered losses in 
excess of US $ 35 million. Only US $ 11 million was recoverable under the
85 Ibi d.
86 [1990] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 431.
87 [2002] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 157.
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reinsurance contract. However, reinsurers denied they should have to pay even for 
that amount on the basis that the broker misrepresented the risk to them. The 
re-insurers were successful in their plea. The reassured (insurers) turned to the broker 
for compensation and claimed: a) US $ 11 million- for losing the cover due to the 
broker’s misrepresentation and b) US $ 24 million- for not advising that it was going 
to be difficult to get reinsurance cover for this particular risk.
The House of Lords held that88
“the duty of the brokers was not confined to the obtaining of excess of loss 
protection for Aneco and informing Aneco that they had done so; at the 
very least they owed a duty to inform Aneco whether or not reinsurance 
was available; if they had told Aneco that reinsurance was not available, it 
would have been obvious to Aneco that the unavailability was due to the 
current market assessment of the risks.”
Therefore, lack of advice allowed the insurers to get compensation for the US $ 24 
million.
O Q
This case is clearly different from Youell v Bland Welch & Co Ltd. T he facts in 
Aneco were rather extraordinary. In this case, the insurer agreed to subscribe, but he 
would only do so if the broker could obtain reinsurance cover on similar terms. That 
was actually a specific condition in the agency agreement between the insurer 
(re-assured) and the broker. Here the broker was under a duty to exercise these duties 
to the assured in accordance with the contract terms strictly.
88 Ibi d, at p 180.
89 [1990] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 431.
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3.1.1.2 Duty to Obtain Insurance Cover with the Most Suitable Insurer
In the execution of the contract of agency, the broker’s duty is to use reasonable skill 
and care and to act honestly. The payment of commission to the broker is to reward 
him for his expertise in placing the risk, since the assured usually leaves the broker to 
obtain the best terms at the best rate in the broker’s discretion. A broker may 
therefore be negligent if he recommends an insurer to the assured which any broker 
with a reasonable knowledge of the insurance market place might consider to be 
unsuitable. In Osman v Moss90 the assured was foreign and did not read or 
understand English well. His broker recommended to him a motor insurance 
company known to be in financial difficulties. It was held that the broker was 
negligent in recommending an insurer known to be in financial difficulties, and the 
assured was entitled to recover.
However, if the broker is in the process of obtaining reinsurance for a professional 
insurer, as opposed to insurance for a client not versed in insurance, it may be that he 
is entitled to rely to some degree upon the knowledge and ability of that professional 
insurer, who can be expected to know something about the quality of the market 
selected. Nevertheless, in Youell v Bland Welsh91 Mr Justice Phillips said: “I can see 
no justification for imposing on the client a duty owed to the broker to check the 
suitability of the cover obtained with a degree of care similar to that which the broker 
is paid to employ when obtaining it.” Nevertheless, the judge reduced the damages 
payable by the broker to reflect the contributory negligence of the professional 
insurer, although only by 20 percent. The rationale for this is that the professional 
client owes a duty of care to run its business properly.
It could be said that this case reflects two sometimes conflicting notions. On the
90 [1970] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 313.
91 [1990] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 431 at p 454.
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one hand an insurer may be expected to have sufficient expertise to understand and 
assess the reinsurance policy. However, against this, it seems wrong to penalize an 
insurer for failing to notice flaws or errors in the reinsurance policy when it has 
appointed a broker to perform this function. It could be said that Phillips J.’s 
decision accurately reflects the balance to be sought between these notions.
3.1.1.3 Duty to Obtain Insurance Cover within a Reasonable Time
An insurance broker is under a duty to obtain insurance cover within a reasonable 
time. If the broker is unable to perform the contract within a reasonable period of 
time or at all, he must inform the assured immediately so that the assured is in a 
position to protect his interests, and is not misled into believing that these interests 
have already been protected by the broker’s performance of the contract.
In Cock, Russell v. Bray, Gibb92 the assured asked his broker to obtain insurance 
cover for his cargo in one day, but the broker failed to do so. The assured claimed 
damages from the broker on the ground that he did not comply with his duty to
QTobtain insurance cover within a reasonable time. Mr. Justice Bailhache held
“In my opinion it was too late that evening to take any effective steps 
towards getting this risk covered. On Saturday morning Mr. Brown, one of 
the brokers employed by the defendants, took the draft slips round to the 
British General Insurance Company...The leading Underwriter of the 
British General did not like the look of the risk either from the point of 
view of the steamer or the subject matter. Mr. Brown, according to his 
evidence, showed the draft slip to other Underwriters and failed to get it 
underwritten... After that it was impossible to get this cargo insured at any 
sort of premium that would be worth paying. Consequently, the whole case 
turns on whether there was an undue delay on the part of the brokers in 
failing to get this risk underwritten on the Saturday. In my opinion, having 
regard to the nature of the risk, the defendants were not guilty of any
92 [1920] 3 Lloyd’s Rep 71.
93 Ibi d  at p 72.
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unreasonable delay at all.”
The reasonable time requirement is not a fixed pre-determined period. In the above 
case, a delay of less than one day was thought not to be unreasonable but in other 
circumstances a delay of one day may be considered unreasonable. For instance, if a 
prudent, experienced broker is asked to obtain insurance for a popular risk, one day 
may be considered sufficient time and failing to secure insurance may be attributed 
to unreasonable delay. Accordingly, the concept of reasonable time depends on 
different circumstances. It can be one day, one week, one month or longer, depending 
on the commercial context.
3.1.1.4 Duty Regarding Policy Wording
It is the broker who obtains the policy from Lloyd’s market for the assured. 
Accordingly, during the process of obtaining insurance, the broker is also responsible 
for the policy wording. In cases where this duty is exercised, it should be 
remembered that the contract might be interpreted contra proferentem94 at a later 
stage. The extent of this duty is wide enough to encompass the following elements:
(1). If the assured inquiries about the meaning of the policy wording, the insurance 
broker is under a duty to advise the assured as to the meaning of his policy.
In Melik & Co. Ltd. v. Norwich Union Fire Insurance Society Ltd,95 the assured 
inquired whether the policy remains in effect when the burglar alarm is temporarily 
out of action. The broker answered positively without checking. Woolf, J (as he then
94 Con tra Proferentem Rule: Ambiguous wording in a contract should be interpreted against the party who is 
relying on it/or who has put it in the contract.
95 [1980] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 523.
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was) suggested that96
“it was the broker's duty to raise the matter much more clearly with the 
defendants and to get the clear and positive answer that the plaintiffs 
required; the broker had instead relied on his own judgment that the 
plaintiffs were insured and if they were not insured he would have been in 
default and that would have been sufficient to find liability assuming that 
there was a loss in respect of that default.”
(2). An insurance broker is also bound by a duty to bring important clauses in the 
policy (e.g. exemption clause) to the assured’s notice. In JWBollom & Co Ltd v Byas 
Mosley & Co Ltd,91 BM had acted as property insurance brokers for JWB for 30 
years. After some false alarms, JWB decided not to switch a yard alarm on over the 
weekend. A fire broke out and caused GBP 8 million worth of damage. JWB's 
insurers repudiated liability on the basis that there had been a breach of clauses 
requiring the maintenance and use of alarms and protections, but settled the claim at 
GBP 5 million. JWB sued BM for failing to take reasonable steps to bring the said 
clauses to its notice. It was held that if JWB had been aware that a failure to keep the 
alarms in operation would entitle the insurers to repudiate liability, they would have 
taken steps to ensure that the alarm was set. The BM was in breach of his duty of 
care.
(3). An insurance broker is also under a duty to retain all the relevant documents, e.g. 
the slip, and policy.
QO t
In Grace v Leslie & Godwin Financial Services Ltd, it was held that an insurance 
broker was under a duty to keep policy slips relating to his principal's policy 
throughout the period during which a reasonable broker might regard a claim as
96 Ibi d, at p 534.
97 [2000] Lloyd’s Rep IR 136.
98 [1995] LRLR 472.
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being possible, so that he was ready to collect claims when necessary. Failure to 
retain relevant documents for such a period amounted to breach of contract.
(4). An insurance broker is under a duty to check the contents of the policy and the 
policy wording.
In Tudor Jones v Crowley Colosso Ltcf9 the assured instructed the broker to obtain 
cover and approved the terms obtained, which included an exclusion clause 
applicable to any part of the works for which a completion certificate had been 
issued before the damage occurred. Later when there was damage the following 
market relied on the exclusion clause to deny the claim for damage to the marina. It 
was held that that C were in breach of their duty of care by failing to make clear to 
the following market that full cover for the project should include any phases which 
might be completed before the others. As a prudent broker, C should have drawn the 
instructing broker's attention specifically to the exclusion clause that represented a 
potential problem.
3.1.1.5 Duty to provide Advice or Information to the Assured
During the process of formation of insurance contracts, the broker also owes a duty 
to provide sufficient advice and information to the assured. Which kind of 
information should the broker tell the assured? What level of advice is required?
(1) An insurance broker is under a duty to provide qualified information in 
accordance with the inquiries of the assured. In Sarginson Brothers v. Keith 
Moulton & Co. Ltd,100 the assured desired to insure their stock of timber
t l iagainst war risks under the commodity Insurance Scheme on 30 Oct 1940.
99 [1996] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 619.
100 [1942] 73 LI L Rep 104.
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They sought the advice and assistance of the broker. The broker informed 
them that their stock of timber was not insurable under the scheme or at all, 
and the assured accepted and acted upon that advice. Later, the stock of 
timber of the assured was destroyed by enemy action and they found that 
their stock was insurable under the scheme. It was held that the broker was 
negligent in expressing an unqualified opinion without taking reasonable 
care to furnish themselves with information to support that opinion. Thus, he 
was liable for the damages suffered by the assured.
(2) An insurance broker affecting an insurance policy on behalf of the assured 
owes a duty of care to inform the assured of any exemption under the policy, 
which may affect the cover given. In the case of McNealy v Pennine 
Insurance Co, 101 the defendant insurance company offered motor insurance 
at low premium rates to certain categories of motorists; specifically excluded 
from such categories were, inter alia, "part-time musicians." The plaintiff 
approached the defendant brokers with a view to affecting a motor insurance 
and also with their assistance, he completed a proposal form stating his 
occupation truthfully, as that of a property repairer. The plaintiff did not 
disclose, nor he was he asked whether he was also a part-time musician. The 
defendant insurers subsequently denied liability with respect to damage 
suffered by the plaintiff in a motor accident, on the grounds that the plaintiff 
as a part-time musician was excluded by the policy. At first instance the 
brokers were held liable to indemnify the plaintiff. It was held, dismissing 
the brokers' appeal, that since they were aware of the exempted categories 
under the policy, they were in breach of their duty of care to the plaintiff in 
failing to inquire whether he fell within such exemptions.
101 [1978] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 18.
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(3) It is the insurance broker’s duty to advise the assured about the information 
and extent of information that the assured must disclose to the insurer 
regarding the subject matter of the insurance. In John Woods (Lisglynn) v. 
Carroll the appellant company insured its vehicles through an insurance 
broker. It informed the broker, by telephone, that it had arranged to trade-in 
one of its old vehicles for a new vehicle, but did not give him all the details 
required to put the new vehicle on cover. The company thought that the 
missing details were not vital, but was not warned by the broker that the new 
vehicle was not covered. The new vehicle was involved in an accident for 
which the company was found liable to pay damages. At first instance, 
Gibson L.J. directed judgment to be entered for the broker in an action by the 
company to recover damages from him. Allowing the appeal, the Court of 
Appeal held that it is the duty of an insurance broker, to warn a client that he 
is not covered until all the required details are produced and the broker had 
not done so in this case.
102 [1980] 3 NIJB
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3.1.2 Duties of Brokers to Insurers
The broker’s status as agent of the assured does not exclude all possibility of him 
being liable to persons other than the assured.103 In some circumstances, a broker 
may act in a dual capacity as the agent for both the assured and the underwriter, for 
instance, regarding the placing of reinsurance and in accepting risks under a binding 
authority.104 Generally speaking, there are two primary duties owed by brokers to the 
insurer, the first is the duty to pay the premium to the insurer and the second is the 
duty of utmost good faith.
3.1.2.1 The Duty Regarding the Premium
The duty of the brokers to the insurer regarding to the premium is stated in s. 53(1) 
of the MIA 1906:
“Unless otherwise agreed, where the marine insurance policy is effected on 
behalf of the assured by a broker, the broker is directly responsible to the 
insurer for the premium...”
From the wording of this section, it can be said that: first, “directly” means that the 
insurer cannot claim the premium from the assured directly and he can only claim it 
from the broker. Second, “the broker is directly responsible” means that the insurer 
can claim the premium from the broker even if the broker has not received the 
premium from the assured. Third, the broker legally becomes liable to pay the 
premium to the insurer as soon as the premium becomes due.
The rule of law by which it is the broker, but not the assured who is liable to the
103 See generally M Clarke, “Insurance Intermediaries: Liability to Third Parties” [1995] IJIL 162.
104 See p i l l  below regarding further discussion of binding authority and placing of reinsurance.
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insurer for the premium is founded on the custom in the London market for more 
than about a century.
In Power v. Butcher105 Mr. Justice Bayley explained the matter as follows:
“According to the ordinary course of trade between the assured, the broker 
and the underwriter, the assured does not in the first instance pay the 
premium to the broker, nor does the latter pay it to the underwriter. But, as 
between the assured and the underwriter, the premiums are considered as 
paid. The underwriter, to whom, in most instances, the assured are unknown, 
looks to the broker for payment, and he to the assured. The latter pay the 
premiums to the broker only, who is a middleman between the assured and 
the underwriter. But he is not merely an agent; he is a principal to receive 
the money from the assured, and to pay it to the underwriters.”
The rationale for the custom of looking to the broker rather than the assured for 
payment was pointed out by Lord Wensleydale (then Parke J.) in Power v. 
Butcher:106
"by the course of dealing (that is, by the custom) the broker has an account 
with the underwriter; in that account the broker gives the underwriter credit 
for the premium when the policy is effected, and he, as agent of both the 
assured and the underwriter, is considered as having paid the premium to the 
underwriter, and the latter as having lent it to the broker again, and so 
becoming his creditor. The broker is then considered as having paid the 
premium for the assured."
1 r\n
Later in Universo Insurance Co. o f Milan v. Merchants Marine Insurance Co. Ltd., 
Mr. Justice Collins provided a justification for making the broker directly liable to
* 1 AO
the insurer on a fiction. He explained the position in this way:
105 (1829) 10 B. & Cr. 329 at p 340.
m Ibid, a t p 347.
107 [1897] 1 QB p 205.
108 Ibi d, at p 209.
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“It is a well recognised practice in marine insurance for the broker to treat 
himself as responsible to the underwriter for the premiums; by a fiction he is 
deemed to have paid the underwriter, and to have borrowed from him the 
amount with which he pays. If that is a correct explanation of the origin of 
the custom, it is as applicable to this form of policy as to a Lloyd's policy.
No doubt there is here a contract to pay by the assured, but by custom the 
broker is treated as personally liable, the same fiction being applicable, 
namely, that the broker has paid the premium, and has so absolved the 
assured from his liability, having first borrowed the money from the 
underwriter to make the payment.”
According to Mr. Justice Collins’s explanation the practice of making the broker 
directly liable to the insurer is based on the fiction that once the contract is concluded, 
it is assumed that the insurer loans the amount of premium to the broker so that the 
broker becomes debtor of that loan. The Court of Appeal affirmed this fiction and 
Lord Esher M.R. said,109
“It has never been supposed hitherto that that course of dealing is in 
contradiction of the terms of the policy. It is not a contradiction of the terms 
of the policy, but a mode of carrying them out. The policy says that the 
assured is to pay the premium, but the mode in which the payment is to be 
made is according to the custom.”
This view gets further support from the judgment in the case of Prentis Donegan & 
Partners Ltd. v. Leeds & Leeds Co. Inc.110 which states that by reason of the custom 
which had itself given rise to s. 53(1) of the Marine Insurance Act, 1906 the 
premiums were deemed to have been paid by broker to underwriter and advanced by 
the underwriter back to broker again by way of loan; so even if the policy contained 
an express clause requiring the assured to pay the underwriters, the liability remained 
that of the broker not of the assured.
109 [1987] 2 QB 93 atp96 .
110 [1998] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 326.
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However, the fiction was challenged in the later case of Heath Lambert Ltd. v. 
Sociedad de Corretaje de Segurosm .
Heath Lambert Facts
INC, a dredging company and a substantial shipowner in Venezuela, retained 
SCORT, a firm of Venezuelan insurance brokers, to place its marine insurance. In 
1994 Banesco became the local insurer, fronting for the London reinsurance market. 
As part of its overall responsibilities, SCORT was also involved in obtaining the 
reinsurance for Banesco in the London market. For this purpose, Blackwell Green 
Ltd. (since subsumed into Heath Lambert), a firm of Lloyd's brokers, was retained as 
placing broker.
The 1996 reinsurance was duly placed by Heath Lambert with a number of Lloyd's 
syndicates and London market insurance companies. The Cover Note issued by 
Heath Lambert on Jan. 26, 1996 and addressed to SCORT confirmed that reinsurance 
had been effected on the basis of “All clauses, terms and conditions as original and to 
follow settlement of same”. Amongst the conditions in the insurance contract was a 
term providing for "Warranted premium payable on cash basis to London 
Underwriters within 90 days of attachment". Following the placement of the 
reinsurance in London, a number of extensions were agreed by underwriters between 
January, 1996 and July, 1996, in respect of each of which additional premiums were 
payable. The premiums due on these extensions were not paid by either defendant.
The issues regarding the payment of premiums that arose from this case are as 
follows:
(1) whether SCORT or Banesco were liable to pay the premiums to Heath Lambert:
111 [2005] 1 Lloyd's Rep 597.
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(2) whether Heath Lambert was under any liability to pay underwriters the premium 
under s. 53(1) of the Marine Insurance Act, 1906 or otherwise, and insofar as Heath 
Lambert did pay the premium did it do so as a volunteer with no right to be 
indemnified.
SCORT, in this case was the producing broker, Bansco was the assured and Heath 
Lambert was acting as a placing broker. The issues before the judge were whether the 
assured and the producing broker were liable for the premium to the placing broker 
and whether the placing broker was liable for the premium to the underwriter.
As to the first issue, it was held by Hirst J., that,112
“Where a producing broker employed a placing broker at Lloyd's, the 
general rule was that there was privity of contract between those brokers, 
and no privity between the principal and the placing broker. The producing 
broker was liable to the placing broker for the premium, which the 
producing broker had to collect from the principal. There might however be 
special factors which led to the exceptional case that there was privity 
between principal and placing broker, but even then the privity might not be 
exclusive. It was not possible at this stage to decide which of the defendants 
was liable for the premium. There was a reasonable prospect that Scort was 
not liable and there was a reasonable prospect that Banesco was liable. It 
would be unjust to release Banesco from the action at this stage unless it 
was certain that the claim against SCORT was bound to succeed.”
The Judge took the view that the case against SCORT was much stronger than that 
against Banesco, but concluded that there was nonetheless a reasonable prospect that 
SCORT was not liable. He concluded therefore that it was not possible to say 
which defendant was liable. However, the judge also confirmed the general rule that 
when a producing broker employed a placing broker the producing broker was liable 
to the placing broker for the premium, which the producing broker had to collect 
from the principal.
112Ibid, at p 597.
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As to the second issue, it was held by L.J., Phillips that,
“it is important to note that it is not (as we understand it) suggested that the 
case falls outside s. 53(1) of the 1906 Act. This is a case in which the policy 
was effected on behalf of the re-assured by a broker, namely Heath Lambert, 
so that the effect of s. 53(1) is that, “unless otherwise agreed”, Heath 
Lambert was directly responsible to the reinsurers for the premium and the 
reinsurers would have been liable to the re-assured for any losses under the 
policy. It is also common ground that “unless otherwise agreed” it is the 
general rule in these circumstances that the broker (Heath Lambert) has a 
cause of action in its own right against the re-assured in respect of unpaid 
premiums...Since it is not suggested that it was “otherwise agreed”, it 
follows that it is common ground that SCORT or Banesco was in principle 
liable to Heath Lambert for the premium. ..It seems to us that the answer to 
that question should in principle depend upon the terms of the relevant 
policy.”
In this case, the terms of the brokers’ cancellation clause quoted in the insurance 
contract show that Heath Lambert was a party to the terms of the policy. Thus the 
reinsurers' right against Heath Lambert to the premium stems from the policy, as 
does Heath Lambert's right to recover premium from SCORT or Banesco and 
Banesco's right to recover any relevant losses under the policy from the reinsurers. 
According to the judgment from this case, it can be argued that the fiction theory was 
superseded by the wording of “unless otherwise agreed” in s.53(l) of the MIA 1906 
which intends to regulate payment of premiums. Whether the broker or the assured 
is liable for the premium all depends upon the true construction of the policy. 
Therefore, this section did not have an impact on the provisions of the marine 
insurance contract. In the light of this, if there is a premium warranty in the contract, 
which states that it is the assured who will pay the premium, that warranty is not 
supplanted by the custom and can still operate.
113 Ibid, at p 601.
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3.1.2.2 The Duty of Utmost Good Faith
3.1.2.2.1 General Introduction to the Broker’s Duty o f Utmost Good Faith
In Carter v. Boehm114, Lord Mansfield stated:
“Insurance is a contract based upon speculation. The special facts, upon 
which the contingent chance is to be computed, lie most commonly in the 
knowledge of the insured only, the underwriter trusts to his representation 
and proceeds upon the confidence that he does not keep back any 
circumstance in his knowledge, to mislead the underwriter into a belief that 
the circumstance does not exist, and to induce him to estimate the risk as if 
it did not exist.”
Subsequently, the English common law developed the concept that all contracts of 
insurance were contracts uberrimae fldei, it being required that each party to the 
contract must act with “utmost good faith” in dealing with the other.
The duty of utmost good faith in relation to insurance contracts is set out at Section 
17 of MIA 1906. It states:
“A contract of marine insurance is a contract based upon the utmost good 
faith, and, if the utmost good faith be not observed by either party, the 
contract may be avoided by the other party.”
The duty of utmost good faith on the broker to the insurer is set out at Section 19 and
20 of MIA 1906:
“19. Disclosure by agent effecting insurance 
Subject to the provisions of the preceding section as to circumstances that 
need not be disclosed, where an insurance is effected for the assured by an 
agent, the agent must disclose to the insurer-
Every material circumstance which is known to himself, and an agent to
114 (1766) 3 Burr 1909.
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insure is deemed to know every circumstance which in the ordinary course 
of business ought to be known by, or to have been communicated to him; 
and
Every material circumstance that the assured is bound to disclose unless it 
came to his knowledge being too late to communicate it to the agent 
20. Representations pending negotiation of contract
(1) Every material representation made by the assured or his agent to the 
insurer during the negotiations for the contract, and before the contract is 
concluded, must be true. If it be untrue the insurer may avoid the contract.”
Compared to the position of the assured, it is fair to suggest that the broker’s duty of 
good faith is more extensive. The broker is not only under the duty to disclose 
material circumstances that is known to the assured and himself but also the material 
circumstances that in the ordinary course of business ought to be known by 
himself.115 The rest of this part will analyse the broker’s duty of utmost good faith in 
more depth.
3.1.2.2.2 Duty o f Disclosure
One of the key aspects of the duty of utmost good faith is the duty of disclosure. This 
aspect of the general duty is specifically developed in section 18 of MIA 1906. It 
states:
“(1) Subject to the provisions of this section, the assured must disclose to 
the insurer, before the contract is concluded, every material circumstance 
which is known to the assured, and the assured is deemed to know every 
circumstance which, in the ordinary course of business, ought to be known 
by him. If the assured fails to make such disclosure, the insurer may avoid 
the contract. (2) Every circumstance is material which would influence the 
judgment of a prudent insurer in fixing the premium, or determining 
whether he will take the risk.”
115 This will be further discussed in below at p 92.
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3.1.2.2.2.1 The Test o f “Materiality ”
3.1.2.2.2.1.1 Meaning o f Materiality
In sections 18, 19 and 20 of MIA 1906 there is reference to “materiality”. The 
statutory test of the “materiality” of a circumstance is contained in section 18 (2), 
which states: “Every circumstance is material which would influence the judgment of 
a prudent insurer in fixing the premium, or determining whether he will take the 
risk.”
In the case of Container Transport International Inc and Reliance Group Inc v. 
Oceanus Mutual Underwriting Association Ltd.116 S tephenson LJ explained the
117wording of this section:
“...I conclude from the language of the sub-sections in their context and 
from the authorities that everything is material to which a prudent insurer, if 
he were in the proposed insured’s place, would wish to direct his mind in the 
course of considering the proposed insurance with a view to deciding 
whether to take it up and on what terms, including premium.”
Here it should be mentioned that there has never been any uncertainty in marine
liftinsurance law that it must be a hypothetical prudent insurer who determines the 
“materiality” of a circumstance. Lord Mustill in Pan Atlantic Insurance Co Ltd v. 
Pine Top Insurance Co L td 119 stated that,
“ ...I pause for a moment to consider the other conspicuous feature of the
116 [19 84] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 476 (CA)
117 Ibi d, at p 529.
118 Emphasis added
119 [1994] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 427 at p 445.
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earlier law, namely, the presence in the equation of the hypothetical prudent 
underwriter. Just when and how this feature was added cannot be deduced 
from the materials now available, but it is at least as old as 1823...and may 
well be much older. It is a fair assumption that at least one reason must have 
been that the principles stated by Lord Mansfield required fair dealing, and 
it would have been unfair to the assured to require disclosure of matters 
which a reasonable underwriter would not have taken into account.”
The wording of section 18 (2) makes it clear that it is the judgment of a hypothetical 
prudent insurer that determines whether the undisclosed circumstance is material or 
not. However, the section fails to clarify the degree or manner of influence which the 
undisclosed information has to have upon the mind or judgment of the prudent 
insurer.
3.1.2.2.2.1.2 How is the Materiality assessed?
The question following the above discussion is, how the “materiality” of a 
circumstance is assessed; in other words, what criterion is to be used to determine 
whether a circumstance is, or is not, material.
(a)The “Decisive influence” test
It was thought in some quarters that, to satisfy the test for materiality and to quality 
for the right to avoid the contract, the court has to be satisfied that a hypothetical 
prudent insurer has to be decisively influenced by the non-disclosure of the material 
circumstance. Lord Goff in Pan Atlantic Insurance Co Ltd v. Pine Top Insurance Co 
Ltd. said: 120
“ ...it must be shown that full and accurate disclosure would have led the 
prudent insurer either to reject the risk or at least to have accepted it on more 
onerous terms. This has been called the ‘decisive influence’ test.”
120 Ibid, at p 430.
84
This decisive influence test was supported in the judgment of Lloyd J, in the court of 
first instance,121
. .whenever an insurer seeks to avoid a contract of insurance or reinsurance 
on the ground of misrepresentation or non-disclosure, there will be two 
separate but closely related questions:
(1) Did the misrepresentation or non-disclosure induce the actual insurer to 
enter into the contact on those terms?
(2) Would the prudent insurer have entered into the contract on the same 
terms if he had known of the misrepresentation or non-disclosure 
immediately before the contract was concluded?
If both questions are answered in favour of the insurer, he will be entitled to 
avoid the contract, not otherwise.”
(b) The rejection o f the “Decisive influence” test
However, the Court of Appeal in Container Transport International Inc and Reliance 
Group Inc v. Oceanus Mutual Underwriting Association Ltd.122 renounced the 
“decisive influence” test.
CTI is a container leasing company. CTI affected insurance with the defendant 
underwriters to cover damage suffered by their containers. However, CTI failed to 
inform the insurers that they had been refused insurance cover by other underwriters 
because of their inaccurate claims record.
The Court of Appeal ruled that the insurers were not liable under the policy, because 
under section 18(2) of the Act, the non-disclosure would have influenced the 
judgment of a prudent insurer. The court considered the meaning of the word
121 Container Transport International Inc and Reliance Group Inc v. Oceanus Mutual Underwriting 
Association Ltd. [1982] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 178.
122 [19 84] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 476 (CA)
1 9 ^“judgment” within the context of section 18. Kerr, L.J., stated,
“The point at issue turns mainly on the meaning of ‘judgment’ in the phrase 
‘would influence the judgment of a prudent insurer in fixing the premium or 
determining whether he will take the risk’. The judge in effect equates 
‘judgment’ with ‘final decision’, as though the wording of these provisions 
“would induce a prudent underwriter to fix a different premium or to decline 
the risk...This interpretation differs crucially from what I have always 
understood to be the law... the word ‘judgment’- to quote the Oxford 
English Dictionary to which we were referred- is used in the sense of ‘the 
formation of an opinion’. To prove the materiality of an undisclosed 
circumstance, the insurer must satisfy the court on a balance of probability- 
by evidence or from the nature of the undisclosed circumstance itself- that 
the judgment, in this sense, of a prudent insurer would have been influenced 
if the circumstance in question had been disclosed. The word ‘influenced’ 
means that the disclosure is one which would have had an impact on the 
formation of his opinion and on his decision making process in relation to 
the matters covered by si 8(2).”
This test was also rejected in the case of Pan Atlantic Insurance Ltd v. Pine Top 
Ltd.124 In this case, Pan Atlantic reinsured their excess of loss with insurers other 
than Pine Top for the years 1977-1979. Pine Top were reinsurers for the first time 
under the 1980 contract. As Pan Atlantic in 1982 sought a reduced premium, it was 
natural for Pine Top to be primarily interested in their loss record, before any 
re-arrangement of premium would be discussed. However, the loss record of Pan 
Atlantic over the years 1977-1979 was misrepresented to Pine Top and there were 
additional losses sustained by Pan Atlantic between 1980 and 1982 which were not 
disclosed to them either. Consequently, Pine Top declined any payment of losses, on 
the grounds of non-disclosure. The House ruled in favour of the underwriters, in that 
there was a material non-disclosure and, thus, the insurer was entitled to avoid the
19Scontract.
™ Ibid, atpp 491,492.
124 [1994] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 427.
125 Although this was non-marine reinsurance, the point of law was considered as one of construction of ss 18 
and 20 of the MIA 1906
19 f \In Pan Atlantic, Lord Mustill rejected the decisive influence test:,
“...must it be shown that full and accurate disclosure would have led the 
prudent underwriter to a different decision on accepting or rating the risk; or 
is a lesser standard of impact on the mind of the prudent underwriter 
sufficient; and, if so, what is that lesser standard?...The main thrust of the 
argument for Pan Atlantic is that this expression calls for the disclosure only 
of such circumstances as would, if disclosed to the hypothetical prudent 
underwriter, have caused him to decline the risk or charge an increased 
premium. I am unable to accept this argument.. .1 am bound to say that in all 
but the most obvious cases the ‘decisive influence’ test faces them with an 
almost impossible task. How can they tell whether the proper disclosure 
would turn the scale? By contrast, if all that they have to consider is whether 
the materials are such that a prudent underwriter would take them into 
account, the text is perfectly workable...Accordingly, treating the matter 
simply as one of statutory interpretation I would feel little hesitation in 
rejecting the test of decisive influence.”
Lord Slynn of Hadley agreed with Lord Mustill:127
“I agree with him that the ‘decisive influence’ test is to be rejected and that a 
circumstance may be material for the purposes of an insurance contract 
(whether marine or non-marine) even though had it been fully and 
accurately disclosed it would not have had a decisive effect on the prudent 
underwriter's decision whether to accept the risk and if so at what 
premium...”
And Lord Goff made his decision to support Lord Mustill as follows,128
“I turn next to the first question, which is whether the decisive influence test 
is the appropriate test for deciding whether a fact which has not been 
disclosed is a material fact. Here there is a difference of opinion between my 
two noble and learned friends, Lord Lloyd accepting the decisive influence 
test and Lord Mustill rejecting it. On this point, I respectfully prefer the
126 [1994] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 427 at pp 434, 440, 441.
127 Ibi d, at p 454.
m Ibid, at p 431.
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reasoning of Lord Mustill.”
(c) The actual inducement test
The case of Pan Atlantic Insurance Ltd v. Pine Top Ltd129 has advocated another test, 
the “actual inducement” test, which means that the actual insurer must be shown to 
have been induced into the contract by the material non-disclosure. Under this test, 
the insurer must show that he/she is induced to enter into the contract as result of that
ion
non-disclosure. Lord Goff stated this test in his judgment that,
“I accept that the actual inducement test accurately represents the law...I 
conclude that there is to be implied in the Marine Insurance Act, 1906 a 
requirement that a material misrepresentation will only entitle the insurer to 
avoid the policy if it induced the making of the contract; and that a similar 
conclusion must be reached in the case of a material non-disclosure.” And 
Lord Mustill also supported the actual inducement test:, 131 “ ... there is to 
be implied in the 1906 Act a qualification that a material misrepresentation 
will not entitle the underwriter to avoid the policy unless the 
misrepresentation induced the making of the contract, using ‘induced’ in the 
sense in which it is used in the general law of contract. This proposition is 
concerned only with material misrepresentations...”
In the later case of St Paul’s Fire and Marine Insurance v. McConnell Constructors 
Ltd the court of appeal supported the “actual inducement” test. In this case the 
appellants were a construction company contracted to build the parliament building 
in the Marshall Islands. They then effected a “contractors all risks” policy with the 
defendants but, at the time the insurance contract was drawn up, the plans shown to 
the insurers showed the building to have piled foundations. When subsidence later 
occurred, the insurers refused payment on the claim because it became evident that
m  Ibid, a t p 427.
130 Ibi d, at p 431.
! 131 Ibid, at pp 447, 452.
i
132 [1995] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 116.
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the building had been constructed without piled foundations. The court of Appeal 
ruled that there had been a non-disclosure of a material fact that had induced the 
insurers into underwriting the policy. Evans LJ. stated in his judgment that,133
“there is only a right to avoid when the misrepresentation or non-disclosure 
was ‘material’ and when the actual insurer was induced thereby to enter into 
the contract...As regards inducement, it is common ground that the insurer 
must prove that he was induced by the non-disclosure or misrepresentation 
to enter into a contract on terms which he would not have accepted if all 
material facts had been made known to him, and that the test of 
‘inducement’ is the same as is established by many authorities in the general 
law of contract.”
(d) A presumption o f the inducement
The “actual inducement” test has raised a related question, which is the notion of the 
presumption of inducement. In the Pan Atlantic Insurance Ltd v. Pine Top Ltd134case, 
Lord Mustill was clear in his mind that there is such a “presumption” in favour of the 
insurer. He stated in his judgment that,
“As a matter of common sense however even where the underwriter is 
shown to have been careless in other respects the assured will have an uphill 
task in persuading the Court that the withholding or misstatement of 
circumstances satisfying the test of materiality has made no difference. 
There is ample material both in the general law and in the specialist works 
on insurance to suggest that there is a presumption in favour of a causative 
effect.”
(e) An exemption o f the presumption o f the inducement
But, it is worth mentioning that there are some circumstances where the presumption
133 Ibi d, at pp 122, 124.
134 [1994] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 427.
135 Ibi d, at p 453.
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of inducement could be rebutted. For instance, if it could be shown that the insurer 
has not acted with the required care or skill the presumption of inducement will not 
apply.
An example of where rebuttal is possible is found in the judgment of Longmore J. in
7 3/CMarc Rich and Co AG v. Portman. The assured were traders in crude oil, and to 
perform their sale and purchase contracts they chartered vessels to collect oil from 
several loading ports. They insured their oil cargoes against loss or damage, and they 
also insured against incurring liabilities as charterers. The insurance also provided 
demurrage cover. When demurrage claims arose, the insurers paid some, but declined 
payment in respect of some other substantial claims on the grounds of non-disclosure. 
This non-disclosure included the lack of any information regarding demurrage claims 
(the loss experience), which the assured had previously paid to the shipowners. 
Furthermore, the assured had failed to disclose adverse port characteristics (such as 
bad weather or difficult tides) which are likely to give rise to demurrage claims. The 
court ruled in favour of the assured in respect of the non-disclosure of the 
characteristics of the port, in that these were held not to be material facts. However, 
the insurer was entitled to avoid liability in respect of the non-disclosure of the loss 
experience. Longmore, J., held that in cases where imprudence in the writing of the 
risk can be shown, the presumption of inducement is rebutted and the underwriters 
must prove actual inducement in order to avoid the contract. However, in the present 
case the underwriters were able to show that they were in fact induced to enter the
1 1 7contract as a result of this non-disclosure. Longmore J. stated that,
“In my view, the question whether the actual underwriter was induced to 
write the relevant risk is to be determined by reference to the actual risks 
underwritten...In either event, the risk would not have been written on the 
terms it was. In these circumstances, I hold that insurers have shown that 
they were induced to write the risk on the terms they did by reason of the
136 [19 96] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 430.
137 Ibid, at p 441.
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non-disclosure of the loss experience.”
Later, the impact of case Assicurazioni Generali SpA v Arab Insurance Group
110
(BSC) also seems to restrict the presumption of inducement significantly. 
Assicurazioni Facts
The claimants, Generali, were an Italian insurer and reinsurer. The defendants, ARIG, 
were an insurer and reinsurer. The claim in this case arises out of a quota share 
retrocession contract whereby Generali retroceded to ARIG a 7.5 per cent line in 
respect of certain US contractors' risks insured by United Insurance Group of 
Pennsylvania. It is common ground between the parties that the contract was initially 
for the insurance year from 2 July 1992 to 2 July 1993 but that it was extended until 
1 September 1993 by agreement between the parties in April/May 1993. ARIG 
continued to accept premium and pay claims until February 1999 but refused to pay 
any more claims after that date. Generali issued proceedings alleging that ARIG 
owed it over $6m by way of unpaid claims. ARIG's defense raised a number of 
issues one of which was that there was a breach of duty of utmost good faith on that 
the reinsurance was “supported” by Munich Re.
On 20 July 1992 ARIG received from Generila, as a part of the 62 page facsimile, 
copies of the security sheets which plainly showed which companies were 
participating in which sections of the packages. Munich Re were shown as 
participants in the programme on section A only and not on section B. ARIG said 
that he focused his attention on the retrocession slips and that he ‘did not review the 
rest of the 62 page facsimile’ ‘with any care’.
138 [2002] CLC 164.
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It was held by J. Morison that,139
“...had the information before the contract was made and his failure to read 
the enclosures is no excuse. If, which I doubt, Mr Rehman was under any 
misapprehension it was due to his own preconceived ideas and a failure to 
study the paperwork properly. In fact, 1 formed a favourable view of Mr 
Rehman as a careful man and witness. I have to say I find it incredible that 
he would have not read the fax in July as carefully as he did the retrocession 
slips which were a part of it. All the other signs are that he approached the 
underwriting decisions with meticulous care...I regard the Munich Re point 
as devoid of legal or factual merit: it seems to me that there was no falsity in 
the representation about support and that there was no inducement and 
ARIG knew the full picture before they signed and returned the retrocession 
slips.”
According to the above judgment, if the reinsurer ARIG has exercised his required 
care and skill, he should be able to get the information which was presented to him. 
Thus, the rules of presumption of inducement under this circumstance should be 
restricted.
3.1.2.2.2.2 The Scope of the Duty o f Disclosure on the Broker
Section 19 of MIA 1906 requires disclosure of three different categories of material 
circumstance. First, under section 19 (b) of the MIA 1906 a broker is expected to 
disclose every material circumstance that the assured is bound to disclose under 
section 18, unless it comes to the assurd’s knowledge too late for it to be 
communicated to the broker. The other two categories fall within Section 19 (a) of 
the MIA 1906 which provides that an insurance broker must disclose every fact 
known to him-the actual knowledge and which he ought to have known in the 
ordinary course of his business-the constructive knowledge. Whether the broker 
should disclose particular information within his ordinary course of business is a 
question of fact and will depend on the nature of that particular information and the 
time available for communicating with the underwriter between receipt of the
139Ibid, a tp  172.
information and placement of the risk.140 How to define the constructive knowledge 
which ought to be known by the broker in his ordinary business mirrors the question 
of how to define the circumstances that the insurer is presumed to know in his 
business which will be further discussed later.141
Section 18(3) of MIA 1906 sets up the exclusions of the broker’s duty of disclosure 
which states the following:
“In the absence of inquiry the following circumstances need not be disclosed, 
namely-(a) Any circumstance which diminishes the risk; (b) Any 
circumstance which is known or presumed to be known to the insurer. The 
insurer is presumed to know matters of common notoriety or knowledge, 
and matters which an insurer in the ordinary course of his business, as such, 
ought to know; (c) Any circumstance as to which information is waived by 
the insurer, (d) Any circumstance which it is superfluous to disclose by 
reason of any express or implied warranty.”
It is quite clear that the facts or circumstances which reduce the risk will not fall into 
the scope of the duty of disclosure. For example, in the case of The Dora142 the 
assured failed to disclose the fact that the insured vessel would have been kept in a 
builder’s yard during the period of construction. It was held that this information fell 
outside the scope of the information which needed to be disclosed to the insurer. In 
the case of The Elena G, 143 the fact that a yacht was kept in secure mooring was held 
to be immaterial as the security precautions diminished the risk.
However, the circumstances which are presumed to be known to the insurer are not 
easy to define. Although in the above section it has been explained that the insurer is 
presumed to know the matters which an insurer in the ordinary course of his business
140 Con tainer Transport International Inc and Reliance Group Inc v. Oceanus Mutual Underwriting 
Association Ltd. [1982] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 178 at p 197.
141 On how to define the circumstances that the insurer is presumed to know, see p 94 blow.
142 [1989] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 69.
143 [2002] Lloyd’s Rep IR 450.
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ought to know, there has not yet been analysis about the scope of the “ordinary 
course of business”. Accordingly, an elaboration of the circumstances that the insurer 
is presumed to know is provided below.
3.1.2.2.2.2.1 How to Define the Circumstances that the Insurer is Presumed to
Know
Several cases have addressed this issue.
The first one is Bolivia v. Indemnity Mutual Marine Assurance Co.144 In this case the 
assured, while obtaining insurance cover for his vessel, failed to disclose that there 
was war in the part of the world where the vessel would have navigated. The Court 
held that the insurer should have been aware of the situation in the course of his 
business.
The next one is the case of The Moonacre.145 In this case the assured, during the
I process of obtaining insurance cover for his yacht, disclosed to the underwriter where
I
I the vessel was going to be kept. However, the assured failed to disclose that a
number of burglaries had taken place in that marina. The Court held that the insurer 
should have been aware of this in the course of his business. Also, the insurer is 
deemed to be aware of information which is posted on a place where the insurer 
should check or be aware of in the course of business. It was held by Judge Colman 
that,146
“On the whole of the evidence I am not satisfied that a prudent underwriter 
would have been influenced in deciding on renewal by information that 
thieves had broken into the vessel while she was laid up at Puerto Banus. As 
a matter of common sense the precise value of what the thieves stole is of
144 [1909] 1 KB 785.
145 [1992] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 501.
146 Ibid, at p 518.
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secondary importance to the fact of breaking in and to the fact that there was 
also an attempt to take a television and the actual theft of the Panda car from 
alongside. But the fact of exposure to theft of this kind must be common to 
every single vessel laid up at a mooring in Spain and there was not shown to 
be anything in the circumstances of this theft which would have taken it out 
of the ordinary incidents to be anticipated during lay-up so as to make it a 
matter which a prudent underwriter entertaining a renewal would wish to 
take into account in deciding whether to write the risk and, if so, on what 
terms. The 1987 radio theft therefore was not a fact which ought to have 
been disclosed when in December, 1987 the third defendants applied for 
renewal of the policy.”
Another case is Friere v. Woodhouse.147 In this case there were two vessels, X and Y 
that sailed from the same port at the same time. After their departure, the owner of X 
obtained insurance cover for X. However, X failed to disclose to the insurer that the 
other vessel, Y, which sailed at the same time as X, had in fact arrived safely. The 
Court held that this was not a circumstance, which needed to be disclosed because 
the safe arrival of Y had already been published in Lloyd’s List. It seems fair to 
conclude that the assured did not need to disclosure the information which was 
posted on a place where the insurer should check or be aware of in the course of 
business.
However, the Court of Appeal had a different opinion in London General Insurance 
Co. Ltd. v. General Mutual Marine Underwriters Association14*. On September 25th, 
1918, the plaintiffs effected with the defendants a policy of reinsurance upon the 
cargo of the steamship Vigo, "lost or not lost," which the plaintiffs had themselves 
previously insured. On the night of September 24th it was known at Lloyd's that part 
of the cargo had been destroyed by fire on board the Vigo. The fact was posted on the 
casualty board at Lloyd's in the morning of September 25th, and a casualty slip 
containing the information was at the same time sent by Lloyd's to their subscribers, 
including the plaintiffs. At 10 o'clock on September 25 the plaintiffs instructed their
147 (1817) Holt NP 572.
148 [1921] 1 KB 104.
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brokers to effect the reinsurance policy at Lloyd's. They did it at 4 o'clock on the 
same afternoon. The plaintiffs, although they received the casualty slip, did not read 
it, and did not, in fact, know of the casualty. The defendants when they wrote the risk 
were equally ignorant of it. It was held that149 the defendants were entitled to 
judgment on the ground of non-disclosure of a material circumstance. The plaintiffs 
ought in the ordinary course of business to have known of the casualty in time to 
recall their instructions to their brokers to effect the reinsurance. They had no right to 
neglect the casualty slips in a case where the risk had already materialised on the ship. 
The defendants, on the other hand, if they had looked at the slips, could not be 
expected to have in mind information about a vessel which at the time they got the 
information would be of no interest to them at all.
From the above two cases it can be said that it is significant to the Lloyd’s 
Underwriter whether information is published in Lloyd’s List or in the, less reputable, 
Casualty Board at Lloyd’s. However, a reasonable underwriter is expected to be 
aware of both in the ordinary course of business. In the later case the Court of Appeal 
made the decision on the ground that the defendant had no insurable interest in the 
ship at the time the relevant item was posted. The decision will be different if the 
defendant did have an insurable interest at the time when the relevant item was 
posted. An example is where an existing insurance contract between the plaintiff and 
the defendant is about to expire and the two parties want to renew it. In this case the 
defendant will be expected to know of the casualty in his ordinary course of business.
The definition of circumstances that the insurer is presumed to know can be briefly 
summarized in the two following cases. In Carter v. Boehm150 Mr. Kealey argued 
that an underwriter who insures a risk within a particular industry ought to know or 
find out the practices of the industry or trade, and the matters which are in general
149 ibid.
150 (1766) 3 Burr 1905.
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well known by persons in that trade. He also submitted that if an underwriter is 
writing a class of business he should be conversant with the course of losses 
affecting the types of risk which fall within that class, although he cannot be 
presumed to know about particular losses which particularly affect certain assureds. 
In North British Fishing Boat Insurance Co., Ltd., v. Starr,151 Justice Rowlatt stated 
that,
“But how am I to look at the question, what ought an underwriter doing this 
business to know in the ordinary course of his business with regard to such a 
matter as is now before me? It seems to me that as this is a marine policy, I 
must look at the underwriter in this case as a person doing the business of 
insuring ships and as necessarily conversant with the course of losses 
affecting particular classes of ships. What he is not bound to know in the 
ordinary course of his business are particular circumstances specially 
affecting ships or lines of ships, and specially affecting some limited number 
of ships.”
3.1.2.2.2.2.2 Express and Implied Waiver
It is logical that the circumstances covered by an express or implied warranty fall 
outside the scope of the duty of disclosure for if the parties cover those aspects 
contractually, there is no need to intervene with an utmost good faith concept.152 It is 
possible for circumstances to be waived by either express agreement or through 
implied waiver.
Express waiver
There should be no difficulty with an express agreement to waive. A typical waiver 
agreement will state the following: “To the fullest extent permissible by applicable 
law, the Insurer hereby agrees that it will not seek to or be entitled to avoid or rescind
151 [1922] 13 LI L Rep 206.
152 The D ora [1989] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 69. The court held that this non-disclosure had no effect on the cover, since 
the issue in question is covered by an express warranty.
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this Policy on the grounds of non-disclosure or misrepresentation by the assured or 
his agents or any other similar grounds.”
However, it should be discussed further about what kind of conduct of the assured or 
broker can be expressly waived. Is it, for example, possible to waive fraud on the 
part of the broker or assured? Is there any limitation on the power to waive of the 
assured or broker? A modem authority on this point was raised up in HIH Casualty 
and General Insurance Ltd. v New Hampshire Insurance Co. and Others.153
HIH Facts
In this case HIH the underwriter of two film finance insurance policies, sought a 
determination of two preliminary issues relating to its claim against reinsurers, NHI, 
IIC and AXA. The insured, LDT, was indemnified in the event of a shortfall between 
the amount of finance provided and the revenue collected from two film projects.
HIH having paid LDT sums totaling over U.S.$31 m. sought to recover under the 
reinsurance agreements. The reinsurers refused to indemnify HIH on the grounds that 
HIH should not have paid LDT or alternatively that, whatever the position under the 
insurance contract they were not obliged to pay under the reinsurance contracts for 
various reasons including breaches of warranty and breaches of the duty of good 
faith.
The reinsurers contended that the underlying insurance contained a warranty to the 
effect that a slate of six or 10 films respectively would be made and that the 
reinsurance contained such a warranty and a further warranty that the insurers would 
obtain the consent of reinsurers to any amendment to the terms of the underlying 
insurance.
153 [2001] 2 Lloyd's Rep 161.
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The claimants submitted that cl. 8 of the policy wording disabled them from relying 
on any breach of warranty by the original assured and that as cl. 8154 was a term of 
the reinsurance it precluded the reinsurers from relying on any breach of warranty 
and further precluded the insurers from relying upon any misrepresentation or 
non-disclosure unless the same was fraudulent.
The key issue in this case was the effect of cl. 8, the relevant important issue being 
whether cl. 8 excluded fraudulent misrepresentation and non-disclosure and 
negligent misrepresentation and non-disclosure.
In the first instance Mr. Justice David Steel held that cl. 8 covered and thus excluded 
a defence based on negligent misrepresentation and non-disclosure. He stated as 
follows, 155
“It is conceded by reinsurers that the clause prohibits avoidance on the 
grounds of innocent non-disclosure and innocent misrepresentation. At the 
other end of the spectrum, there are in fact no allegations of fraud against 
HIH or its agents. For the record, I hold that it is not open to a party to 
exclude liability for his own fraud in inducing the contract: see S. Pearson 
& Son Ltd. v. Dublin Corporation, [1907] A.C. 351.”
However, it was held in the Court of Appeal by L. J. Rix that,156
“I note that in HIH Casualty and General Insurance Ltd. v. Chase Manhattan 
Bank, [2001] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 30 at par. 44 the case of Pearson v. Dublin 
Corporation is analysed by Mr. Justice Aikens, and that he concludes at pars. 
45-46 that it is conceptually possible to have a clause in a contract of
154 “Clause 8 Disclosure and/or Waiver Of Rights
8.1 To the fullest extent permissible by applicable law, the Insurer hereby agrees that it will not seek to or be 
entitled to avoid or rescind this Policy or reject any claim hereunder or be entitled to seek any remedy or 
redress on the grounds of invalidity or unenforceability of any of its arrangements with Flashpoint Ltd. or any 
other person (or of any arrangements between Flashpoint Ltd. or the Purchaser) or non-disclosure or 
misrepresentation by any person or any other similar grounds. The Insurer irrevocably agrees not to assert and 
waives any and all defences and rights of set-off and/or counterclaim (including without limitation any such 
rights acquired by assignment or otherwise) which it may have against the Assured or which may be available 
so as to deny payment of any amount due hereunder in accordance with the express terms hereof.”
155 [2001] 1 Lloyd's Rep 378 atp 388.
156 [2001] 2 Lloyd's Rep 161 atpp 186, 187.
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insurance that excludes or limits the consequences of fraudulent 
non-disclosure by the assured's agent.”
“It is for that reason that its effect will appear equivocal and so the Court 
naturally asks: what did the parties actually intend to cover by these general 
words? I think that the Canada Steamship case rules of construction were 
not intended to apply to a particular clause that is specifically directed at 
exempting liability for the breach of a particular type of absolute duty, 
where the breach can be established whether or not negligence (or fraud) is 
proved.”
So, subject to the limitations concerning fraud, discussed above, it seems that it can 
be argued that provided a clause in a contract of insurance is clearly and specifically 
intended to cover the consequences of a breach of the duty of disclosure or the "duty" 
not to misrepresent material facts, there should be no limitation on using fraud or 
negligence in non-disclosure or misrepresentation as the ground for a right to avoid a 
breach of the duty of good faith.
Implied waiver
In contrast to the clarity of express waivers, it is quite difficult to detect an implied 
Waiver. Such a waiver might arise if the insurer asks no further question even 
though the assured provided sufficient information or even though the insurer 
became aware of circumstances which ought to have put him on inquiry. In such a 
case it could be argued that by asking no further information the insurer has waived 
the disclosure requirement on the part of the assured. In Mann Macneal & Steevens 
Ltd. v. Capital and Counties Insurance C o157, the assured, while obtaining 
insurance cover for his vessel, disclosed that the vessel was at sea at that point in 
time and carrying cargo. The nature of the cargo was not disclosed by the assured but 
was in fact petrol stored in drums. Later, the insurer became aware of the nature of 
the cargo and attempted to avoid the policy for non-disclosure. It was ruled by Mr.
157 [1920] 4 Lloyd’s Rep 57.
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Justice Greer158 that
“It seems to me that the fact that she was then definitely fixed to carry these 
dangerous goods makes all the difference, because the insurers who were 
told that, would know at the time, and would say, ‘I am asked to make an 
insurance on a cargo which is definitely fixed to the extent of 2500 drums of 
this dangerous, material.’ I (his Lordship) describe it as dangerous material, 
because it was clear that so long as it remains in the drums it is just as 
innocent as toffee or syrup in drums, but at the same time one knows of the 
innumerable risks run by a ship during the course of the voyage from the 
time the goods are put into the ship until the time they are taken out of the 
ship at the other end. I think this is a fixture which ought to have been 
disclosed as a material fact, and ought to have been known to the 
Underwriters.”
Accordingly the insurer had waived the information since sufficient information was 
provided by the assured to put him on inquiry, but nevertheless no question was 
asked as to the nature of the cargo.
3.1.2.2.2.3 The Duty o f Discloser on Sub-broker
Another important issue regarding such kind of duty on the broker is the duty of 
disclosure on sub-brokers. One of the most popular examples of a sub-broker 
situation is stated at the beginning of this Chapter: when a broker is not accredited to 
obtain the insurance cover for the assured from the market he may contact another 
broker who is capable of doing the business. The latter is called the placing broker 
and the former, the producing broker. The relationship between them in effect is that 
the placing broker acts as the broker to the producing broker. Accordingly, he is the 
sub-broker for the original assured. As discussed above, section 19 of MIA 1906 sets 
out the duty of disclosure of the broker. However, it does not contain any clear 
reference to the required status of the broker. Should that section be restricted to the 
producing broker only, or, do the placing broker and other sub-brokers also owe such
158 Ibi d, at p 58.
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a duty?
This question has been referred recently in the case of BP pic v. Aon Ltd}59 
BP Facts
BP and 28 co-assureds were insured for the period 31 December 1998 to 1 July 2000 
under an all risks open cover. The insurance had been placed by Aon. Aon presented 
the risk to London, European and US market insurers in 1998. The policy was on a 
declaration basis, so that each individual risk had to be declared before the insurance 
attached to it. It was determined by Aon that Aon London would handle declarations 
to the open cover emanating from BP's London office, whereas declarations 
emanating from Chicago would be handled by Aon companies in the US and 
transmitted to London. In April 1999 BP and Aon Texas executed a three-year 
service agreement which set out the obligations of the parties and the fee structure 
for Aon Texas. By June 2000 some 30 projects were declared to the leading 
underwriters. Of those, four were withdrawn and 14 did not give rise to losses. The 
remaining 12 projects produced claims of some US$220m which were disputed by 
the underwriters on coverage grounds and also on the basis of misrepresentation and 
non-disclosure. A number of the declarations were accepted, but four were not and a 
further three were subjected to increased premium and additional deductibles. The 
leading underwriters commenced proceedings against BP in New York and 
subsequently in London, asserting that the declarations were invalid. BP joined Aon 
London and Aon Texas to the English proceedings, alleging breach of the service 
agreement and breach of duty of care.
BP's assertion was that Aon London owed a duty of care to BP which it had broken 
by failing to exercise reasonable care and skill in making timely declarations to the 
open cover. Aon London denied liability. It rejected the suggestion that it owed any
159 [2006] Lloyd’s Rep IR 577.
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duty of care, in that the relationship between BP and Aon was set out in the service 
agreement which set out the entirety of the parties' obligations worldwide. Aon 
London had never been a party to that agreement, and thus did not owe any duties.
Before Colman J. made his decision, he turned to the decided cases on the specific 
question of whether a sub-agent owed a duty of care to the principal.
The point has arisen in a number of insurance and reinsurance cases. There are 
different points of view that have been taken regarding such a duty on a sub-agent.
In some cases where a duty of care was established there had been either a 
concession or an assumption to that effect.160 While in other cases a duty of care 
had been denied161 or at best held to be arguable so that the claim should not be 
struck out.162
The question in the present case was, therefore, whether Aon London had 
assumed responsibility towards BP in the making of declarations. After a lengthy 
review of the facts, Colman J concluded that there had indeed been the required 
assumption of responsibility and, accordingly, that Aon London had owed a duty 
of care to BP. Colman J was satisfied that Aon London undertook responsibility 
to BP to provide the services of a broker under the open cover with proper 
professional skill and care, and that BP relied upon that undertaking. The learned 
judge continued:163
'The very essence of the service which BP was entitled to expect Aon 
London to provide was the provision of complete cover for each 
notified project and not merely cover from the leading underwriters.
On each occasion when Aon London received from BP London or
160 see Coolee Ltd v Wing, Heath & Co (1930) 38 LI LR 188; Mint Security Ltd v Blair [1982] 1 Lloyd's Rep 188; 
O'Brien v Hughes-Gibb & Co Ltd [1995] LRLR 90; Tudor Jones II  v Crawley Colosso Ltd  [1996] 2 Lloyd's Rep 
619.
161 Pa ngood Ltd v Barclay Brown & Co Ltd [1999] Lloyd's Rep IR 405.
162 Eur opean International Reinsurance Co Ltd v Curzon Insurance Ltd [2003] Lloyd's Rep IR 793.
163 [2006] Lloyd’s Rep IR 577.
103
from BP Chicago ... a notification of a project to be declared to the 
Open Cover Aon London's professional duty of care was engaged.
Once it received the instructions its duty attached to that project and it 
was obliged to take such steps as were reasonably required to procure 
cover by declaring the project to all the underwriters on the London 
and continental markets, including all the Frankona Defendants. Its 
omission to do so would amount to a breach of its professional duty of 
care in tort.”
In reaching this conclusion Colman J analysed the terms of the service agreement 
itself, including the indemnity provisions which conferred an obligation on Aon to 
indemnity BP for liabilities or losses suffered by it or its associates, and found 
nothing in it which was inconsistent with the imposition of a duty of care on Aon 
London. Colman J went on to hold that Aon London had owed a duty of care not 
just to BP, but also to its affiliates, co-venturers and contractors who were the 
co-assureds under the open cover. Those parties had relied upon BP's 
procurement of cover, and there could be an assumption of responsibility even if 
it was indirectly conveyed. In the present case the communication to BP by Aon 
London of an assumption of responsibility was also a representation to other 
co-assureds of Aon London's personal responsibility to them, given that they had 
relied on Aon London to perform its delegated functions.
English law has yet to give a definitive answer to the question of whether a placing 
broker who has no contractual relationship with the assured owes a duty of care to 
the assured in the placement of the risk, or whether liability is borne entirely by the 
producing broker with whom the assured does have a contract. In BP pic v Aon Ltd 
case, the point arose not in the context of a placing broker, but in the context of the 
sub-brokers to whom the duty to declare risks to an open cover had been delegated. 
Colman J held that the sub-broker had a duty of care to the assured despite the 
absence of any contract between them, and in so deciding has opened the way to a 
more generalised finding that placing brokers do owe duties of care.
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3.1.2.2.3 Duty not to make misrepresentation
Another key aspect of the duty of utmost good faith is the duty not to make 
misrepresentation. This aspect of the general duty is specifically developed in the 
Section 20 of MIA 1906 which states:
“20. Representations pending negotiation of contract 
Every material representation made by the assured or his agent to the insurer 
during the negotiations for the contract, and before the contract is concluded, 
must be true. If it be untrue the insurer may avoid the contract... (3) A 
representation may be either a representation as to a matter of fact, or as to a 
matter of expectation or belief’
According to the above section, a representation could be either a representation of 
facts or a representation of opinion or a representation of intention.
3.1.2.2.3.1 Representation o f Fact
An example where the representation is one of facts can be shown in Williams v. 
Atlantic Assurance Company, Limited164. In this case the assured stated that a cargo 
of textile goods was worth 8,000 pounds, but in fact it was worth only 250 pounds. 
The representation of the cargo’s price was the representation of facts. It was held by 
Slesser L.J. that165,
“I hold that, under s. 20 of the 1906 Act, the underwriter was entitled to 
avoid the contract for an untrue material representation. That is to say, I find 
the value which was declared at 8000 to have been in fact 250 and no 
more.”
In another case, a representation as to where the cargo was stored was the relevant
164 [1933] 1 KB 81.
165Ibid, a tp  108.
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representation of facts. In Liberian Insurance Agency Inc. v. Mosse166, while 
obtaining the insurance cover, the assured described the cargo as cups and plates in 
wooden cases. When the goods arrived, it was found that the cargo was stored in
1 f \  7cardboard-boxes. It was held by Mr. Justice Donaldson that,
“There are, however, other matters which underwriters say should have been 
disclosed in accordance with the duty of disclosure imposed by s. 18 of the 
Marine Insurance Act, 1906, or which involved material misrepresentation 
and gave rise to a right to avoid the contract under s. 20 of that Act. I can 
deal with these briefly, because there is little in dispute, (a) There was a 
failure to disclose that the cargo included 823 cartons as contrasted with 
wooden cases. This fact was clear from the invoices, which were in the 
possession of L.I.A. when the risk was placed. It is a mystery why the goods 
were described simply as being ‘in wooden cases’ and who was responsible 
for this misdescription. On the evidence, Mr. Phillips concedes, as he must, 
that this was a material non-disclosure or misrepresentation. The fact that 
part of the cargo was contained in cartons would have affected the premium 
or rendered underwriters unwilling to accept the risk at all. The reason is 
that cartons are more susceptible to water damage and, if so damaged, may 
fail to protect the enamel ware.”
3.1.2.23.2 Representation o f Opinion
An example of a representation of opinion can be seen in Anderson v. Pacific Fire 
and Marine Insurance Co. . It was held in this case that a statement by the captain 
of a vessel that a meeting point on a sea voyage was “a good and safe anchorage and 
well sheltered” was an honest opinion.
The valuation of a subject-matter of insurance is also a representation of opinion.169 
When the representation of the valuation is more than the real value of the
166 [1977] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 560.
167Ibid, a tp  565.
168 [1872] LR 7 CP 65.
169 Io nides v. Pender [1874] LR 9 QB 531.
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subject-matter, there is an excessive valuation. For example, a cargo of spirits worth 
500 pounds was insured under a valued policy for 3,000 pounds and this is an 
excessive valuation. In some circumstances, excessive valuation is a 
misrepresentation. However, in some other cases, such kind of valuation does not 
constitute a misrepresentation. The following two cases were both about 
overvaluation. But the judgment was completely different in each.
The first case is Eagle Star Insurance Co. Ltd. v Games Video Co. (GVC) S.A. (the 
"Game Boy")'70
The Game Boy Facts
The vessel Game Boy was insured by the claimant under a marine hull policy at a 
value of U.S.$1,800,000. The insurance was taken out to cover the period while the 
vessel was laid up at Chalkis and whilst the repairs were carried out at Avlis shipyard. 
The resulting damage caused Game Boy to list to starboard and partially to sink. The 
defendants were the named assureds under the insurance policy and made a claim 
against the insurers under the policy. The insurers sought a declaration that the 
contract of insurance had been validly avoided and/or that they were under no 
liability to the defendants. The insurers argued that the defendants had made material 
misrepresentations about the condition and value of the vessel, and in particular that 
the vessel’s true value was significantly less than the value of U.S.$1,800,000 in the 
insurance contract.
It was held by Simon J. as follows,171
170 [2004] 1 Lloyd's Rep 238.
171 Ibi d, at p 248.
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“the defendants had no genuine belief that the value of the vessel was 
U.S.SI,800,000; the documents said to form the basis for the defendants’ 
stated belief were, to their knowledge, not genuine; they were created because 
the defendants knew very well that the valuation of U.S.$1,800,000 could not 
be justified without them; the true value of the vessel at the time of the 
contract of insurance was U.S.$100-150,000, and the defendants knew that; 
the misrepresentation was material, and was relied on by the insurers; the 
insurers were therefore entitled to avoid the contract of insurance”
In the light of the findings of facts in the Game Boy case, it should be concluded that 
the assured had no genuine belief that the value of the vessel was U.S. $ 1,800,000 
and the assureds knew very well that the valuation of U.S.$1,800,000 could not be 
justified. This case further establishes that valuation is a matter of opinion and that a
• * • 172statement of value can only amount to a misrepresentation if made in bad faith.
In contrast, the decision in the case of North Star Shipping Ltd v Sphere Drake
11 'XInsurance Pic was completely different.
North Star was purchased by one of the Kent companies in a damaged condition for 
US$1.3 million in September 1989. In April 1994 an agreement was entered into to 
sell the vessel at a price of US$1.4 million. The vessel was insured with the 
defendants under a war risks policy. The war risks cover was for US$4 million. In 
this case, the insurers raised two main grounds of defence. First, they alleged that the 
loss was not caused by an insured peril because the explosion was deliberately 
caused or procured by the assured owners for the purpose of advancing a fraudulent 
claim on underwriters.
172 see s. 20(5) o f the Marine Insurance Act 1906 and Economides v. Commercial Union Assurance Co. Pic 
[1998] QB 587, per Lord Justice Peter Gibson at p 606:
“Once statute deems an honest representation as to a matter of belief to be true, I cannot see that there is scope 
for inquiry as whether there were objectively reasonable grounds for that belief. Of course the absence of 
reasonable grounds for belief may point to the absence of good faith for that belief. But in a case such as the 
present where the bad faith of the plaintiff is not alleged, I can see no basis for the implication of a 
representation of reasonable grounds for belief.”
173 [2006] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 183.
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Secondly, the insurers alleged that they were entitled to avoid the policies for 
misrepresentation and non-disclosure of a number of matters, one of which was 
regarding the value of the vessel that there had been excessive valuation of the vessel 
at US$4 million when the market value was only US$1.4 million.
It was held by LJ. Lloyd at the Court of Appeal that,174
“the excessive valuation was a material fact. The test of materiality was 
whether the disparity between the insured value and the market value was 
consistent with prudent ship management. The market value of North Star 
was agreed at US$1,350,000. An underwriter knowing the market value 
roughly would appreciate the difference between US$4 million and US$1.35 
million, and ask questions if he were interested in finding out what the 
reasons were for the differential. The sale logically added nothing to the 
knowledge that the underwriter had of the market value. If the sale had no 
relevance the underwriter could see for himself that the difference between 
US$4 million and the vessel's market value would raise questions. The 
underwriter might prefer to take the extra premium rather than investigate 
whether the good management reasons established US$4 million as opposed 
to some lesser figure”
Normally, excessive valuation is a misrepresentation. However, there are several 
situations where an excessive valuation will not avoid the contract. First if both 
parties are aware of the excessive valuation there is agreement between the assured 
and the insurer on the subject-matter of insurance and hence the rationale for 
avoiding the contract falls. Secondly where the insurer is not aware of the excessive 
valuation, but the excessive valuation can be explained as a part of an ordinary 
business transaction it might be justified. The North Star case belongs to the second 
scenario .
174 Ibi d, paras 46-48.
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3.1,2.23,3 Representation o f Intention
In Seismik Sekuritik AG. v. Spere Drake Insurance Co. pic ,175 the assured, during 
negotiations, indicated that the insured vessel would not be chartered. Later, during 
the currency of the policy, the insured vessel was chartered and the insurer attempted 
to avoid the policy for misrepresentation. The court held that this did not amount to 
misrepresentation as when the statement was made the assured had genuinely 
intended this to the case even though he later changed his mind.
3.1.2.2.3.4 A Special Circumstance
There is a particular issue that should be discussed here which is whether inaccurate 
answers to ambiguous questions amounts to misrepresentation. This question was 
discussed in Willmott v. General Accident Fire.176 In this case a motor boat which 
was insured under a time policy sank during a gale. The insurer attempted to avoid 
the policy because during negotiations the assured stated that the value of the vessel 
was 200 pounds even though he bought it for much less but spent a lot of money to 
upgrade her. The question posed to the assured was “What did it cost to you?” The 
question is ambiguous, because it could mean two things: “What did it cost to you to 
buy?” or “What did it cost to you to put her in the state she is now?” It was held that 
the sinking was due to perils of the sea and was not caused by the defective condition 
of the vessel or through the plaintiffs failure to repair, that the change of plan as to 
mooring was made subsequent to the date of policy, and that as such a change was 
not prohibited by the policy the question of non-disclosure of that material fact did 
not arise; and that the incorrect answer made by the plaintiff as to the value of the 
vessel was probably due to the fact that he was incorrectly questioned by the 
defendant’s agent, who himself completed the proposal form. Judgment was for the
175 [1997] 8 CL 351.
176 (1935) 53 L1L Rep 156.
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plaintiff for the actual value of the vessel. Accordingly, the representation made by 
the assured was not a wrong one.
3.1.2.3 Other Duties of Broker to Insurers
As discussed above, regarding the intermediary of the broker, the main rule is that 
the broker is the agent of the party seeking insurance and he must not allow any other 
possible duty to conflict with his obligations to his primary principal. If such a 
conflict is perceived to exist, the broker must obtain the principal’s fully informed 
consent to permit him to act in a dual capacity.177 In some circumstances, a broker 
may act in a dual capacity as the agent for both the assured and the insurer if two 
conditions are satisfied, (i) the broker must, in a clear manner, assume responsibility 
to the insurer and (ii) this assumption of responsibility must not have an actual or 
potential impact on the duty of the broker to the assured, e.g. regarding claims, 
regarding collection and payment of premiums, in relation to the placing of 
reinsurance, and in accepting risks under a binding authority. This chapter will only 
focus on the duties of the broker to the insurer at the formation stage- under a 
binding authority and in relation to the placing of reinsurance.
3.1.2.3.1 Under a Binding Authority
A binding authority is a contract between an insurer and a broker delegating certain 
underwriting powers to the broker. Under a “binding authority”, an underwriter may 
authorise a broker to rate and accept specified risks on his behalf without reverting to 
the underwriter to obtain his approval. The broker therefore becomes the agent of the
177 In North and South Trust Company v. Berkeley [1970] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 467, a Lloyd’s broker obtained for 
underwriters an adjuster’s report which the insured wished to see. The underwriters applied for an injunction to 
prevent the brokers from providing it. Donaldson J., as he then was, held that although the practice of Lloyd’s 
underwriters in using brokers to communicate with assessors on their behalf was wholly unreasonable and 
therefore incapable of being a legal usage the brokers when acting for the underwriters were not acting in 
discharge of any duty to the insured and were therefore not under a duty to pass on to the insured the 
confidential information they obtained on behalf of the underwriters.
In Anglo-African Merchants Ltd v. Bayley [1969] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 268, it was held that it was in law inconsistent 
with a Broker’s duty to the Assured for the broker to act as agent for Lloyd’s Underwriters without the consent 
of the Assured.
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underwriter. It is the broker who deals with the negotiation of terms, although they 
are not usually capable of much argument, and issues the necessary documentation to 
the assured.
The advantages of using a binding authority include saving time and avoiding 
excessive administration because the process enables routine risks to be placed at 
Lloyd’s without the need for individual negotiation of each risk. Also there is one 
dispute that was removed by the operation of a “binder”. By using a binder, any 
information given to the broker will be transferred to the underwriter, so that 
avoidance for nondisclosure cannot be attempted later by the underwriter in respect 
of such information if the broker has not passed it on.
“Binding authorities” evidence is an accepted practice at Lloyd’s in which the broker 
acts in a dual capacity. On the one hand he is arranging insurance for the insured on 
the best possible terms, and yet on the other he is obtaining business for his other 
principal, the underwriter, and obtaining further commission for himself. There are 
various conflicts of interest that might arise in the operation of a binder. For instance, 
the assured could obtain insurance cover with better conditions from other insurers, 
but the broker, by using the binder ties him to the insurer from whom the broker got 
the binding authority. In short, in such a case, both the insurer and the broker benefit
1 78from using the binder but the assured loses out. On the other hand, the assured 
might not be able to obtain any insurance cover from the market or he could obtain 
the cover at a higher cost, but the broker, by using the binder, provides him a 
reasonable cover from his insurer. In this situation, it is the broker and the assured 
who benefit from using the binder while the insurer loses out.
1 7QAs discussed above, in insurance the broker is specifically instructed by the
178 In practice, however, the assured should be able to evaluate the quality of the insurance obtained by the broker 
and can take his business elsewhere if it proves unsatisfactory or uncompetitive.
179 S e e p 64.
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assured to obtain the best possible insurance for that assured, and the assured will 
believe that the broker is doing exactly that, without concern for personal gain or
1 OA
with other motives. Megaw L J . in Eagle Star Insurance Co v. Spratt stated that 
“an agent for one party should not act for the opposite party in connection with the 
same transaction without the latter’s informed consent” Thus any failure of the 
broker in complying with the above dictum may lead to liability for breach of his 
duties as an agent, provided that damage can be proven. Accordingly, one method of 
avoiding the conflict of interest is to request the broker to make it clear to the assured 
whether he is under any binding authority with any insurers and to obtain the consent 
of the assured.
3.1.2.3.2 In Relation to the Placing o f Reinsurance
Since the eighteenth century the law has accepted that the broker is the agent of the 
assured and that duties of the broker are owed to the assured rather than to 
underwriters. That principle has in recent years begun to break down in the light of 
the realities of insurance and reinsurance markets.181 Brokers will often find 
themselves representing different parties up and down a reinsurance chain, and it has 
been accepted that a broker owes a duty of utmost good faith to underwriters when 
placing a risk and a broker can be liable to underwriters for losses incurred on their 
policies where the underwriters were induced to enter into those policies by promises
1 89of reinsurance cover.
180 [1971] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 116.
181 One of the leading cases is Everett v. Hogg Robinson & Gardner Mountain (Insurance) Ltd [1973] 2 Lloyd’s 
Rep 217; Another case where the Lloyd’s broker breached a duty owed to underwriters is 
Forsikringsaktieselskapet Vesta v. Butcher, Bain Dawes and others [1988] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 19. The modem test of 
liability is whether the broker has assumed responsibility to the insurer under the reinsurance over, a point 
illustrated by the decision of the Court of Appeal in European International Reinsurance Co Ltd v Curzon 
Insurance Ltd  [2003] Lloyd's Rep IR 805.
182 The duty of the broker to the reinsurer under the reinsurance cover has also been be considered above at p 36.
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3.1.2.4 The Reform of Insurance Law on the Duty of Utmost Good Faith
In the final discussion of the duties of the broker, the recent reforms of insurance law, 
particularly the reforms regarding the duty of utmost good faith will be discussed. 
In the course of 2006 and 2007, the English and Scottish Law Commissions 
published three Issues Papers which led up to publication of an consultation paper in
1 RTJuly 2007. That document sets out the Law Commissions' provisional 
recommendations on Utmost Good Faith, Warranties and Intermediaries.
3.1.2.4.1 Utmost Good Faith
The Law Commissions’ review of current insurance law and the approach towards its 
reform has been based on the distinction between consumer insurance and business 
insurance. In outline, the Law commission has proposed that there should be no duty 
of disclosure in consumer insurance, but only an obligation to answer questions. The 
duty of disclosure would be retained in business insurance.
3.1.2.4.1.1 Consumer Insurance
The Law commission has proposed that there should be no duty of disclosure in 
consumer insurance, on the basis that “[ijnsurers should ask questions about what 
they want to know; consumers should not be expected to give information that has 
not been asked for.”184 Faced with such a question, the duty of the assured under the 
current recommendation is to give accurate answers.
The remedies are available to the insurer when the assured has made a material false
183 The La w Commission Consultation Paper No 182 and the Scottish Law Commission Discussion Paper No 
134, Insurance Contract Law: Misrepresentation, Non-Disclosure and Breach o f  Warranty by the Insured (2007)
184 Ibid, at para 1.75.
114
statement to the questions and the insurer can prove that he was induced by the false 
statement to enter into the insurance contract. The insurer’s remedies depend upon 
the assured’s state of mind. If the assured has given his answers to questions honestly 
and carefully, he is entitled to have his claim paid and the insurer has no remedy 
against him; if the assured has deliberately or recklessly given false answers to 
questions which a reasonable assured ought to have known would be relevant to the 
insurer, the policy may be avoided; if the assured has been negligent in his answers, 
the insurer’s remedy will be based on the principle that he should be returned to the 
position where they would have been in if there is no such misrepresentation.185
As to the materiality of the statement, the “prudent insurer” test would be replaced 
with the “prudent assured” test accordingly. The test is whether the fact in question 
would appear be material to a reasonable assured in the circumstances but not the 
insurer.
3.1.2.4.1.2 Business Insurance
In contrast to the proposals for consumer insurance, the duty of disclosure is to be 
retained for business insurance. In business cases, therefore, there is both duty of 
disclosure and a duty not to misrepresent facts.
As far as disclosure is concerned, the remedies for the insurer is available if the 
assured did not disclose the material facts to the insurer and the insurer was induced 
by the non-disclosure to enter into the insurance contract. The above abolition of the 
prudent insurer test and its replacement with the prudent assured test, recommended 
by the Law Commissions as the approach to be adopted in consumer insurance, has 
been adopted by the Law Commissions as the default rule for business policies as
185 For i nstance, if the insurers would have charged an additional premium, the amount of the claim is reduced in 
proportion to degree of underinsurance; if the insurers would have excluded a particular risk, the claim will not be 
payable if it would have fallen within the exclusion; and if the insurers would have declined the risk, the policy is 
to be avoided and premiums returned.
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well.
As far as misrepresentation is concerned, the recommendation follows those for 
consumer policies. The remedies will be available to the insurer if there was false 
statement, a reasonable assured would have been aware that the information was 
relevant to the insurer, and there was the necessary inducement. Different remedies 
should be applied depending upon whether the assured was innocent, negligent or 
fraudulent. The Law Commissions have adhered to their view that if the assured 
made the misrepresentation innocently, he should be able to recover and that if a 
policy obtained by fraud, that policy should be voidable. However, as far as 
negligence is concerned, it has yet to be decided whether to apply the consumer 
principle of putting the insurers into the position they would have been in but for the 
negligence or whether negligence should be treated in the same way as fraud.
3.1.2.4.2 Intermediaries
The issues of the role of intermediaries are considered by the Law Commissions. The 
question of the incidence of the agency of an intermediary matters when the 
intermediary has obtained information from the assured to put to the insurers in an 
application for cover, but has either failed to disclose facts revealed by the assured or 
has misstated them. If the intermediary is the agent of the assured, those risks are 
borne by him; if the intermediary is the agent of the insurers, they are deemed to 
know what the agent has been told and thus cannot rely upon the defences of 
non-disclosure or misrepresentation.
The Law Commissions have proposed that an intermediary should be regarded as the 
insurer’s agent for the purposes of obtaining pre-contract information and such an 
intermediary should remain the insurer’s agent while completing a proposal form. 
While, the intermediary who is genuinely searching the market on the assured’s 
behalf should be regarded as the agent of assured.
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However, in business insurance, the position of brokers is more complex. The 
presumption of the common law is that a broker is the agent of the assured, starting 
with the search for insurance and ending with the progression of claims, and in 
particular in the presentation of information to insurer. Despite his role as agent of 
the assured, the broker may be the agent of the insurer for other purpose. Since it 
does not automatically follow that a person who searches the market on the assured’s 
behalf should remain the agent of the assured when presenting information to the
t 0£
insurers, the question of whether the broker should be treated as the agent of 
insurer in placing business is proposed.
The point of if it is appropriate to transfer the agency of the broker in the placement 
process is discussed in the LCCP. There were four possible justifications for transfer 
were discussed in the paper, but were thought to be not convincing.187 However, the 
retaining the present agency rule that the broker is the agent of the assured in 
placement was argued by Professor Rob Merkins that, “the present agency rule is 
incompatible with the Law Commissions’ own recommendations, which turn on the 
state of mind of the assured. The Law Commissions have to some extent recognised
186 Rob Merkin and John Lowiy, Reconstructing Insurance Law: The Law Commission s Consultation Paper, 
[2008] MLR 71 (1)95 at p 104.
187 The La w Commission Consultation Paper No 182 and the Scottish Law Commission Discussion Paper No 
134, Insurance Contract Law: Misrepresentation, Non-Disclosure and Breach o f Warranty by the Insured (2007), 
at paras 10.7-10.23 which were:
(i) the deep pocket theory, namely that insurers are more likely than brokers to be able to meet the assured,s claim 
and so insurers should bear liability;
(ii) the ease of enforcement argument, namely that the assured can simply sue the insurers for the defaults of the 
broker rather than first suing the insurers, losing and then turning to the broker;
(iii) the reasonable expectations argument, namely that the assured expects the broker to be acting for insurers; 
and
(iv) the market discipline argument, which is that insurers rather than assureds will be aware of broker 
shortcomings so that inefficient brokers would fall by the wayside if insurers were responsible for their 
actions.
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1 8Sthis in their discussion of section 19(a) of thel906Act.”
Section 19 (a) of the MIA 1906 provides that an agent to insure must disclose every 
fact known to him or which he ought to have known in the ordinary course of his 
business. The Law Commission have recommended the repeal of section 19 (a) in its 
application to consumer insurance. The LCCP proposes that where a broker has 
failed to disclose facts which were known by him but were not known to the assured, 
the insurer should no longer have the right to avoid the policy. Instead, the insurer 
should have the right to claim damages from the broker, on the basis that the section 
19(a) duty is imposed on the broker rather than on the assured. “If section 19(a) is 
left untouched in business insurance, then under the Law Commissions’ proposals an 
assured who was wholly unaware of facts relevant to the insurers could still find that 
the insurers had the right to avoid by reason of the broker’s knowledge of those facts 
and his failure to disclose them, once again making a mockery of the notion that an 
innocent assured is to be protected.”189
188 Rob Merkin and John Lowry, Reconstructing Insurance Law: The Law Commission s Consultation Paper, 
[2008] MLR 71 (1) 95 at p 106.
189 Ibid. at pl05.
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3.2 RIGHTS OF THE BROKER
3.2.1 Payment for the Broker’s Service
The main right of the broker is to claim his commission once the contract is made. A 
broker is usually employed to obtain insurance for a specific period of a particular 
risk on the best possible terms for the assured. Therefore, he is entitled to the 
remuneration when a valid and binding contract of insurance has come into existence, 
which covers the required or appropriate risks.
3.2.1.1 Who Pays the Broker’s Commission
The British Insurance Broker’s Council accepted190that the broker’s remuneration is 
paid by the insurer, and did not suggest that it should be paid directly by the assured 
to the broker. This practice is well established and fully sanctioned by the court. In 
Pryke v. Gibbs Hartley Cooper191 Waller J. made the following statement,
“ .. .the traditional view is that brokerage is promised and paid by the insurer 
for the introduction of business...the insured is content for the broker to 
receive that brokerage because it constitutes remuneration for the services 
he has performed and is performing for the insured..
3.2.1.2 When will the Broker be Paid?
The liability of the insurer to pay brokerage to the broker comes into existence when 
the contract is formed. The time for payment of brokerage to the broker is not upon 
the formation of a binding contract, which can exist without payment of premium or 
even agreement as to premium, but upon the payment of premium by the broker. The 
broker is invariably paid by commission, which is deducted by him upon receipt of
190 See 1876 Consultative Document published the Council.
191 [1991] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 602.
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the gross premium from the assured, prior to forwarding the balance to the insurer.
3.2.1.3 What Happens if the Contract is Cancelled at Later Stage? Is the Broker
Entitled to Retain the Commission?
It has already been emphasized that although the broker’s duties and obligations are 
primarily owed to his client—the assured, it is the insurer who is actually liable to
1Q9 »pay the brokerage. Following Velos v. Harbour Insurance Services it has been 
equally clear that brokerage is earned once the contract of insurance is formed, so 
that any later cancellation or termination does not require the broker to return the 
“unearned” brokerage, even if the premium from which brokerage is deducted is 
payable in instalments. He can keep the amount he got.
However, the situation is different where a contract is avoided ab initio. It is as 
though it never existed, and the parties must be returned to their original positions. 
The insurer is responsible to the assured for the return of the gross premium paid by 
the assured. The question then arises of what happens to the brokerage. Usually it is 
returned by the broker to the insurer if the insurer has paid the gross premium direct 
to the assured, or added by the broker to the net premium returned by the insurer to 
the broker, before returning the gross sum to the assured.
3.2.2 Lien on Policy
Section 53(2) of the Marine Insurance Act 1906 states:
“Unless otherwise agreed, the broker has, as agent of the assured, a lien 
upon the policy for the amount of the premium and his charges in respect of 
effecting the policy; and where he has dealt with the person who employs 
him as principal, he also has a lien on the policy in respect of any balance on 
any insurance account which may be due to him from such person, unless 
when the debt was incurred he had reason to believe that such person was
192 [1997] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 461.
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only an agent.”
This lien entitles the broker to retain any policy document until all liabilities in 
respect of the contract of insurance agency have been extinguished, but the broker 
cannot retain any policies for monies due for other services unconnected with the 
insurance.
Although he can exercise a lien on any policy in respect of any balance on any 
insurance account due to him from the assured, the lien is lost in the following 
situations: (a) if the insured pays the broker what he is owed, (b) if the broker waives 
his right to the lien, (c) if he validly parts with the possession of the policy document, 
or (d) if he does any other act inconsistent with the continuing existence of the lien.
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3.3 LIABILITIES OF BROKER
3.3.1 The Broker’s Professional Liability to the Assured
An insurance broker is usually instructed at the beginning of his legal relationship 
with his principal, the assured, to obtain quotations for intended contracts of 
insurance, or to procure the best possible insurance, which he must do by using his 
best endeavours and exercising reasonable skill and care. In light of the analysis
1 Q'Xcarried out in the previous part, the broker’s liabilities usually arise in the 
following ways:
First, the broker’s liabilities arise when the broker fails to obtain proper insurance. 
Where details of the risk are clearly specified by the assured, the broker is requested 
to obtain the requisite cover. When there is no specific request from the assured 
about the insurance cover, the broker is requested to exercise his duty of reasonable 
care to obtain a reasonable cover from a reasonable underwriter within a reasonable 
time. A failure to obtain the above insurance may give rise to liability. However, if 
the broker can show that he took all reasonable steps to effect the insurance but that it 
was unobtainable, and that he informed his principle, the assured, accordingly, or 
took reasonable steps to do so194 and by the fastest method of communication,195 
such a failure may not give rise to liability.
There are two points need to be mentioned here. First, in the UK, a contract of 
insurance involving an insurer who is not authorized and regulated by the 
Department of Trade and Industry/Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 is illegal
193 See the Duties of brokers above at p 75.
194 United Mills Agencies Ltd v. RE Harvey Bray & Co [1951] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 631.
195 The rationale behind this additional obligation is to allow his principal, the assured, to attempt to obtain 
insurance elsewhere.
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and therefore in principle, unenforceable by either party. In Bates v Barrow196 the 
court held the Financial Services Act 1986197 to be retrospective in effect so that an 
assured could enforce payment by an unauthorized insurer for post 1982 contracts. 
As a result of Bates v Barrow198 it is currently the law that a broker should exercise 
reasonable skill and care to ensure that any insurer with whom he places insurance is 
licensed in the United Kingdom and regulated by the FSA. Accordingly, the broker’s 
liability may arise if he placed the insurance with an unauthorized insurer. Second, 
what does a reasonable cover mean? Is the broker expected to obtain the cheapest 
policy? The cheapest policy may not always be the best suited to the assured’s 
requirements. For a broker to discard on renewal an insurer with whom the assured 
has had a good relationship in order to obtain a cheaper policy may even be negligent, 
unless full disclosure has been made to the assured.199 Indeed, the cheapest policy 
may indicate an overriding desire on the part of the insurer to obtain premium 
income now and dispute any claim later.200 Thus a more expensive policy with a 
reputable insurer may well be in the assured’s best interest. Liability, however, will 
not lie on the broker who has not obtained the cheapest policy unless the assured can 
show that the same insurance was reasonably available elsewhere at a cheaper price, 
or that the broker unreasonably attributed too much to one factor or term and not 
enough to another.
Secondly, as discussed above, an insurer is entitled to avoid the contract at anytime if 
he learns that a fact material to the risk has not been disclosed to him prior to the date 
the contract was concluded. A fact is material if a prudent insurer would take it into 
account when considering the risk or if it would influence a prudent insurer when
196 [1995] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 680.
197 The Financial Services Act 1986 (the "Old Act") was replaced by the Financial Services and Markets Act 
2000 .
m Ibid.
199 In Norlympia Seafoods Ltd v Dale and Co Ltd [1988] ILR 6475, the broker was liable for failing to disclose to 
the assured the inferior quality of the insurer.
200 Christopher Henley, The law o f insurance broking, (2nd ed, Sweet & Maxwell, 2004) at p 396.
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considering whether to take the risk or the amount of premium to be charged. The 
assured may consider that he has provided all relevant information, but he has 
approached the broker with a view to obtaining his professional expertise and the 
assured fully appreciates the extent of his duty of disclosure, and that all such 
information is passed to insurers. Accordingly, the broker’s liabilities may arise when 
the broker breaches his duty of disclosure in utmost good faith.
3.3.2 Damages Could be Claimed
When the insurer refuses to make the payment to the assured because the broker 
breached his duty, the assured should be allowed to claim damages from the broker. 
The general principle is that the assured should be placed in the same position as if 
the act giving rise to non-payment by the insurer had not occurred which means that 
the assured should be compensated as if the contract had been properly performed 
and as if the loss had not taken place, so that a valid contract of insurance existed. 
Thus, the damages that can be claimed back from the broker include the amount 
which the assured could have been able to claim under the policy had the policy 
provided the required cover, or the cost of alternative cover and the wasted costs.
(1) The amount, which the assured could have been able to claim under the policy, 
had the policy provided the required cover.
Example: the broker is required to obtain the cover for a cargo of coal, worth £
10,000, against all risks. But the cover is obtained by the broker only against “perils
of the seas, theft and explosion”. Later, there is a fire and a total loss of the cargo. So
the cargo is lost as a result of fire which is not a risk covered by the insurance
obtained. Under this cover, the insurer will not be liable for the uncovered risk and,
therefore, will not pay for the assured’s loss. The insurer would of course have paid
for the total loss, £ 10,000, if the broker had obtained the cover from him against “all
risks”. So the broker is liable for his own mistake and the damages that can be
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claimed back from the broker amount to £10,000, the amount that the assured could 
have been able to claim back under the policy if that policy provided the cover for 
“all risks”.
9fi1For instance, in the case of Youell v. Bland Welch & Co Ltd (No 2) , the brokers had
been instructed to obtain reinsurance on the London market on behalf of insurers, in 
respect of construction risks on three new building vessels. The brokers erroneously 
informed the insurers that they had obtained reinsurance as “original”. The 
reinsurance was subject to a cut-off clause whereby the cover terminated 48 months 
after the commencement of construction. The brokers failed to inform the insurers. 
Had the insurers been given that information, they would not have accepted the 
reinsurance, and would have written greatly reduced lines on the original insurance. 
Phillips J held that the brokers were in breach of their duty of care both in contract 
and tort. Consequently, the measures of damages should be equal to the difference 
between the amount for which the insurers became liable on the original insurance, 
and the amount for which they would have been liable if they had written the reduced 
lines.
In comparison, in Aneco Reinsurance Underwriting Ltd v. Johnson & Higgines
909Ltd, the House of Lords recently held that following a broker’s negligent omission 
to advise that adequate reinsurance was not available in respect of insurance cover 
that the claimant was seeking to enter into, the proper measure of damages was the 
full extent of the claimant’s losses.
The facts of the case were that Aneco was invited by the defendant brokers (Johnson) 
to participate in an excess of loss account of certain Lloyd’s marine syndicates under 
a proportional treaty. Aneco made it a condition of their arrangement with the broker
201 [1990] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 431.
202 [2001] UKHL 51.
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that their entry into the treaty was subject to the broker’s obtaining satisfactory 
reinsurance on similar terms. Johnson, therefore, not only acted as brokers for the 
syndicate, but as brokers for Aneco for the reinsurance. Johnson obtained the 
reinsurance and Aneco thus entered into the proportional treaty. In due course Aneco 
suffered losses in excess of US$35 million under that treaty US$11 million of which 
would have been covered by the reinsurance but for the fact that the reinsurance was 
properly avoided by the reinsurers on the grounds of non-disclosure by Johnson. It 
further emerged that if the brokers had made the enquiries, presentation and 
disclosure that they should have made, they would have discovered that the outwards 
reinsurance cover on which Aneco relied from the start was never available.
The issue for the House of Lords was whether the quantum of damages should be 
restricted to the sum of US$ 11 million or the entirety of the loss of more than US$ 
35 million.
Lord Steyn characterized the question in these terms- the former would be applicable 
if the defendants’ duty was limited to obtaining reinsurance cover but not if it 
extended to advising on the availability of such cover in the market. At a more 
general level, the distinction is whether defendants had undertaken a duty merely to 
provide information as against a duty to advise the claimant.
If on one side the defendants had only undertaken a duty to provide information, the 
quantum of damages should be restricted to the sum of 11 million. This follows the
203judgment in Banque Bruxelles Lambert SA v. Eagle Star Insurance Co Ltd. In this 
case the House of Lord’s decision has serious implications for the measure of 
damages which could be claimed by the claimant in the event of a breach. On the 
side of this case, the duty is only confined to taking reasonable care that the 
information provided is correct and any liability for damages shall be measured
203 [1997] AC 191.
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along the lines of the foreseeable consequences of the information being incorrect. 
As Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead said in Nyekeredit Mortgage Bank Pic v. Edward 
Erdman Group Ltd (No 2)204, the defendant
“is not liable for all the consequences which flow from the claimant entering 
into the transaction. He is not even liable for all the foreseeable 
consequences. He is not liable for consequences which would have arisen 
even if the advice had been correct. He is not liable for these because they 
are the consequence of the risks the claimant would have taken upon himself 
even if the... advice had been sound. As such they are not within the scope 
of the duty owed to the claimant by the defendant.”
If on the other hand, the duty of the broker was to advise the insurer, the defendant 
must take reasonable care to consider all potential consequences of the course of 
action advised to the claimant and if there is a breach he or she shall be liable for all 
foreseeable consequences of that course of action having been followed. After a 
quick review of the applicable principles of law, Lord Steyn held that the brokers had 
in fact taken on the role of adviser and as such should be made responsible for all the 
foreseeable consequences of the claimant taking the advised course of action which 
was to underwrite the risk. As such, they were liable for the totality of the loss.
(2) The cost of alternative cover.
Example'. The broker is required to obtain cover for a cargo of coal worth £10,000, 
against all risks. But the cover is obtained from an insurance company, A, only 
against “perils of the seas, theft and explosion” for the premium of £2,000. Later, the 
assured realizes this mistake and obtains insurance cover from another insurance 
company, B, against “fire” by paying an additional premium of £500. However, if the 
broker obtains the cover, including fire, from A, the premium will be £2,200. Now
204 [1997] 1 WLR 1627 at p 1631.
205 This case has dealt a severer blow on broker’s acting in a dual capacity role which is discussed above at p 75. 
The dilemma is this-the broker, whilst laboring under a duty to the insured to place the insurance, is also 
simultaneously under a duty of care to the insurer to provide advice to him on whether or not to write the 
insurance at all.
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the assured has to pay his two premiums with both A and B for £2,500. So the 
assured paid £300 more than he should pay. In this case, the broker is liable for £300 
damages for the assured which is the cost of obtaining alternative cover.
(3) Wasted costs.
Example: The broker is required to obtain cover for a cargo of coal worth £10,000, 
against all risks. However, he did not disclose a material situation which would have 
influenced the insurer’s decision on whether to take the risk or not. Later, after the 
contract has been completed there is a loss on the cargo caused by a risk which is 
covered by the existing insurance contract. However, the insurer refuses to pay for 
the loss suffered by the assured on the grounds of non-disclosure by the broker. The 
assured decided to sue the insurer and the broker for his own damages. In this case 
the broker is going to be liable not only for the loss suffered by the assured, but also 
for the litigation cost which is the “wasted cost”.
3.3.3 Limiting and Excluding broker’s Liability
Liability may arise when the broker breaches his duties, however, in some 
circumstances, he may be able to limit or exclude his liabilities.
First, brokers can limit or exclude their liability if they can prove that the assured is 
responsible for or has contributed to the lack of suitable insurance.
According to section 1(1) of the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945: 
“ (1) Where any person suffers damage as the result partly of his own fault and partly 
of the fault of any other person or persons, a claim in respect of that damage shall not 
be defeated by reason of the fault of the person suffering the damage, but the 
damages recoverable in respect thereof shall be reduced to such extent as the court
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thinks just and equitable having regard to the claimant's share in the responsibility 
for the damage . . It can be said that the broker can limit his liability if he can 
prove that the negligence of the assured contributed to the damage . In JW  Bollom & 
Co Ltd v. Byas Mosley & Co Ltd206 the court clearly accepted that the brokers could 
utilize any alternative defence open to an insurer to counter the assured’s claim and 
that the damages payable by the brokers to the insured could therefore be reduced 
commensurately.
Secondly, the broker can also exclude his liability if he can prove the existence of an 
independent ground for the insurer to disclaim liability. In the case of Fraser v.
9 0 7  • *Furman the assured had an employer’s liability policy with the insurer which 
was due for renewal shortly. The broker neglected to renew the assured’s liability 
policy. When a loss arose, the assured was unable to claim compensation from the 
insurer. The assured, then, turned to his broker. The broker accepted that he was 
negligent but pleaded that the assured had failed to take reasonable precautions for 
the safety of its employees, in breach of a condition in the policy, which would have 
entitled the insurer to repudiate liability. The Court of Appeal held that the assured 
had not contravened the relevant condition, but added that if the insurer would have 
been able to plead a defence of that nature, the broker would have been able to deny 
liability.
Thirdly, the broker may succeed if he can show that the assured would not have been 
insured in the circumstances irrespective of any failure on the part of the broker.
90RIn Gunns v. Par Insurance Brokers the assured made a claim for approximately 
£348,000 under his policy for loss of jewellery kept in a safe at his house. The 
insurers declined to pay this loss, alleging his non-disclosure of material facts. The
206 [2000] Lloyd’s Rep IR 136.
207 [1967] 3 All ER 57.
208 [1997] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 173.
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assured then sued the brokers for the amount of the loss, alleging that they were 
liable by reason of their failure properly to answer questions in the proposal form on 
his behalf. He claimed that he had responded correctly to these questions when they 
were put to him by the brokers or that he had passed on to them information which 
would have enabled them to answer these questions correctly, but that the broker had 
then failed to answer the questions properly on his behalf. In addition he alleged that 
the broker did not properly explain the true meaning of the questions and the answers 
required. A further issue arose out of the fact that at the time of the burglary, the 
assured had failed to activate the burglar alarm at the property, and had failed to lock 
all of the locks on the back door of the property despite being aware of the high value 
of the contents of the house, and having believed that he had been followed prior to 
the burglary by would-be burglars. The brokers claimed that the assured had himself 
written the answers to the relevant questions in the proposal form, and that he had 
told them nothing about any previous losses or declinature.
The court accepted the brokers’ evidence and applied the presumption that where 
there had been a non-disclosure of material information, the insurers had been 
induced to give cover or to give cover on the terms they did. The judge also found 
that the assured was an experienced businessman who was aware the 
misrepresentation or non-disclosure could lead to claims being repudiated. The 
brokers were therefore not liable for any non-disclosure or misrepresentation. In 
addition, the court held that the assured had been in breach of a condition in the 
policy that they would take all reasonable precautions to avoid loss and to safeguard 
the property from loss or damage. Accordingly, even if the brokers had been liable in 
respect of the non-disclosures, the assured would still not have recovered by reason 
of the breach of condition.
Fourthly, can the brokers limit or exclude their liabilities if they can prove that the 
assured is not insurable at the moment the insurance contract is concluded?
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In Everett v Hogg, Robinson & Gardner Mountain (Insurance) Ltd109 the broker 
wrongly told the insurer that plastic was not used in the assured’s products, which it 
was, and the insured failed to disclose its adverse claims record, both of which 
amounted to breaches of the duty of utmost good faith. The insurance was voidable, 
but the issue was whether it would in fact have been avoided. One defence open to a 
broker where he appears liable for a non-disclosure is the argument that had the 
broker correctly specified all relevant facts, that the assured would have been 
uninsurable. The court didn’t accept such an argument and preferred to believe that 
“some accommodation would have been reached between the insured and the
9 1 ninsurer” such as charging an additional premium
• 911Later, in the case 0 & R Jewelers v. Terry & Jardine Insurance Brokers this 
principle was considered in a case where the insurers had in fact been able to avoid 
for non-disclosure. The court said that the uninsurability of the assured could not 
amount to a complete defence because it disregarded the possibility that the assured 
may have found some other way of protecting himself against loss, so that damages 
against the brokers were, in principle, available. So it cannot be said that the brokers 
can limit or exclude their liabilities if they can prove that the assured is not insurable 
at the moment the insurance contract is concluded. However, things will be different 
if it is absolutely clear that insurance could not be obtained anywhere by the assured.
919In 0 & R Jewelers v. Terry & Jardine Insurance Brokers the judge commented that 
the proper way was “to take into account all the ifs and buts and come to a 
comprehensive estimate of the chance of obtaining insurance.”
209 [1973] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 217.
210 Mint Security V. Blair [1982] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 188.
211 [1999] Lloyd’s Rep IR 436.
212 Ibid.
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CHAPTER 4 
LEGAL ISSUES ARISING AFTER THE MARINE 
INSURANCE CONTRACT IS FORMED
INTRODUCTION
As discussed in the earlier chapter, at the formation stage of marine insurance 
contracts, the broker prepares a brief document-slip and then takes the slip around 
the market seeking subscriptions. Once the broker has obtained the desired level of 
subscriptions, the slip is closed. Some months later, another document, a formal 
policy, is prepared.
Accordingly, there are two important documents (slip and policy) involved during 
the formation of marine insurance contracts. The significance, and the role of these 
two documents, has been stated in the MIA 1906. Section 22 of the MIA 1906:
“Contract must be embodied in policy. Subject to the provisions of any 
statute, a contract of marine insurance is inadmissible in evidence unless it is 
embodied in a marine policy in accordance with the Act. The policy may be 
executed and issued either at the time when the contract is concluded, or 
afterwards.”
The provision which explains the legal nature of the slip is Section 89 of the Act:
“Slip as evidence. Where there is duly stamped policy, reference may be 
made, as heretofore, to the slip or covering note, in any legal proceeding.”
The first issue focused in the current chapter is the relationship between the slip and 
the policy. When there a discrepancy between these two documents arises it needs to
213 See Chapter 2.
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be considered in which document the basis of the agreement can be found.
A further issue to consider at this point is the role of held cover clauses. A “held 
covered clause” is a contract term, under which the insurer’s liability will be 
expanded. Once the requirements of a held covered clause are satisfied, i.e. notice is 
given to the underwriter and additional premium is agreed, the assured remains 
covered. The legal importance and significance of these clauses to post contractual 
issues, the nature of such clauses and the applications of the duty of utmost good 
faith under held covered clauses will be analysed below. It should be noted that 
held-covered clauses are able to create a new contract as existing one continue, so 
they are relevant to our analysis on formation of marine insurance contract.
Even though these issues arise after the contract is formed, the roots of the problems 
can be traced to the formation stage of the contract. The matters are, therefore, 
closely connected to the formation stage and need to be examined in depth. It is the 
main purpose of this chapter to analyse the legal issues arising after the contract is 
formed as long as they are linked to the pre-contractual stage.
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4.1 DISCREPANCY BETWEEN POLICY AND SLIP
As stated above, there are two important documents at the formation stage of the 
marine insurance contract, known as the “slip” and the “policy”. With all contracts, 
there exists the possibility of discrepancy between the actual agreement and any 
subsequent written record thereof. In the case of contracts of marine insurance, this 
possibility is exacerbated by the use of a slip with a formal policy. When there is a 
discrepancy between a slip and a policy, the question raised is whether the policy can 
supersede the slip or the slip can prevail over the policy. The next part will discuss 
various ways of approaching this problem.
4.1.1 Narrow Approach
The narrow approach completely denies that the slip is admissible in order to aid the 
construction of the policy, which means that if there is discrepancy between the two 
documents, the slip cannot be considered as evidence. It follows that the slip will 
not be available to assist the true construction of the insurance contract at all. This 
approach was evident in Youell v Bland Welch & Co Ltd.214 This case concerned a 
contract of reinsurance at Lloyd's. The slip was superseded by a formal policy. It was 
common place for this to happen, but the defendant reinsurers submitted that the slip 
could be looked at as an aid to the construction of the policy. Mr. Justice Phillips (as 
he then was) disagreed. He held that the parol evidence rule215 made the slip 
inadmissible. He said that,216
214 [1990] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 423.
215 “parol testimony cannot be received to contradict, vary, add to or subtract from the terms of a written contract, 
or the terms in which the parties have deliberately agreed to record any part of their contract.” Bank o f 
Australasia vpalmer [1879] AC 540 at p 545.
216 [1990] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 423 at p 428.
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“But if prior written agreements or drafts were admitted in evidence as an 
aid to construction the result would be that the Courts would often be called 
upon to consider a profusion of documents in cases where there was an issue 
as to the true construction of the final version of the contract. The English 
Court has firmly set its face against such a practice. It has done so by 
adopting the so-called parol evidence rule . . . ”
This approach denies the admissibility of the slip as an aid to the interpretation of the 
contract on the basis that the slip is “extrinsic evidence”, that is evidence outside the 
four comers of the document. However, this traditional rule of inadmissibility, at 
least in so far as it extends beyond the exclusion of negotiations, is inconsistent with 
the modem approach to extrinsic evidence. Today, language is always understood as 
contextual; the contract is always a product of the circumstances in which it was 
drafted.217 Thus, even where the wording of a contract can be given meaning when
217 Lord Hoffmann in Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd v. West Bromwich Society [1998] 1 WLR 896 (HL) 
revisited and restated the general approach to the construction of contracts as follows,
“The principles may be summarized as follows;
(1) Interpretation is the ascertainment of the meaning which the document would convey to a reasonable 
person having all the background knowledge which would reasonably have been available to the parties in 
the situation in which they were at the time of the contract.
(2) The background was famously referred to by Lord Wilberforce as the “matrix of fact,” but this phrase is, 
if anything, an understated description of what the background may include. Subject to the requirement that 
it should have been reasonably available to the parties and to the exception to be mentioned next, it includes 
absolutely anything which would have affected the way in which the language of the document would have 
been understood by a reasonable man.
(3) The law excludes from the admissible background the previous negotiations of the parties and their 
declarations of subjective intent. They are admissible only in an action for rectification. The law makes this 
distinction for reasons of practical policy and, in this respect only, legal interpretation differs from the way 
we would interpret utterances in ordinary life. The boundaries of this exception are in some respects unclear. 
But this is not the occasion on which to explore them.
(4) The meaning which a document (or any other utterance) would convey to a reasonable man is not the 
same thing as the meaning of its words. The meaning of words is a matter of dictionaries and grammars; the 
meaning of the document is what the parties using those words against the relevant background would 
reasonably have been understood to mean. The background may not merely enable the reasonable man to 
choose between the possible meanings of words which are ambiguous but even (as occasionally happens in 
ordinary life) to conclude that the parties must, for whatever reason, have used the wrong words or syntax: 
see Mannai Investments Co. Ltd. v. Eagle Star Life Assurance Co. Ltd. [1997] AC 749 .
(5) The “rule” that words should be given their “natural and ordinary meaning” reflects the common sense 
proposition that we do not easily accept that people have made linguistic mistakes, particularly in formal 
documents. On the other hand, if one would nevertheless conclude from the background that something must
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read in isolation, the extrinsic evidence will still be admissible to establish the 
background against which the contract was concluded. In this way the extrinsic 
evidence may give a better indication of the true intention of the parties and 
influence the interpretation of the contract accordingly.
4.1.2 Liberal Approach
The liberal approach is in keeping with the modem approach to extrinsic evidence, 
highlighted above. This approach was evident in the decision of the Court of Appeal
'y | o
in HIH Casualty & General Insurance Ltd v New Hampshire Insurance Co. 
According to Rix LJ, there is no rule of law that has the effect of rendering the slip 
inadmissible:
“In my judgment, there is nothing in these citations which binds this Court 
to mle that where a prior contract has been followed by a further contract, or 
where in an insurance context a slip contract has been followed by a policy, 
there is a rule of law which makes it inadmissible to consider the terms of 
the prior contract...”219
Under this approach the parties’ intention will determine the evidential utility of the 
slip. It may be the case that the parties intended the contract as stated in the policy 
to supersede the contract as stated in the slip. On the other hand the parties may have 
intended the slip to take precedence over the policy.220
have gone wrong with the language, the law does not require judges to attribute to the parties an intention 
which they plainly could not have had. Lord Diplock made this point more vigorously when he said in 
Antaios Compania Naviera S.A. v. Salen Rederierna A.B. [1985] AC 191 , 20, ‘if detailed semantic and 
syntactical analysis of words in a commercial contract is going to lead to a conclusion that flouts business 
commonsense, it must be made to yield to business commonsense.’”
218 [2001] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 161. 
2X9 Ibid, at p 178.
220 Ibi d, paras 69-79
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4.1.2.1 The Policy Superseding the Slip
If it is the intention of the parties for the policy to supersede the slip, it must follow 
that the parties' contract is found exclusively in the policy. In such circumstances the 
slip cannot be used to add to, or modify the policy and any discrepancy between the 
slip and the policy will be resolved in favour of the policy. However, the slip will 
retain an interpretive role and if there is a need to construe the terms or the wording 
of the contract, as stated in the policy, reference can then be made to the slip. Rix LJ., 
asked,221
“But does it follow that the earlier contract cannot even be looked at for the 
purposes of construing the later contract? In principle, it would seem to me 
that it is always admissible to look at prior contracts as part of the matrix or 
surrounding circumstances of a later contract...a cautious and sceptical 
approach to finding any assistance in the earlier contract in the slip 
seems.. .a sound principle.”
Where the parties’ intention is that the policy supersedes the slip, there is one 
exception to the rule that the policy prevails. The exception arises where the meaning 
of the policy is unclear but the meaning of the slip is clear. In these circumstances, 
the discrepancy between the two documents can be resolved in favour of the slip. In
999The Aikshaw, according to the slip a vessel was covered “at and from any port or 
ports and (or) place or places on the west coast of South America in any rotation, 
while there” and for a voyage to Europe. On the wording of the policy, however, the 
cover attached only “at and from any ports and (or) places of loading”. When the 
vessel was lost after arriving at a port on the west coast of South America but before 
arrival at a port of loading, the terms of the slip prevailed as the real expression of
990
the parties’ intentions. Also, in Motteux v London Assurance, the policy was
221 Ibid, a tp  179.
222 (1893) 9 TLR 605.
223 (1739) 1 ATK 545.
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unclear whether it attached “at and from” or only “from” a port. The court read the 
policy in accordance with the clear wording of the slip.
4.1.2.2 The Slip Prevailing
The second possibility is that the parties intend the slip to prevail. In such a case, 
subject to evidence that the discrepancy results from a decision to vary the contract, 
inconsistencies should be resolved in favour of the slip.
In Western Assurance Co v Poole,224 expert evidence established that incorporation
00  ^in the policy of a sue and labour clause contradicted the phrase “no s/c” in the slip 
and the insurer was accordingly held not liable for suing and labouring expenses. In 
Eagle Star & British Dominion Insurance Co Ltd v A V  Reiner,226 a vessel was 
stranded while leaving the port of Valencia at the outset of a voyage from Spain to 
Antwerp. According to the wording of the policy, the whole voyage was covered, but
under the slip, as construed, risk did not attach until Gibraltar. As a result of this
0 0 0discrepancy, Salter J stated as follows:
“I am satisfied that the policy is not in accordance with the contract the 
parties made and that there was a mistake common to them both. The 
contract which they in fact made appears upon the slip and was a contract 
under which the risk attached and was meant by both parties to attach ‘at 
and from and o ff Gibraltar”
224 (1903) 8 Com Cas 108.
225 A sue and labour clause extends cover by expressly authorizing the taking of reasonable steps in mitigation of 
the consequences of an insured casualty and promising indemnification in respect of expenses reasonably 
incurred thereby.
226 (1927) 27 LIL Rep 173.
227 Ibid, a tp  177.
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4.2 THE PARTIES’ INTENTION
From the above discussion, it is quite clear that when there is discrepancy between 
the slip and policy, the question of which document supersedes the other depends on 
the parties’ intention. Accordingly, the method of establishing what the parties’ 
intention actually is becomes a key issue that needs to be analysed in further detail.
The intention of the parties must inevitably fall upon the wording chosen by them. 
However, the meaning to be given to those words may be affected by a wide range of 
factors.
4.2.1 The Natural Meaning of the Words
The starting point in interpreting the words chosen by the parities to express their 
agreement is their ordinary and natural meaning. The inquiry as to the true 
interpretation of a contract “will start, and usually finish, by asking what is the 
ordinary meaning of the words used”
In Melanesian Mission Trust Board v Australian Mutual Provident Society,229 Lord 
Hope reasoned as follows:
“Where ordinary words have been used they must be taken to have been 
used according to the ordinary meaning of those words. If their meaning is 
clear and unambiguous, effect must be given to them because that is what 
the parties are taken to have agreed to by their contract. Various rules may 
be invoked to assist interpretation in the event that there is an ambiguity.
But it is not the function of the court, when construing a document, to search 
for an ambiguity... It is of course legitimate to look at the document as a 
whole and to examine the context in which these word have been used, as 
the context may affect the meaning of the words. But unless the context
228 Charter Rei nsurance Co. Ltd v Fagan [1997] AC 313 at p 384, per Lord Mustill.
229 [1996] UKPC 53.
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shows that the ordinary meaning cannot be given to them or that there is an 
ambiguity, the ordinary meaning of the words which have been used in the 
document must prevail.”
4.2.1.1 When there is an Ambiguity about the Meaning of the Words
When there is an ambiguity about the meaning of the wording, for example, where 
some relevant clause in the contract is capable of two or more equally legitimate 
interpretations, the ambiguity entitles the court to invoke the contra proferentem 
rule. Under this rule, the ambiguity is resolved against whichever party is 
responsible for the ambiguous clause. During the formation of marine insurance 
contracts, the wording of a policy is generally put together by the broker. The 
broker, as agent of the assured, then tenders the wording in the form of a slip to the 
insurer for consideration of the acceptability of the risk, including the precise terms, 
and the appropriate level of premium. Where the term that proves ambiguous is one 
inserted by or on behalf of the assured, the contra proferentem rule requires 
interpretation in favour of the insurer and against the interests of the assured. Where, 
by contrast, the ambiguity resides in an amendment to the slip introduced by the 
insurer, the ambiguity will be resolved against the insurer.
In M/S Aswan Engineering Establishment Co Ltd v Iron Trades Mutual Insurance Co 
1
Ltd, the policy adopted the insurer’s standard liability form and excluded “the cost 
of replacing or making good defective materials, plant, machinery, goods or 
commodities.” In this case pails supplied by the assured collapsed as a result of 
inadequate packing and stowage. Since such a scenario was not clearly covered by 
the wording of the exclusion, it followed that the insurer could not benefit from that 
exclusion. Hobhouse J held that the insurer was not protected by the exclusion:
230 The expression “contra proferentem rule” is a convenient abbreviation of the maxim verba chartarum fortius 
accipiuntur contra proferentem.
231 [1989] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 289.
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“This was not liability for the cost of replacing or making good anything. 
What the wording refers to on its natural meaning is a situation where the 
assured has undertaken a contractual liability to replace or make good as 
under a guarantee clause in a contract for the sale of goods. If, contrary to 
my view, it is not clear that this wording has this meaning then it is at best 
ambiguous and capable of more than one meaning, and the ambiguity must 
be resolved against the defendants.”
4.2.1.2 Where the meaning of the words may Lead to an Excessively
Unreasonable Result
The natural meaning of the words should be respected when two parties’ intention is 
deduced. However, the situation becomes more complicated when the questioned 
words could lead to an excessively unreasonable result.
In Schuler (L) AG v. Wickman Machine Tool Sales Ltd,233 clause 7(b) of the contract 
required exclusive sales agents to visit each of six named potential customers each 
week and to ensure that the visits were all carried out by the same named 
representative or, in unavoidable default, by the same named alternative 
representative. The clause was described as a “condition”. The question was whether 
the word “condition” was employed in its technical legal sense to denote a term any 
breach of which as a repudiation of the contract. The House of Lords refused to 
accept that the word “condition” was used in its technical sense. Had the term been 
used in its technical sense a solitary failure to visit one firm in one week by the 
representative or alternative would have entitled the principal to terminate the 
contract. Yet there was no provision in the contract for substitution of the primary or 
alternative representatives even if one or both should die, retire, or otherwise leave 
the company, or to cover simultaneous illness of both eligible representatives, or to 
cover refusal by one of the customers to accept a visit each and every week. A 
technical interpretation of the word ‘condition’ could, therefore, have produced
232 Ibid, a t p 293.
233 [1974] AC 235.
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results described variously as “so unreasonable”234, “absurd”235, and “grotesque”236.
9^ 7On the issue of interpretation, Lord Reid stated as follows:
“The fact that a particular construction leads to a very unreasonable result 
must be a relevant consideration. The more unreasonable a result the more 
unlikely it is that the parties can have intended it, and if they do intend it the 
more necessary it is that they shall make that intention abundantly clear.”
It seems reasonable to infer from this judgment that a wording which may lead to an 
excessively unreasonable result is unlikely to be taken to reflect the true intention of 
the parities.
However, in the case of Kuwait Airways Corp v Kuwait Insurance Co SAK (No 1), 
Lord Hobhouse took a different view.
In this case an aviation policy covered aircraft hulls against a range of perils set out 
in six paragraphs lettered (a) to (f). Paragraph (a) comprised war, invasion, hostilities 
and similar perils while paragraph (e) contained perils of deprivation of possession 
including seizure. An extension of the policy to aircraft spares covered the same 
range of perils “other than paragraph (a)” which was to apply only to spares in transit. 
This reflected the caution with which the insurance market approaches war risks; 
where war-risks operate, cover for goods, in principle, is often confined to goods in 
transit. A considerable quantity of insured spares were seized by Iraqi forces when 
they invaded Kuwait. Prima facie, this loss could be regarded as caused by any one 
of a range of perils listed in paragraph (a) and also by seizure. The question was 
whether, in the context of the cover for spares not in transit, cover against the perils
234 Ibi d, at p 251, per Lord Reid.
235 Ibid, at p 256, per Loard Simon.
236 Ibi d, at p 272, per Lord Kilbrandon.
237 Ibid, at p 251.
238 [1999] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 803.
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in paragraph (a) had been merely omitted from cover or, as argued by the insurers, 
excluded. A majority of the Court of Appeal found in favour of the insurers. If the 
insurers did not want to cover the loss of spares by war except while in transit, it 
made no commercial sense to cover exactly such a loss under another name. Reading 
the extension as merely omitting paragraph (a) would be an “over-literal 
interpretation”240
This holding was however, reversed by the House of Lords. According to the House 
of Lords, background market concerns regarding the extent of cover that it was 
prudent to offer for goods not in transit were irrelevant. The wording of the extension 
was clear. The perils mentioned in paragraph (a) were omitted, not excluded, and 
there was simply no rationale to permit the court to rescue an insurer from an 
imprudent bargain. According to Lord Hobhouse,
“it must...be stressed that it is not for the courts to tell the parties what 
contract they should have made nor, after the event, to evaluate the merits 
and demerits of their bargain. If, as here, the parties have used plain 
language to express their intentions, that should be the end of it: the court 
should enforce the contract in accordance with its terms”241
Accordingly, the conclusion should be “If the contract on its true interpretation is 
commercially bizarre, the courts cannot rewrite it. Any remoulding by the court in 
the course of the construction process of the parities4 obligations expressed in the 
language used must be founded on the intention of the parties whether express or 
implied in the document itself read in the relevant matrix of facts.”242 Kuwait 
Airways Corp makes it clear that the parties are responsible for their own commercial 
arrangements, however foolish, and the Court will not intervene to mitigate any 
undesirable consequences that arise from an imprudent bargain. The House of
239 [1997] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 687 at pp. 695,701.
240 Ibi d, at p 695, per Staughton LJ.
241 [1999] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 803 at p 816.
242 Howard Bennett, The Law o f Marine Insurance, (2nd ed, Oxford University Press, 2006) at p 275.
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Lords is no doubt right to observe that one can have a clear intention that is 
nonetheless foolish; it is not within the jurisdiction of the Court to remedy such lack 
of commercial good sense.
4.2.2 The Business Common Sense of the Words
Lord Hoffmann in the case of Investors Compensation243 stated:
“Interpretation is the ascertainment of the meaning which the document 
would convey to a reasonable person having all the background knowledge 
which would reasonably have been available to the parties in the situation in 
which they were in at the time of contract”
So, in order to search for the true intention of the parties, it is also important that the 
wordings should be construed in a manner consistent with what makes commercial 
sense. “The less commercially sensible an interpretation, the less likely the parties as 
deemed reasonable commercial people are to have intended it.”244 Thus, it has been 
said that “if detailed semantic and syntactical analysis of words in a commercial 
contract is going to lead to a conclusion that flouts business commonsense, it must be 
made to yield to business common sense”245
In Quorum v Schramm,246 in the aftermath of a fire that had probably damaged a 
painting insured under a fine art policy, the parties agreed a clause addressing the 
measure of indemnity for partial loss. Part of this clause operated as an average 
clause, rendering the assured its own insurer for the proportion of the risk 
corresponding to the difference between the sum insured and the market value of the 
painting immediately prior to the loss. This average clause left part of the risk with 
the assured if the value of the painting had risen above the sum insured. This made
243 Inves tors Compensation System Scheme Ltd v West Bromwich Building Society [1998] 1 WLR 896 at p 913.
244 Man nai Investments Co Ltd v Eagle Star Life Assurance Co Ltd [1997] AC 749 at p 771.
245 Ant aors Compania Naviera SA v Salen RederiernaAB [1985] AC 191 at p 201, per Lord Diplock.
246 [2002] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 249.
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commercial sense. However, on its wording, the clause also left part of the risk with 
the assured where the value of the painting had fallen below the sum insured. This 
was an extraordinary commercial consequence, as the premium would have been 
paid on the basis of the sum insured and there would be no commercial logic in this 
consequence. Accordingly, and indeed at the insurer’s invitation, Thomas J held that 
the average clause should be construed in accordance with the plain intention of the 
parities that it should apply only where the market value had risen above the sum 
insured.
4.2.3 How can the Parties’ Intention be Expressed?
As discussed above the parties’ intention is of paramount importance in the 
resolution of discrepancies between the slip and policy and now it is appropriate to 
consider how the parties’ intention can be expressed.
4.2.3.1 Expressing the Intention for the Policy to Supersede the Slip
According to Rix LJ in HIH  v New Hampshire247, “In the insurance market...it may 
well by now be possible to talk of a general presumption that a policy is intended to 
supersede a slip.”248 It is the normal inference whenever a slip is followed by a 
policy that the parties’ intention is for the policy to supersede the slip. This intention 
to supersede has been stated to be the understanding of Lloyd’s market where the slip 
is sent to the Lloyd’s Policy Signing Office (now superseded by Ins-sure) and a 
policy is duly issued.249 It is not necessary therefore to explicitly state that the policy 
will supersede the slip.
247 [2001] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 161.
248 Ibi d, at para 85.
249 New Hampsh ire Insurance Co v MGN Ltd [1997] LRLR 24 at p 33.
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4.2.3.2 Expressing the Intention for the Slip to Prevail over the Policy
To express the intention for the slip to prevail over the policy can prove difficult. 
However, designating the slip as the “slip policy” or “slip contract” can be 
considered as an indication that the wording of slip is intended to be final.
In HIH v New Hampshire itself, Rix LJ considered that the parties had not intended 
the policy to supersede the slip for two reasons. First, the slip was designated a “slip 
policy” and, secondly, the policy was incomplete as demonstrated by its silence with
252respect to premium.
Likewise, in Assicurazioni Generali SpA v Ege Sigorta AS,253 the slip was stated to 
be a “slip contract”. Colman J held that the subsequent tendering of wording by the 
broker for approval by the insurer was a “purely ministerial exercise”. In the event 
that the wording did not accurately reflect the slip, its tender was not an offer to vary 
the contract but an error in completing the contract wording. An acceptance by the 
insurer was not an agreement to any new wording.
250 However, it might also mean that both documents will live together, which will be further discussed below at 
p 150.
251 [2001] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 161.
252 Ibi d, at para 95.
253 [2002] Lloyd’s Rep IR 480 at p 484.
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4.3 RECTIFICATION
A discrepancy may sometimes arise between the agreement of the parties and any 
subsequent written record thereof. For instance, in marine insurance contracts such 
a discrepancy could be found in either the slip or policy, where one or both fail to 
reflect the agreement that was actually reached by the parties. Rectification is the 
equitable remedy by which a court can remedy mistakes in the recording of the 
parties’ agreement. Thus, it has been said that: “Courts of equity do not rectify 
contracts; they may and do rectify instruments purporting to have been made in 
pursuance of the terms of contract.” 254
Rectification is generally confined to failures by the written record accurately to 
reflect the common intention of the parties. The conditions to be satisfied were 
summarized by Slade LJ as follows:255
“First, there must be a common intention in regard to the particular 
provisions of the agreement in question, together with some outward 
expression of accord. Secondly, this common intention must continue up to 
the time of execution of the instrument. Thirdly, there must be clear 
evidence that the instrument as executed does not accurately represent the 
true agreement of the parties at the time of its execution. Fourthly, it must be 
shown that the instrument, if rectified as claimed, would accurately 
represent the true agreement of the parties at that time..
For example, in a marine insurance contract, if the policy contains terms 
contradictory to or inconsistent with a prior contract between the parties, one party 
may bring an action for its rectification. The burden of proof lies upon the party 
seeking rectification. This party must adduce convincing proof of the parties’ 
outward expression of accord or common intention. The burden of discrediting a
254 Howard Bennett, The Law o f Marine Insurance, (2nd ed, Oxford University Press, 2006) at p 294.
255 A gip  SpA v Navigazione Alta Italia SpA [1984] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 353 at p 359.
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policy on oral evidence alone is an exceptionally difficult one to discharge, and 
rectification is achieved usually only in cases where there has been some written 
expression of the parties’ intention, such as a slip. Accordingly, during this process 
reference might be made to the slip.
4.3.1 The Utility of the Slip in Any Given Rectification Action will Depend on
the Intention of the Parties
The utility of the slip in any given rectification action will depend on the intention of 
the parties as to whether the policy should supersede the slip. In A. Gagniere & Co.
n e n
Ltd v The Eastern Company o f Warehouses Insurance, Bankes LJ stated:
“If you prove that the parties have come to a definite parol agreement, and 
you then afterwards find in the document which is intended to carry out that 
definite agreement something other than that definite agreement has been 
inserted, then it is right to rectify the document in order that it may carry out 
the real agreement between the parties. But in order to bring that doctrine 
into play it is necessary to establish beyond doubt the real agreement 
between these parties was that which it is sought to insert in the document in 
place of agreement which appears there.”
256 In Parsons v. Bignold (1846) 15 L.J.Ch.379: A applied to an insurance office for a policy on the life of B, his 
son. The insurers’ agent gave him a form to complete. It included a question as to his interest in the life assured. A 
did not complete the answer to the question in writing, but explained orally to the agent that he possessed an 
interest in certain lands, held of the Dean and Chapter of Wells, for so long as his son, B, lived. The agent then 
filled up the form incorrectly, including certain other lands in the declaration of interest. On B’s death, the 
insurers declined to pay on the ground that the declaration of interest was untrue and avoided the policy, into 
which it had been incorporated as the basic of the contract. A claimed rectification of the policy to accord with his 
answer given to the agent, who, it was assumed for the sake of argument, had acted as the insures’ agent in 
writing down the answer. No adequate evidence of their conversation was, however, given by A and, although the 
agent had freely admitted in a letter that he might well have made a mistake, he did not give evidence to support 
that admission. Rectification was refused, the Lord Chancellor saying that, “nothing short of the most clear and 
distinct evidence would be sufficient.
257 (1921) 8 LIL Rep 365.
258 Ibid, a t p 366.
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4.3.2 Where the Two Parties’ Intention is that the Policy is Intended to
Supersede the slip
In these circumstances, the natural inference is that any discrepancy in terms between 
the two documents has been agreed by the parties and represents the product of a 
deliberate variation of the contract. If there is any difference between the wording of 
the slip and that of the formal contract which is embodied in the policy, the natural 
assumption is and should be that the wording of the policy has been designed to 
reflect better the agreement between the parties. To refer to the slip as an aid to the 
construction of the policy would make little sense in these circumstances and indeed 
would run counter to one of the objects of replacing the slip with the policy.
Of course rectification may still be available in these circumstances, but the party 
who is seeking rectification cannot use the slip as evidence of the accurate record of 
the transaction.
4.3.3 Where the Two Parties’ Intention is that Slip is Intended to Supersede
the Policy
In this case, the slip represents the final terms of a binding contract, and in the event 
of any discrepancy between the slip and the later policy, the slip will prevail and the 
policy will be rectified accordingly.259 An example of an assured successfully 
relying on the slip is provided by Wilson Holgate & Co Ltd v Lancashire & Cheshire
960Insurance Corp Ltd. The underwriters’ defence of misdescription of the insured 
goods failed where the slip accurately described the goods as palm oil but the policy 
referred to them as palm kernel oil, a quite different substance. According to 
Bailhache J, the slip represented the original and real contract and the error in the 
policy was to be disregarded or, if necessary, rectified. Likewise, in Symington & Co
259 Banque Sabbag SAL v Hope [1972] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 253 at p 263.
260 [1922] 13 LILR Rep 486.
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Of\\ •v Union Insurance Society o f Canton Ltd (No 2), the insurers argued that the slip 
should be read as incorporating an implied term that the contract was subject to the 
usual terms of the insurer in order to take advantage of a marginal note in the policy 
restricting the cover that the slip recorded as grounded. The Court of Appeal held, 
however, that any intended disparity between the terms as recorded on the slip and 
the final policy had to be expressly contemplated on the slip.
4.3.4 Rectification of Both Slip and Policy
Off)Rectification of both slip and policy is possible. In The Demetra K , the insurers’ 
unsuccessful rectification claim arose out of a change of terms of renewal. In 1995, 
the Demetra K was insured under a policy that incorporated the Institute Time 
Clauses Hulls (1/10/83) modified by a so-called “October memorandum” that added 
war risks and “risks of loss or damage by acts of vandalism and/or sabotage and/or 
malicious mischief’. In 1996, cover was renewed on a slip that again incorporated 
the Institute Time Clause Hulls (1/10/83), but the terms of the October memorandum, 
although originally incorporated, were struck out. During the currency of the 
renewed cover, the vessel was seriously damaged by a fire that, for the purposes of 
the action, was assumed to have been started deliberately but not by the assured 
owners. The assureds claimed under the insurance for loss caused by the covered 
peril of fire. The insurers accepted that war risks had simply not been included in the 
1996 policy but argued that the underwriter and broker had agreed an express 
exclusion of “loss or damage by acts of vandalism and/or sabotage and/or malicious 
mischief’ and sought rectification of the policy accordingly.
The Court of Appeal held that, in the absence of the express exclusion for which the 
insurers contended, the loss would be covered by the policy. On balance, the 
evidence favoured the assureds’ contention that the underwriter and broker had
261 [1928] 32 LIL Rep 287.
262 [2002] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 581.
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agreed merely to delete the October memorandum but not to add an express 
exclusion. Alternatively, the insurers had failed to adduce convincing evidence of an 
antecedent agreement conflicting with the terms of the 1996 slip as required for 
rectification. Although the parties had clearly agreed on the deletion, there was no 
evidence of any agreement as to the intended effect of that deletion on the scope of 
the cover provided by the policy.
Accordingly, it can be suggested that, provided there is clear evidence, the policy 
may be rectified to accord with the parties’ proven agreement even if the agreement 
is contrary to both the slip and the policy.
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4.4 HELD COVERED CLAUSES
A “held covered clause” is a clause with a special character that may be agreed to by 
parties to a marine insurance contract. Under such a term the underwriter agrees to an 
extension or modification of cover subject to agreement on reasonable alteration of 
terms and this clause normally is invoked after the conclusion of the original contract 
by the assured giving notice to the insurer. The effect of a held covered clause is to 
extend the original policy cover. The notice under the held covered clause amounts to 
a request to the insurer to quote terms for “new cover” or “variation” And the 
process is in parallel to the “presentation of the risk” process prior to the formation of 
the contract. It is vital to analyse the relevant legal issues under this clause at this 
stage.
4.4.1 Held Covered Clauses are Designed to Offer Protection to the Assured
According to the common law, and specially stipulated in the Marine Insurance Act 
1906, the risks which are covered under a marine insurance policy should be clearly 
stated in the contract. The insurer is not responsible for the risks which fall outside of 
the range referred to in the contract. The doctrine of “alteration of risk” should be 
viewed as inflexible and weighted heavily in the insurer’s favour.
However, held covered clauses are an exception to the above rules. Under the held 
covered clause, when the situation stated in the term occurs and this situation 
constitutes an alteration of risk, the insurer’s liability is not prospectively discharged 
and he is still responsible. Instead, the assured remains covered provided any 
specified conditions are fulfilled, usually notification of the event by the assured to 
the insurer and agreement upon any appropriate additional premium and change of 
terms.
263 The nature of this clause will be further considered below at pi 54.
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Here are a few examples of held covered clauses:
Clause 10 of the Institute Cargo Clauses (A), (B) and (C) is a held covered clause 
covering change of voyage. The “breach of warranty” clause in the Institute Time 
Clauses Hulls (cl. 3) is a held covered clause covering “any breach of warranty as to 
cargo, trade, locality, towage, salvage services or date of sailing”. The “change of 
voyage ” clause in the Institute Voyage Clauses Hull (cl. 2) is a held covered clause 
covering not only change of voyage but also deviation and “any breach of warranty 
as to towage or salvage services”. In each case, the assured is held covered provided 
notice is given to the insurers264 and any amended terms of cover and additional 
premium required are agreed.
Accordingly, the purpose of the held covered clause is to offer protection to the 
assured. However, the protection must be within the limits and subject to the 
conditions of the clause.
4.4.2 Two Different Types of Held Covered Clauses
According to Longmore. L.J., in The Mercandian Continent65 there are two kinds of 
held covered clauses named “traditional held covered clauses” and “held covered 
clauses.”
The “Traditional held covered clause”
A clause qualifies as “a traditional held covered clause” where, if the assured gives 
notice to the insurer and the parties agree an additional premium or other terms, the 
assured can get an opportunity to extend the scope of cover.
264 The cargo clauses require “prompt notice”, while the hulls clauses require notice “immediately after receipt of 
advices”
265 [2001] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 563.
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A typical example of this kind of clause is the Institute Time Clause Hulls (1995) 
clause 3, which stated, “Held covered in case of any breach of warranty as to cargo, 
trade, locality, towage, salvage services or date of sailing provided notice be given to 
the Underwriters immediately after receipt of advices and any amended terms of 
cove and any additional premium required by them be agreed.” This kind of clause 
enables the assured to extend the limits of cover if the notice is given and an 
additional premium is agreed.
The “Held covered clause”
Held covered clauses are clauses which provide “automatic” coverage on a pro rata 
premium.
A typical example of this kind of clause is the Institute Time Clause Hulls (1995) 
clause 2, which stated that, “Should the Vessel at the expiration of this insurance to 
be at sea and in distress or missing, she shall, provided notice be given to the 
Underwriters prior to expiration of this insurance, be held covered until arrival at the 
next port in good safety, or if in port and in distress until the vessel is made safe, at a 
pro rata monthly premium.” Under this kind of clause, the limits of the additional 
cover have already been determined and a premium agreed in advance, so all that the 
assured does is to exercise rights which he has under the original contract.
4.4.3 The Nature of Held Covered Clauses
Held covered clauses are terms stipulated in the marine insurance contract. The
parties’ obligations under these terms are not carried out until the held covered
clauses are invoked by giving notice from the assured. Once the assured does give
notice, the original risk alters and the cover is extended. “A held covered clause is
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undoubtedly a valid contract”266 but the question remains about the precise nature of 
such clauses. In particular the question should be considered whether the held 
covered clause is just part of the existing insurance contract or creates a new contract 
apart from the original one; the legal status of the held cover clause and the 
obligations arising under it may differ depending on its true status.
Since the held covered clause is one of the terms in the original contract, it is 
possible to view the held covered clause as an integral part of the initial contract. If 
the held covered clause is regarded as part of the initial contract, the extended cover 
provided by this clause may be viewed as one category of covers arising under the 
original policy. Accordingly, a held covered clause would be said to establish an 
immediate binding obligation in the insurance contract which the parties have 
entered into.
However, contractual terms create a bilateral obligation, while, held covered clauses, 
in fact, create only a unilateral obligation which requires the underwriter to provide 
the specified additional cover if the assured gives notice. Accordingly, the answer to 
the question raised earlier should be that the held covered clause creates a distinct 
contract of insurance. The held covered clause is perceived as an offer made by the 
underwriter to provide. If demanded, additional cover is provided in accordance with 
the terms and conditions specified in the clause. Beyond being unilateral, the offer is 
also irrevocable. The underwriter is bound to maintain the offer for as long as the 
held covered clause is capable of being invoked by the assured, which period may 
extend beyond the duration of the initial insurance contract. The assured accepts the 
offer and provides consideration by giving a valid notice as specified in the clause. In 
giving notice, the assured also promises, subject to any express terms the parties may 
agree, to pay a reasonable additional premium and/or to agree reasonable amended 
terms, and in so doing provides consideration.
266 D. Rhi dian Thomas, The Modem Law o f Marine Insurance VII, (LLP Publishing, 2002) at p 52.
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Adopting the above analysis, the effect of a held covered clause is that the 
underwriter undertakes a contractual obligation to provide additional cover, if the 
assured demands by giving notice. It does not become an obligation requiring 
performance until notice is given, and if notice is not given it never becomes an 
active obligation. Until notice is given, the assured is under no obligation whatsoever. 
But once notice is given, both parties are subject to immediate obligation. The 
underwriter is obliged to provide the promised additional cover. There is no option in 
the matter and failure to do so amounts to breach of contract. The assured is obliged 
to agree any specified conditions precedent, usually relating to additional premium 
and amended terms of cover.
4.4.4 Whether the Additional Cover is an Option for the Assured
It is quite clear that the additional cover provided by held covered clauses is only 
available when notice is given by the assured. Thus, the assured’s notice is the trigger 
to activate the held covered clause. When the assured gives notice to the underwriter, 
the underwriter is obliged to hold the assured covered, although the underwriters’ 
obligation is usually subject to the right to the payment of additional premium or 
amended conditions of cover. Here, the relevant question is whether the assured is 
entitled to choose not to give the notice. In other words it needs to be considered 
whether giving notice is an option for the assured.
Professor Rhidian Thomas’s approach to that issue is as follows:267 “There is, of 
course, no obligation on an assured to invoke a held covered clause; the clause 
merely gives the assured the right to election.” However, Hamilton J took a different 
view in the case of Mentz, Decker & Co v. Maritime Insurance Co. The clause in
267 D. Rhi dian Thomas, The Modern Law o f Marine Insurance VII, (LLP Publishing, 2002) at p 4.
268 [1910] KB 132.
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this case stated: “in the event of the vessel making any deviation or change of voyage 
[the assured] shall be held covered at a premium to be arranged provided due notice 
be given by the assured on receipt of advice of such deviation or change of voyage.” 
Obiter, Hamilton J agreed with counsel for the insurers that “it is impossible to 
construe the clause as giving an option to the assured to be covered or not as he 
chooses”269
In my opinion, the answer to the question whether there is an option for the assured 
to be held covered or not should depend on the wording of the particular clause and 
on the relevant intention of the parties. In Mentz, Decker & Co v. Maritime Insurance 
Co.210 the wording of the clause stated that “it is mutually agreed that such deviation 
or change of voyage shall be held covered”. This could be read as meaning that the 
assured had already agreed that deviations and changes of voyage were to be covered. 
According to the true intention of the parties, if the assured failed to give notice as 
required, the result will be that the assured is deprived of cover. In contrast, clause 
9 of the Modem Institute Cargo Clauses provides that, where the contract of carriage 
or transit terminates in certain circumstances, the insurance “shall also terminate 
unless prompt notice is given to the underwriter and continuation of cover is 
requested.” The wording used in this clause can hardly be interpreted as an obligation 
to give notice. The two parties’ intention should be read as affording the assured the 
opportunity in the relevant circumstances, to assess its needs and determine whether 
or not they are best served by continuation of the insurance.
269 Ibid, at p 135.
270 Ibid.
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4.4.5 Difficulties that may Arise in the Case of Co-insurance
It is a common practice that, during the formation of marine insurance contracts, a 
policy is subscribed by a number of underwriters. When there is a held covered 
clause in the insurance policy, the invocation of such a clause may give rise to some 
difficulties. Several issues arise. For example, it may be asked, to whom should the 
assured give the notice; is the assured required to give notice to every underwriter; if 
the assured gives notice to different underwriters at different times, will this action 
still be considered as a valid invocation of the held covered clause; and can it be said 
that different underwriters may request different levels of the additional premium? A 
common and effective method of avoiding these potential difficulties is by agreeing a 
“leading underwriter agreement”, whereby the leading underwriter receives notice 
and agrees the level of additional premium and/or new terms of cover on behalf of 
the following co-insurers.271
4.4.6 The Importance of the Notice
There is a consideration that is relevant and common to all held covered clauses. It 
may argued that, under held covered clauses, an assured may give notice and pay an 
additional premium only in the event of a loss, and this can cause inequity to the 
insurer. The inequity may be said to arise here because the insurers will take a 
different and greater risk without either the knowledge necessary to permit the 
seeking of reinsurance or the certain benefit of an appropriately enhanced premium. 
However, the law has responded by rendering the benefit of a held covered clause to 
be conditional upon the giving of notice at least within a reasonable time of 
discovery by the assured of the alteration of risk. Accordingly, central to the concept 
of a held covered clause is the requirement of notice. How it is to be given may be 
governed by the terms of the held covered clause itself. In contemporary practice it is 
almost a universal requirement that the notice be prompt, but otherwise little, if any,
271 A leading underwriter clause is discussed in Chapter 2 at p 47.
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is stipulated as to the form of the notice.
4.4.6.1 The Time within Which Notice is to be Given
In contemporary practice held covered clauses usually make express provision for 
the time within which notice must be given. The standard obligation is to require
0 7 0  0 0 0notice to be given “promptly” or “immediately” after receipt of the held 
covered events. Words such as “promptly” and “immediately” indicate clearly that 
once an assured is aware that a held covered event has occurred or will or may occur, 
notice must be communicated at once. The notice must be given without delay, at the 
first practicable moment, to the underwriters if additional cover is required.
In the absence of such an express provision, the courts will imply a term to the effect 
that the benefit of a held covered clause is conditional upon the giving of notice 
within a reasonable time.
Thames & Mersey Marine Insurance Co Ltd v HT van Laun & Co274 concerned two 
differently worded cargo policies. The “Liverpool policy” held the assured covered 
in case of deviation or change of voyage “provided notice be given and any 
additional premium required be agreed immediately after receipt of advice”. The 
“London policy” contained a held covered clause confined to deviations but silent 
with respect to notifying the insurer. The insured’s adventure involved the 
transportation of a cargo of cattle and sheep to a Chinese port, the bill of lading 
specifying Taku. After the vessel had sailed, the consignees repudiated the contract of 
sale and, on 16 December, the master found Taku blocked by ice, a fact known to the 
assured on 17 December. That same day, and repeatedly during the following week,
272 For example, Institute Cargo Clause (a) (b)(c) clause 10.
273 For example, Institute Time Clauses Hulls, Port Riskd incl. Limited Navigation (20.7.87) Clause 1.2.
274 [1917] 2 KB 48N.
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the assured directed the master to hold his position. Appalling conditions on board, 
however, compelled the master to depart from a different port on 25 December, the 
entire cargo ultimately being destroyed at sea for health reasons. The House of Lords 
held that such delay in communication infringed both the express immediate 
notification requirement of the Liverpool policy and a requirement of notification 
within a reasonable time to be implied into the London policy.
4.4.6.2 What is a Reasonable Time?
As discussed above, when there is no express provision in the contract terms as to the 
giving of notice, the law will imply that the notice must be given within a reasonable 
time. However, can the reasonable time be fixed within a certain period of time, for 
example one day or one week? The appropriate approach has been enunciated in the 
following terms in Liberian Insurance Agency Inc v Mosse275 by Donaldson J:
“What time is reasonable will depend on all the circumstances. Thus if the 
assured learns the true facts while the risk is still current, a reasonable time 
will usually be a shorter period than if this occurs when the adventure has 
already ended. If the assured learns the true facts when the insured property 
is in the grip of a peril, which is likely to cause loss or damage, a reasonable 
time will be very short indeed.”
So, what constitutes a reasonable time is a question of fact to be decided according to 
the circumstances of each case.
4.4.6.3 Whether the Implied Term Protects the Assured More Than the
Expressed Term?
From the wording, there would seem to be a clear distinction between an obligation 
to give “prompt” or “immediate” notice and an obligation to give notice within a 
reasonable period of time. It seems that the assured can get more protection from the
275 [1977] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 560 at p 566.
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implied obligation, because a longer period of time may be considered as reasonable 
under the implied term than would be permitted when the obligation is defined in
276terms of the former words. However, in Liberian Insurance Agency Inc v Mosse, 
Donaldson J appears to suggest that there is no difference between the two
777formulations. He said:
“It may be objected that it is unfortunate to use the words ‘prompt notice’ 
when what is meant is notice within a reasonable time. However, in the 
context of a clause which may impose on underwriters, and indirectly upon 
reinsuring underwriters, risks which they have never specifically accepted, I 
do not think that notice which is other than prompt could ever be said to be 
given within a reasonable time. In my judgment, the use of the word 
‘prompt’ is not only justifiable but also desirable in explanation of the 
obligation which id implicit in the clause itself.”
From the above judgment, it can be said that prompt notice really meant reasonable 
notice, and that a notice not promptly given would almost inevitably equally amount 
to a notice not given within a reasonable time.
4.4.6.4 What is Knowledge?
In order to invoke a held covered clause, the assured needs to give notice to the 
insurer within a reasonable time after he obtains knowledge of the event which is 
covered under a held covered clause. The question that arises next is what precisely 
is meant by knowledge? Obviously, there is no difficulty when actual knowledge can 
be established: but does knowledge extend to categories of constructive knowledge, 
such as the knowledge an assured has denied to himself by turning a blind eye, or the 
knowledge the assured would have acquired had he acted with reasonable 
competence in the management of his affairs? The answer can be found from the
77ftjudgment of Lord Denning in The Eurysthenes, where he states:
276 Ibid.
277 Ibi d, at p 566.
278 [1977] Q.B. 49 at p 68.
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“If a man, suspicious of the truth, turns a blind eye to it, and refrains from 
inquiry-so that he should not know it for certain- then he is to be regarded as 
knowing the truth.”
4.4.7 The Additional Premium
When notification of the event held covered by the clause is given by the assured, on 
theone hand the underwriter is obliged to provide the promised additional cover, on 
the other hand, the assured is obliged to agree any specified conditions precedent. 
These conditions usually relate to the additional premium. In establishing the 
obligation to pay the additional premium the drafting of held covered clauses may 
vary and much will depend on the proper construction of the wording used.
For example, in Institute Cargo Clause (A) (B) (C), clause 9 states that “ ...this 
insurance shall also terminate unless prompt notice is given to the underwriters and 
continuation of cover is requested when the insurance shall remain in force, subject 
to an additional premium if required by the underwriter...” Here the phrase “if 
required” makes it clear that the conditional obligation of the assured in respect of 
the additional premium only becomes operative where the underwriters actually 
demand the premium in question.
In Institute Cargo Clause (A) (B) (C), clause 10 states “ ...held covered at a premium 
and on conditions to be arranged subject to prompt notice being given to the 
Underwriter”. Here the wording appears to suggest that the additional premium will 
be demanded, and therefore that the assured is under an obligation to pay additional 
premium.
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4.4.7.1 A Reasonable Additional Premium
Following the invocation of a held covered clause, in most instances, the amount of 
the additional premium payable will be settled by negotiation between the parties. 
However, when the parties’ negotiation fails, what is the additional premium to be 
paid by the assured? Section 31 (2) of Marine Insurance Act 1906 provides the 
answer:
“Where an insurance is effected on the terms that an additional premium is 
be arranged in any given event, and that event happens but no arrangement 
is made, then a reasonable additional premium is payable.”
The impact of s. 31 (2) is to introduce into every held covered clause a conditional 
implied statutory term to the effect that where the parties fail to agree an additional 
premium, the assured is under an obligation to pay a reasonable additional premium.
The question which naturally comes to be considered is what is meant by a 
reasonable premium? This question should be answered primarily by reference to 
market practice at the relevant point in time.
4.4.7.2 What is the Relevant Time to Assess the Additional Premium
The issue of the point at which the additional premium should be assessed is referred 
to in Mentz, Decker & Co v. Maritime Insurance Co?19 On the facts of the case the 
insured vessel was lost following a deviation, which was a held covered event in the 
voyage policy. The assured gave notice to be held covered following the loss. One 
question which came to be considered related to the basis on which the additional 
premium was to be assessed where the assessment did not take place until after the 
insured vessel was lost. Hamilton J answered the question by indicating, “the 
premium is to be calculated as it would have been calculated by the parties if they
279 [1910] 1 KB 132.
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980had known of the deviation at the time that it happened.”
4.4.7.3 How to Assess the Reasonable Additional Premium
The decision in Greenock Steamship Co. Ltd v Maritime Insurance Co Ltd1*1 is 
instructive in determining what a reasonable additional premium may require. In this 
case an insured vessel embarked on a voyage stage inadequately coaled and therefore 
in an unseaworthy condition. This amounted to breach of warranty with cover 
terminated, save that there was also a held covered clause which stipulated breach of 
warranty to be a “held covered” event. The parties failed to agree an additional 
premium and the question was referred to the court for determination. In the abstract,
• 989 •Bigham J considered the question before the court to be “what is a reasonable 
premium for the added risk?” Applying the question to the factual context of the case, 
Bigham J formulated the question, “What might an underwriter fairly require as a 
premium for insuring a steamer which starts on a voyage short of coal?”
Responding to the question, Bigham J considered that an underwriter confronted by 
such a risk would be justified in taking into account two material considerations. 
First, the probable losses that would occur. Because the insured vessel was 
inadequately coaled, alternative sources of fuel would be required, which of 
necessity must come from the ship’s fittings or spars, and from the cargo. These 
losses, in turn, would be general average losses which the underwriter would be 
entitled to take into account in assessing a reasonable premium. Second, and 
additionally, Bigham J considered that the underwriter could take into account the 
increased risk of the total loss of the ship as a result of her being sent on a voyage 
inadequately bunkered.
210 Ibid, at pp. 134,135.
281 [1903] 1 KB 367.
282 Ibi d, at p 375.
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Applying these two principles to the facts of the case, Bigham J concluded that the 
underwriter was entitled to charge an additional premium at least equal to the 
average loss claimed by the assured owner for ship’s fittings and spars burnt, and the 
sum paid for cargo needed as fuel. In the event the claim under the policy was 
equalled by the entitlement of the underwriter to the additional premium, and the 
claim of the assured, therefore, failed.
Liberian Insurance Agency Inc. v. Mosse is also instructive on the point. Here 
Donaldson J set out the approach in the following terms:
“the clause only applies if the assured on the basis of an accurate declaration 
of all the facts affecting the risk but excluding knowledge of what was to 
happen in the event, could have obtained a quotation in the market at a 
premium which could properly be described as ‘a reasonable commercial 
rate’ ”.
Accordingly, the answer to the question raised earlier, (‘what is a reasonable 
additional premium?’), depends on the facts and circumstances of each individual 
case. The additional premium should be assessed by reference to market practice and 
evidence of such market practice should be sought from those within the market with 
the appropriate knowledge, expertise and experience.
283 [1977] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 560 at p 568.
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4.4.8 The Application of the Duty of Utmost Good Faith in Held Covered
Clauses
It has been judicially confirmed on several occasions that an assured who seeks to 
invoke a held covered clause must conduct himself with the utmost good faith in his 
dealings with underwriters. There are two principal cases dealing with this issue 
which should be noted.
The decision in Overseas Commodities Limited v. Style concerned a claim under 
two policies of marine insurance in respect of damage to two consignments of 
canned pork. The policies provided that the tins of pork would be marked in a 
particular manner. Certain of the tins were incorrectly marked. Each policy contained 
a “held covered” clause in the event of omission or error in description of the insured 
cargo, upon which the assured sought to rely. The assured obtained two letters from 
the manufacturers’ agents containing inconsistent explanations for the incorrect 
markings. Only the letter containing the most favourable explanation was presented 
to the insurers. Me Nair J held that,
“To obtain the protection of the ‘held covered’ clause, the assured must act 
with the utmost good faith towards the underwriters, this being an obligation 
which rests upon them throughout the currency of the policy.”
The assured’s failure to provide insurers with both explanations for the incorrect 
markings was a breach of that duty, thereby preventing the assured from relying upon 
the “held covered” clause.
The same “held covered” clause was considered in Liberian Insurance Agency Inc v.
284 [1958] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 546.
285 Ibi d, at p 559.
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Mosse,286 The facts of that case are a little unusual. The plaintiff, acting as broker, 
arranged all cargo insurance on behalf of African Trading Company with the 
defendant insurers. A claim was made on the policy, which the insurers declined. The 
assured successfully sued the plaintiff brokers in Liberia on the basis that they 
claimed to be agents for Lloyd’s (which they were not). The plaintiff brokers 
commenced English proceedings against the insurers seeking restitution. In order to 
recover an indemnity from the insurers, the brokers had to prove that the insurers 
were liable under the policy to the assured. The insurers denied liability because 
there had been a misrepresentation concerning the cargo of enamelware. The brokers 
argued that the assured could rely upon the “held covered” provision. Donaldson, J in
989considering the judgment in Style, remarked that observance of the utmost good 
faith was a condition precedent to the application of the held covered clause. He went 
on to say that the clause required an accurate declaration of all the facts affecting the 
risk. The assured was in breach of that duty by not advising the insurers promptly of 
the true nature and quality of the cargo. On the facts of the case, the “held covered” 
clause could not be relied upon and the brokers’ claim failed.
Accordingly, when an additional premium, or other terms, is to be agreed pursuant to 
such a clause, it is established that the assured will owe a duty of good faith to the 
insurer to inform him of all details relating to the risk, or at least the manner in which
• 988the risk has changed by virtue of the scope of cover being extended. However, the 
scope of such a duty is not entirely clear. The issues of how “materiality” will be 
judged under held covered clauses and the effect of the breach of duty of utmost 
good faith need to be discussed further.
286 [1977] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 560.
287 Ibi d, at p 567.
288 Overseas Commodities Lt d  v. Style [1958] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 546 at p 559, per McNair, J; Liberian Insurance 
Agency Inc v. Mosse [1977] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 560 at p 568, per Donaldson, J; The Litsion Pride [1985] 1 Lloyd’s 
Rep 437 at p 511, per Hirst, J; New Hampshire Insurance Company v. MGN Ltd [1997] LRLR 24 at p 28, per 
Potter, J; kJs Merc-Scandia XXXXII v. Certain Lloyd’s Underwriters [2001] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 563, per Longmore LJ.
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4.4.8.1 How to Define “Materiality” under Held Covered Clauses?
The concept of materiality must be adapted to this specific context. Thus, it is clear, 
for example, that a circumstance that has arisen since the conclusion of the contract 
that would be material were the risk being placed for the first time or being renewed 
but that is not material to the amendment does not require disclosure under a held 
covered clause.
In Iron Trades Mutual Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Companhia De Seguros Imperio, the 
need to tailor ’materiality’ to its context was cogently articulated by Hobhouse, J:
“Where there is an addition to a contract, as where it is varied, there can be a 
further duty of disclosure but only to the extent that it is material to the 
variation being proposed. If the addition does not alter the contractual rights 
there will be no fact that it is material to disclose and the same will apply if 
variation is favourable to the insurer. It will only be when the insurer is 
being asked to take on some additional risk and/or needing to reassess the 
premium or terms of cover that disclosure of further facts could be material 
and, even then, the facts to be disclosed are only those which are material to 
what the insurer is being asked to do...Any other conclusion would lead to 
an absurdity; the duty of utmost good faith does not include giving the 
insurer an opportunity, after he has accepted the risk and become bound, to 
escape from his commitment.”
In The Litsion Pride,290 Hirst J,. stated that
“a circumstance is material if it would influence the judgement of a prudent 
underwriter in making the relevant decision to which the misrepresentation 
or non-disclosure relates”.
Moreover, the House of Lords has since ruled in Pan Atlantic Insurance Co. Ltd v.
289 [1991] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 213.
290 [1985] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 437 at p 511.
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Pine Top Insurance Co.Ltd191 that breach of the pre-formation duty of utmost good 
faith requires subjective inducement of the actual insurer in question and there is no 
reason to distinguish the post-formation duty on this point. Consequently, the scope 
of the duty attaching to held covered clauses is confined to circumstances that are 
both material to the alteration of risk in question and that induce the actual insurer 
into agreeing to that alteration.
4.4.8.2 What is the Remedy for Breach of the Duty of Utmost Good Faith
under Held Covered Clauses?
An important issue which arises in relation to the application of the duty of utmost 
good faith under held covered clauses is the question of the appropriate remedy. If 
the duty arises out of s. 17 of the MIA 1906, the only remedy is avoidance. The next 
question that may arise is whether avoidance is a universal remedy or one that exists 
alongside alternatives. Does avoidance always allude to the original contract of 
insurance or can it relate to a severable part of the original contract?
The question was considered in Fraser Shipping Ltd v. Colton.
Fraser concerned a policy incorporating the Institute Voyage Clauses Hull for a 
voyage to Shanghai of a vessel being towed for demolition. On 25 May, the assureds 
decided to send the tow to Huang Pu, where it arrived on 24 June. The tow moored at 
the quarantine anchorage awaiting passage up river to the delivery berth. On 25 June, 
notice of this change of voyage was given to and accepted by the insurers. However, 
the insurers were not told that the tow had already been waiting at anchorage at 
Huang Pu for 24 hours during which time it had been involved in a minor collision, 
that the port of Huang Pu was congested so that delivery of the tow was likely to be 
delayed at the quarantine anchorage, that de-ballasting and work on the anchor were
291 [1995] 1 AC 501.
292 [1997] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 586.
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necessary before the voyage up river, and that a hurricane was threatening the port. 
The assureds unsuccessfully invoked the Institute Voyage Clauses Hull, cl. 2.
Potter, L.J., sitting as a judge of first insurance, held that the assureds had failed to 
give timely notice and had not disclosed material circumstances, such non-disclosure 
inducing the insurers into agreeing the change of voyage. In doing so, he applied the 
MIA 1906, sectionl8 to the assured’s disclosure obligations under cl. 2.
However, it is readily appreciated that the doctrine of utmost good faith has its 
source in section 17 of the MIA 1906, and that the particular duties established by ss. 
18-20 amount to specific applications of the doctrine and not to a definition of the 
province of the general doctrine. Section 17 is drafted in very wide terms. Beyond 
making it clear that the general duty of utmost good faith arises as a matter of law 
and is mutual in its application, and that the remedy for breach of the duty is 
restricted to avoidance of the contract of marine insurance, all is presented in a very 
general vein. In contrast, the specific duties recognized in ss. 18-20 are defined with 
particularity and it is plain that they are restricted to the negotiating and 
pre-contractual phase.
It follows that the duty of utmost good faith attaching to held covered clauses, or 
other contractual modifications, does not fall within either section 17 or section 18 of 
the MIA 1906. As has already been seen, section 18 cannot apply once the contract 
has been concluded and section 18 (1) provides that in the event of non-disclosure 
“the insurer may avoid the contract”. A similar problem arises with section 17.
Just as the meaning of “materiality” will reflect the operation of utmost good faith in
the specific context of held covered clauses so to should the remedy for
non-compliance be adapted to fit this same narrow application of the duty. If the
duty is tailored to the variation of the contract, the remedy should be limited to that
variation and breach of the duty should not affect the entirety of the cover. There is,
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consequently, no justification for permitting retrospective avoidance of the entire 
contract in the event of non-compliance with the duty of utmost good faith which 
applies to held covered clauses. The duty of utmost good faith has previously been 
properly discharged with respect to any original risks and the insurer should remain 
liable for prior casualties therefore. The insurer’s remedy should be limited to 
avoidance of any extension of cover granted on the basis of improper presentation of 
that risk. Put another way, observance of utmost good faith with respect to a held 
covered clause is condition precedent to the enforceability of the insurer’s promise to 
maintain the cover, not to the insurer’s promise to grant cover in the first place.
Accordingly, to the point can be clarified that an implication of the applicability of 
the duty of utmost faith when invoking a held covered clause is that the assured is 
under particular obligations to disclose all material information and not to make 
material misrepresentations. Section 18 and 20 are relevant, but in all likelihood 
subject to certain qualifications. In the first place the concept of materiality, as 
defined in sub-section (2) of both sections, is to be restricted to the held covered risk. 
Second, information is material if it would influence the judgment of a prudent 
insurer in fixing the additional premium and/or determining the conditions on which 
the additional cover is to be provided. Third, since the insurer is already obliged to 
provide the additional cover, if demanded, information relating to whether the 
additional risk should be accepted is not material, but information which helps the 
underwriter to decide whether the additional risk falls within the terms of the held 
cover clauses is material. Fourth, given the circumstances which may prevail an 
assured gives notice of a held covered event and also the conditions precedent to 
which the additional cover must be satisfied, it may be that the concept of deemed 
knowledge pursuant to s. 18(1), which has been developed in the context of the 
standard pre-contractual application of the doctrine, may require some modification. 
As for the consequences of breach of the duty of utmost good faith in invoking a held 
covered clause, it is becoming increasingly certain that it is the additional cover 
alone which may be avoided.
CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION
The main conclusion of the thesis is that, most of the practices in the London market 
in relation to contract formation are in line with general contract law principles and 
any deviation can be explained by market custom. It is hoped that this thesis analysed 
and discussed main legal problems arising at this stage and offers solutions to 
problematic areas.
5.1 LEGAL ISSUES ARISING BEFORE THE CONTRACT IS CONCLUDED
The formation of the marine insurance contract in the London market is quite 
different from the formation of non-marine insurance contracts. An assured will act 
through his agent, a broker. The broker will prepare one of the two important 
documents -  the slip - and take the slip around the market seeking subscriptions. The 
underwriters who are interested in the insurance will initial the slip. Once the broker 
has obtained the desired level of subscriptions, the slip is closed and the other 
important document -  the policy - will be issued later. In the past, when the broker 
prepared the slip, he could use different formats for various types of risks which 
would cause interpretation difficulties and uncertainty. The need for the standard slip 
format emerged and with the new LMP and LMP BRAT slips much of the 
interpretive problems were resolved and increased clarity resulted.
During this process, the subscription on the slip should be considered as an 
acceptance by the underwriter rather than an offer from the underwriter.293 In the 
case of partial subscriptions, when one underwriter signs on the slip, the insurance
293 Ge neral Reinsurance Corporation and Others v. Forsakeringsaktiebolaget Fennia Patria [1982] 1 Lloyd’s 
Rep 87 and [1983] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 290.
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contract between himself and the assured is concluded. Accordingly each 
subscription constitutes an individual contract and each underwriter may be bound to 
the assured on different terms. Both the assured and the underwriters are bound to 
each subscription before full subscription and the underwriter is liable for loss prior 
to full subscription.
However, when the underwriter subscribes the slip and puts some kind of 
qualification on it, that subscription is not an acceptance and it should be considered 
as a counter-offer, which is left to the assured to accept or reject. The assured may 
accept the response but he may also reject it with a further proposition, in which case 
the assured makes a further counter-offer. Again the underwriter may accept or reject 
any counter-offer. This process continues until the counter-offer of one or other is 
finally accepted or rejected. The court will look at the entirety of the negotiations to 
determine if there is a point at which the relevant agreement has been reached.294
It should be noted that the above offer and acceptance rule operates in a different 
manner when a reinsurance contract is formed, particularly, where the reinsurance 
contract is formed before the original insurance contract. In practice, it happens quite 
often that the underwriter will not participate in the original insurance unless the 
reinsurance is arranged in advance. In such a case, the signature of the reinsurer on 
the reinsurance slip will not be considered as an acceptance. It should, instead, be 
taken as an offer of reinsurance from the reinsurer. The contract of reinsurance is 
concluded when the reinsured accepts this offer. Subsequently, the duty of disclosure 
will not come to an end at the moment when the reinsurer signs on the slip, rather it 
will be exhausted when the reinsured signs on the slip.
At the formation stage, it is common to incorporate a leading underwriter clause into
294 C T Ilnc  v. Oceanus Mutual Underwriting Assn (Bermuda) Ltd  [1984] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 476.
295 Bo nner v. Cox [2005] Lloyd's Rep. I.R  p. 569; The Zephyr [1984] 1 Lloyd's Rep 58.
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the marine insurance contracts. The broker takes the slip to the leading underwriter 
who has a reputation in the market as an expert in the kind of cover required and 
whose lead is likely to be followed by other insurers in the market. The broker and 
the leading underwriter go through the slip together. They agree on any amendments 
to the broker’s draft and fix the premium. Under a leading underwriter agreement, 
the underwriters who follow the lead may agree to accept any minor amendments or 
additions to the policy without the need for their specific approval or authority.
* • 906However, the leading underwriter cannot agree to a material alteration of the risk.
As to the nature of this clause, whether the leading underwriter should be considered
9Q7 9 0 0as the “agent” of the following market or only as the “trigger” actually depends 
upon the scope and terminology of the clause itself.299 The judicial view is divided 
on the legal nature of such clauses but the writer believes that there is practical 
advantage of adopting “trigger” approach.
Signing down is a common practice in Lloyd’s market at the formation stage. 
Signing-down plays two important functions. First, it enables brokers to show their 
business to more underwriters and these larger lines make the risk appear more 
attractive to following underwriters Secondly, if the assured wishes to increase the 
value insured, the initial commitment of underwriters to a larger percentage than 
ultimately obtained provides an indication of where some spare capacity may be 
found. In this practice, the broker is generally asked to provide a “signing indication” 
which amounts to a promise given by the broker. When the broker can not reach the 
indicated level of subscription, his liability to the underwriter can be analysed in 
terms of contract since he is in breach of an implied undertaking to use his best 
endeavours to ensure that there would be a certain level of subscription on the slip
296 Barlee Marine C orporation v Mountain (The “Leegas”)  [1987] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 471.
297 Ro adworks Ltd v Charman [1994] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 99.
298 Man der v Commercial Union Assurance Co pic [1998] Lloyd’s Rep IR 93; The Tiburon [1990] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 
418 at p 422.
299 Barlee Marine C orporation v Mountain [1987] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 471; Unum Life Insurance Co o f America v 
Israel Phoenix Assurance Co Ltd. [2002] Lloyd’s Rep IR 374.
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and the lack of best endeavours could be equated with lack of reasonable care.300
5.2 THE ROLE OF INSURANCE BROKERS
In placing insurance at Lloyd’s, an insurance broker is one of the key players. The 
broker is always the agent of his principal, the assured, who employs him to obtain 
the insurance contract. When the duties of broker to the assured are clearly defined in
oni
the contractual terms, the broker must exercise his duties accordingly. When there 
is no such kind of contractual terms, the broker is under a duty of reasonable care 
which can be summarized as follows: with his reasonable knowledge of the
insurance market place, the broker is under a duty to obtain sufficient cover with 
the most suitable insurer303 within a reasonable time.304 The reasonable time 
requirement does not of course amount to a fixed pre-determined period, but rather it 
will be modified on a case by case basis to reflect the range of different 
circumstances that will have arisen. The broker is also responsible for the policy
1 AC
wording and is under a duty to provide advice and information to the assured; this 
duty will encompass a requirement to give qualified information in accordance with 
the inquiries of the assured, to inform the assured of any exemption under the policy 
and to give advice about what the assured must disclose to the insurer regarding the 
subject matter of the insurance.
300 The Zephyr [1984] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 58.
301 S trong v. S.Allison [1926] 25 Lloyd’s Rep 504; Talbot Underwriting Ltd v. Nausch Hogan & Murray Inc (The
Jason 5) [2006] Lloyd’s Rep IR 531.
302 Yuill & Co v. Robson[\90S] 1 KB 270; Youell v Bland Welch & Co Ltd [1990]2 Lloyd’s Rep 431; Aneco 
Reinsurance Underwriting Ltd. (in liquidation) v. Johnson & Higgins Ltd [2002] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 157.
303 Osman v Moss [1970] 1 Lloyd’s Rep313; Youell v Bland Welch & Co Ltd [1990]2 Lloyd’s Rep 431.
304 Cock, R ussell v. Bray, Gibb[1920] 3 Lloyd’s Rep 71.
305 Melik & Co. Ltd. v. Norwich Union Fire Insurance Society Ltd. [1980] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 523; JWBollom & Co 
Ltd v Byas Mosley & Co Ltd [2000] Lloyd’s Rep IR 136; Grace v Leslie & Godwin Financial Services 
Z,/<i[1995]LRLR 472; Tudor Jones v Crowley Colosso Ltd [1996] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 619.
306 Sarginson Brothers v. Keith Moulton & Co. Ltd, [1942] 73 LI L Rep 104; McNealy v Pennine Insurance 
Co[ 1978] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 18; John Woods (Lisglynn) v. Carroll [1980] 3 NIJB
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307In some circumstances, for example in relation to the placing of reinsurance, and 
in accepting risks under a binding authority,308 the broker acts in a dual capacity as 
the agent for both assured and insurer and he also owes duties to the insurer. This is 
likely to create practical difficulties, but the London market practice of dual agency 
is very common. The main duties of the broker to the insurer are first, the duty to pay 
the premium and secondly the duty of utmost good faith.
The rule of law by which it is the broker, but not the assured who is liable to the 
insurer for the premium is founded on the custom in the London market for more 
than about a century309. This custom is based on the fiction that once the contract is 
concluded, it is assumed that the insurer loans the amount of premium to the broker 
so that the broker becomes debtor of that loan. However, this fiction theory was 
superseded by the wording of “unless otherwise agreed” in s.53(1) of the MIA 1906; 
this phrase enables policies to be construed in accordance with what is actually 
agreed and therefore either the broker or the assured can be liable for the premium. 
The MIA, which is intended to regulate payment of premiums, makes it clear that 
whether the broker or the assured is liable for the premium will depend upon the true
■J 1 A
construction of the policy.
The duty of utmost good faith on the broker to the insurer is set out at Section 19 and 
20 of MIA 1906. However, these sections do not contain any clear reference to the 
required status of the broker- i.e. it is not clear whether the duties laid out are 
restricted in their application, to the producing broker. It has been suggested, 
however, that the placing broker and other sub-brokers also owe such duties to the
307 Ever ett v. Hogg Robinson & Gardner Mountain (Insurance) Ltd [1973] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 217; 
Forsikringsaktieselskapet Vesta v. Butcher, Bain Dawes and others [1988] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 19; European 
International Reinsurance Co Ltd v Curzon Insurance Ltd [2003] Lloyd's Rep IR 805.
308 Ea gle Star Insurance Co v. Spratt [1971] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 116.
309 Power v . Butcher (1829) 10 B & Cr 329 at p 340; Universo Insurance Co. o f  Milan v. Merchants Marine 
Insurance Co. Ltd. [1897] 1 QB 205; Prentis Donegan & Partners Ltd. v. Leeds & Leeds Co. Inc. [1998] 2 
Lloyd’s Rep 326.
310 Heath Lambert Ltd. v. Sociedad de Corretaje de Seguros [2005] 1 Lloyd's Rep 597.
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311assured despite the absence of any contract between them.
One of the key aspects of the duty of utmost good faith is the duty of disclosure. 
Compared with the assured, this duty on the broker is more extensive, in this respect. 
The broker is not only under a duty to disclose material circumstances that are 
known to the assured and himself but also the material circumstances that in the 
ordinary course of business ought to be known by himself. A circumstance is to be 
regarded as material if it has the capacity to influence the judgment of an insurer in 
fixing the premium, or determining whether he will take the risk. It is the judgment 
of a hypothetical prudent insurer that determines whether the undisclosed 
circumstance is material or not. 312 When the insurer wants to exercise his right 
against the broker under the duty of disclosure, he must show that he is induced to
O 1 'J
enter into the contract as result of that non-disclosure. If the insurer cannot prove 
it, there is a presumption of inducement in favour of him.314 However, if it could be 
shown that the insurer has not acted with the required care or skill the presumption of 
inducement will not apply.315 According to Section 18(3) of MIA 1906, the broker 
does not need to disclose the facts or circumstances which reduce the risk or 
which are presumed to be known to the insurer. The definition of circumstances that 
the insurer is presumed to know can be briefly summarized as the circumstances an 
underwriter who insures a risk within a particular industry ought to know or find out, 
the practices of the industry or trade, and the matters which are in general well
311 BP pic v. Aon Ltd. [2006] Lloyd’s Rep IR 577.
312 Con tainer Transport International Inc and Reliance Group Inc v. Oceanus Mutual Underwriting Association 
Ltd. [1984] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 476; Pan Atlantic Insurance Co Ltd v. Pine Top Insurance Co Ltd. [1994] 2 Lloyd’s 
Rep 427 at p 445.
313 Pa n Atlantic Insurance Ltd v. Pine Top Ltd [1994] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 427; St Paul's Fire and Marine Insurance v. 
McConnell Constructors Ltd  [1995] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 116.
314 Pa n Atlantic Insurance Ltd v. Pine Top Ltd [1994] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 427.
315 Mar c Rich and Co AG  v. Portman. [1996] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 430; Assicurazioni Generali SpA vArab Insurance 
Group (BSC) [2002] CLC 164.
316 The D ora [1989] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 69; The Elena G [2002] Lloyd’s Rep IR 450.
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known by persons in that trade. The broker does not need to disclose any 
circumstance as to which information is waived by the insurer. These circumstances
• • • l lOcan be waived by either express agreement or through implied waiver. Provided a 
clause in the contract of insurance is clearly and specifically intended to express what 
kind of conduct of the assured or broker can be expressly waived, it is even possible
n 1 q
to waive fraud on the part of the broker or assured.
Another key aspect of the duty of utmost good faith is the duty not to make 
misrepresentation. This is specifically developed in Section 20 of MIA 1906.
• 320According to this section, a representation could be either a representation of facts 
or a representation of opinion or a representation of intention. Normally, 
excessive valuation is a misrepresentation.323 However, if both parties are aware of 
the excessive valuation or the insurer is not aware of the excessive valuation, but the 
excessive valuation can be explained as a part of an ordinary business transaction, 
this excessive valuation will not be counted as misrepresentation.324
A broker is usually employed to obtain insurance for a specific period of a particular 
risk on the best possible terms for the assured. Therefore, he is entitled to the 
remuneration when a valid and binding contract of insurance has come into existence. 
It has been well established that the broker’s remuneration is paid by the insurer
317 Carterv. Boehm (1766) 3 Burr 1905; North British Fishing Boat Insurance Co., Ltd., v. Starr [1922] 13 LI L 
Rep 206.
318 Man n Macneal & Steevens Ltd. v. Capital and Counties Insurance Co [1920] 4 Lloyd’s Rep 57.
319 HIH Casu alty and General Insurance Ltd. v New Hampshire Insurance Co. and Others [2001] 2 Lloyd's Rep 
161.
320 Williams v. Atlantic Assurance Company, Limited [1933] 1 KB 81; Liberian Insurance Agency Inc. v. Mosse 
[1977] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 560.
321 An derson v. Pacific Fire and Marine Insurance Co. [1872] LR 7 CP 65.
322 Seismik Sekuritik AG. v. Spere Drake Insurance Co. p/c[1997] 8 CL 351.
323 Ea gle Star Insurance Co. Ltd. v Games Video Co. (GVC) S.A. (the "Game Boy") [2004] 1 Lloyd's Rep 238.
324 North Star Shipping Ltd v Sphere Drake Insurance Pic [2006] 2 Lloyd's Rep 183.
325 Pryke v. Gibbs Hartley Cooper [1991] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 602.
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and the liability of the insurer to pay brokerage to the broker comes into existence 
when the contract is formed. When the broker breaches his duty to his principal the 
liabilities arise. However, in some circumstances, the broker may be able to limit or 
exclude his liabilities when the broker can prove that the assured is responsible for or 
has contributed to the lack of suitable insurance;326 or when the broker can prove the
• • ♦ *377existence of an independent ground for the insurer to disclaim liability; or when 
the broker can show that the assured would not have been insured in the 
circumstances irrespective of any failure on the part of the broker; or when the 
broker can prove that the assured is not insurable at the moment the insurance 
contract is concluded.329
5.3 LEGAL ISSUES ARISING AFTER THE CONTRACT IS CONCLUDED
When there is a discrepancy between the two important documents, slip and policy, 
the question raised is whether the policy can supersede the slip or the slip can prevail 
over the policy. The narrow approach330 which asserts that the slip will not be 
available to assist the true construction of the insurance contract at all has been 
denied by the liberal approach.331 The writer is of the opinion that the slip must 
play a degree in the identification of the parties’ intention so the liberal approach 
should be welcomed. Under the liberal approach the parties’ intention will determine 
the evidential utility of the slip. It may be the case that the parties intended the
332contract as stated in the policy to supersede the contract as stated in the slip. On
326 JW  Bottom & Co Ltd v. Byas Mosley & Co Ltd  [2000] Lloyd’s Rep IR 136.
327 Fraser v. Furman[\961] 3 All ER 57.
328 Gun ns v. Par Insurance Brokers[1997] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 17.
329 Ever ett v Hogg, Robinson & Gardner Mountain (Insurance) Ltd [1973] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 217; 0 & R Jewelers v. 
Terry & Jardine Insurance Brokers[ 1999] Lloyd’s Rep IR 436.
330 Youell v. Bland Welch & Co Ltd. [1990] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 423.
331 HIH Casu alty & General Insurance Ltd v New Hampshire Insurance Co. [2001] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 161.
332 Ibi d.\ The Aikshaw{ 1893) 9 TLR 605 ; Motteux v London Assurance(\739) 1 Atk 545.
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the other hand the parties may have intended the slip to take precedence over the 
policy. The intention of the parties must inevitably fall upon the wording chosen 
by them. The interpretation of the words chosen by the parities may be affected by 
the natural meaning of the words334 and the business common sense of the words.335 
When there is an ambiguity about the meaning of the wording, the ambiguity entitles 
the court to invoke the contra proferentem rule.336 Accordingly, where the term that 
proves ambiguous is one inserted by or on behalf of the assured, the contra 
proferentem rule requires interpretation in favour of the insurer and against the 
interests of the assured. Where, by contrast, the ambiguity resides in an amendment 
to the slip introduced by the insurer, the ambiguity will be resolved against the 
insurer. Where the meaning of the words may lead to an excessively unreasonable 
result, if the parties have used plain language to express their intentions, that should 
be the end of it: the court should enforce the contract in accordance with its terms.337
Rectification is the equitable remedy by which a court can remedy mistakes in the 
recording of the parties’ agreement. The utility of the slip in any given rectification 
action will depend on the intention of the parties as to whether the policy should
O ' l O
supersede the slip. Where the two parties’ intention is that the policy is intended 
to supersede the slip, the natural assumption is and should be that the wording of the 
policy has been designed to reflect better the agreement between the parties. To refer 
to the slip as an aid to the construction of the policy would make little sense in these 
circumstances. Where the two parties’ intention is that the slip is intended to
333 Western Assurance Co v Poole( 1903) 8 Com Cas 108.; Eagle Star & British Dominion Insurance Co Ltd vA V  
Reiner(\921) 27 LIL Rep 173.
334 Melanesia n Mission Trust Board v Australian Mutual Provident Society [1996] UKPC 53.
335 Investors Compensation System Scheme Ltd v West Bromwich Building Society [1998] 1 WLR 896 p. 913; 
Mannai Investments Co Ltd v Eagle Star Life Assurance Co Ltd [1997] AC 749; Antaors Compania Naviera SA v 
Salen Rederierna AB  [1985] AC 191; Quorum v Schramm [2002] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 249.
336 M/S Aswan Engineering Establishment Co Ltd v Iron Trades Mutual Insurance Co Ltd  [1989] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 
289.
337 Kuwa it Airways Corp v Kuwait Insurance Co SAK (No 1) [1999] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 803.
338 A. G agniere & Co. Ltd v The Eastern Company o f Warehouses Insurance [1921] 8 LIL Rep 365.
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supersede the policy, the slip represents the final terms of a binding contract, and in 
the event of any discrepancy between the slip and the later policy, the slip will 
prevail and the policy will be rectified accordingly. It should also be mentioned 
that rectification of both slip and policy is possible.340
Held covered clauses are the clauses which are designed to offer protection to the 
assured, because under such types of clauses, when the situation stated in the term 
occurs which constitutes an alteration of risk, the insurer’s liability is not 
prospectively discharged. The assured remains covered provided any specified 
conditions are fulfilled, usually notification of the event by the assured to the insurer 
and agreement upon any appropriate additional premium and change of terms. Since 
the held covered clause is one of the terms in the original contract, it is possible to 
view the held covered clause as an integral part of the initial contract. However, the 
invocation of this clause, by the assured giving notice,, creates a distinct contract 
apart from the original one. It is appropriate to analyse held covered clauses in this 
part as they, if operated, create a new contract during the currency of the original 
contract.
It is quite clear that the additional cover provided by held covered clauses is only 
available when notice is given by the assured. Whether the additional cover is an 
option for the assured should depend on the wording of the particular clause and on 
the relevant intention of the parties.341 In contemporary practice held covered 
clauses usually make express provision for the time within which notice must be 
given. In the absence of such an express provision, the courts will imply a term to 
the effect that the benefit of a held covered clause is conditional upon the giving of
339 Ba nque Sabbag SAL v Hope [1972] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 253; Wilson Holgate & Co Ltd  v Lancashire & Cheshire 
Insurance Corp Ltd. [19221 13 LILR Rep 486; Symington & Co v Union Insurance Society o f  Canton Ltd (No 2) 
[1928] 32 LIL Rep 287.
340 The Demetra K  [2002] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 581.
341 Mentz, Decker & Co v. Maritime Insurance Co. [1910] KB 132.
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notice within a “reasonable time”. Again, what constitutes a “reasonable time” is a
T49question of fact to be decided according to the circumstances of each case.
When the held covered clause is invoked, the assured is normally obliged to pay 
additional premium. Following the invocation of a held covered clause, in most 
instances, the amount of the additional premium payable will be settled by 
negotiation between the parties. However, when the parties’ negotiation fails, the 
assured is under an obligation to pay a reasonable additional premium. The question 
of “What is a reasonable additional premium?” depends on the facts and 
circumstances of each individual case. The additional premium should be assessed by 
reference to market practice and evidence of such market practice should be sought 
from those within the market with the appropriate knowledge, expertise and 
experience.343
Since the held covered clause creates a distinct contract apart from the original 
insurance contract, it is established that the assured will owe a duty of utmost good 
faith to the insurer.344 The scope of the duty attaching to held covered clauses is 
confined to circumstances that are both material to the alteration of risk and that 
induce the actual insurer into agreeing to that alteration.345 As for the consequences 
of breach of the duty of utmost good faith in invoking a held covered clause, it is 
becoming increasingly certain that it is the additional cover alone which may be 
avoided but not the original contract.346
342 Liberi an Insurance Agency Inc v Mosse [1977] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 560.
343 Mentz, Decker & Co v. Maritime Insurance Co. [1910] 1 KB 132; Greenock Steamship Co. Ltd v Maritime 
Insurance Co Ltd  [1903] 1 KB 367; Liberian Insurance Agency Inc. v. Mosse [1977] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 560.
344 Overseas Commodities Limi ted v. Style [1958] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 546; Liberian Insurance Agency Inc v. Mosse. 
[1977] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 560.
345 Ir on Trades Mutual Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Companhia De Seguros Imperio [1991] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 213; The 
Litsion Pride [1985] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 437; Pan Atlantic Insurance Co. Ltd v. Pine Top Insurance Co.Ltd [1995] 1 
AC 501.
346 Fraser S  hipping Ltd v. Colton. [1997] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 586.
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APPENDIX
Marine Insurance Act 1906
An Act to codify the Law relating to Marine Insurance. [21 December 1906]
BE it enacted by the King’s most Excellent Majesty, by and with the advice and consent o f the 
Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons, in this present Parliament assembled, and by the 
authority o f the same, as follows:
MARINE INSURANCE
1. Marine insurance defined
A contract o f  marine insurance is a contract whereby the insurer undertakes to indemnify the 
assured, in manner and to the extent thereby agreed, against marine losses, that is to say, the 
losses incident to marine adventure.
2. Mixed sea and land risks
(1)A contract o f marine insurance may, by its express terms, or by usage o f trade, be extended so 
as to protect the assured against losses on inland waters or on any land risk which may be 
incidental to any sea voyage.
(2) Where a ship in course o f building, or the launch o f a ship, or any adventure analogous to a 
marine adventure, is covered by a policy in the form of a marine policy, the provisions o f this Act, 
in so far as applicable, shall apply thereto; but, except as by this section provided, nothing in this 
Act shall alter or affect any rule o f law applicable to any contract o f insurance other than a 
contract o f marine insurance as by this Act defined.
3. Marine adventure and maritime perils defined
(1)Subject to the provisions o f this Act, every lawful marine adventure may be the subject o f a 
contract of marine insurance.
(2)In particular there is a marine adventure where—
(a)Any ship goods or other moveables are exposed to maritime perils. Such property is in this Act 
referred to as “insurable property”;
(b)The earning or acquisition o f any freight, passage money, commission, profit, or other 
pecuniary benefit, or the security for any advances, loan, or disbursements, is endangered by the 
exposure o f insurable property to maritime perils;
(c)Any liability to a third party may be incurred by the owner of, or other person interested in or 
responsible for, insurable property, by reason o f maritime perils.
“Maritime perils” means the perils consequent on, or incidental to, the navigation o f the sea, that 
is to say, perils o f the seas, fire, war perils, pirates, rovers, thieves, captures, seisures, restraints,
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and detainments o f princes and peoples, jettisons, barratry, and any other perils, either of the like 
kind or which may be designated by the policy.
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I n s u r a b l e  I n t e r e s t
4. Avoidance of  wagering or gaming contracts
(1)Every contract o f marine insurance by way o f gaming or wagering is void.
(2)A contract o f marine insurance is deemed to be a gaming or wagering contract—
(a)Where the assured has not an insurable interest as defined by this Act, and the contract is 
entered into with no expectation o f acquiring such an interest; or
(b) Where the policy is made “interest or no interest,” or “without further proof o f interest than 
the policy itself,” or “without benefit o f salvage to the insurer,” or subject to any other like term:
Provided that, where there is no possibility o f salvage, a policy may be effected without benefit 
o f salvage to the insurer.
5. Insurable interest defined
(1)Subject to the provisions o f this Act, every person has an insurable interest who is interested in 
a marine adventure.
(2)In particular a person is interested in a marine adventure where he stands in any legal or 
equitable relation to the adventure or to any insurable property at risk therein, in consequence of 
which he may benefit by the safety or due arrival o f insurable property, or may be prejudiced by 
its loss, or by damage thereto, or by the detention thereof, or may incur liability in respect 
thereof.
6. When interest must attach
(1)The assured must be interested in the subject-matter insured at the time o f the loss though he 
need not be interested when the insurance is effected:
Provided that where the subject-matter is insured “lost or not lost,” the assured may recover 
although he may not have acquired his interest until after the loss, unless at the time o f effecting 
the contract o f insurance the assured was aware o f the loss, and the insurer was not.
(2) Where the assured has no interest at the time o f the loss, he cannot acquire interest by any act 
or election after he is aware o f the loss.
7. Defeasible or contingent interest
(1)A defeasible interest is insurable, as also is a contingent interest.
(2)In particular, where the buyer o f goods has insured them, he has an insurable interest, 
notwithstanding that he might, at his election, have rejected the goods, or have treated them as at 
the seller’s risk, by reason o f the latter’s delay in making delivery or otherwise.
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8. Partial interest
A partial interest o f any nature is insurable.
9. Re-insurance
(1)The insurer under a contract o f marine insurance has an insurable interest in his risk, and may 
re-insure in respect of it.
(2)Unless the policy otherwise provides, the original assured has no right or interest in respect of 
such re-insurance.
10. Bottomry
The lender o f money on bottomry or respondentia has an insurable interest in respect o f the loan.
11. Master’s and seamen’s wages
The master or any member o f the crew o f a ship has an insurable interest in respect o f his wages.
12. Advance freight
In the case o f advance freight, the person advancing the freight has an insurable interest, in so far 
as such freight is not repayable in case of loss.
13. Charges of  insurance
The assured has an insurable interest in the charges o f any insurance which he may effect.
14. Quantum of interest
(1)Where the subject-matter insured is mortgaged, the mortgagor has an insurable interest in the 
full value thereof, and the mortgagee has an insurable interest in respect o f any sum due or to 
become due under the mortgage.
(2)A mortgagee, consignee, or other person having an interest in the subject-matter insured may 
insure on behalf and for the benefit o f other persons interested as well as for his own benefit.
(3)The owner o f insurable property has an insurable interest in respect o f the full value thereof, 
notwithstanding that some third person may have agreed, or be liable, to indemnify him in case 
o f loss.
15. Assignment o f  interest
Where the assured assigns or otherwise parts with his interest in the subject-matter insured, he 
does not thereby transfer to the assignee his rights under the contract o f insurance, unless there be 
an express or implied agreement with the assignee to that effect.
But the provisions o f this section do not affect a transmission o f interest by operation o f law.
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16. Measure o f  insurable value
Subject to any express provision or valuation in the policy, the insurable value o f the 
subject-matter insured must be ascertained as follows:—
(1)In insurance on ship, the insurable value is the value, at the commencement o f the risk, o f the 
ship, including her outfit, provisions and stores for the officers and crew, money advanced for 
seamen’s wages, and other disbursements (if any) incurred to make the ship fit for the voyage or 
adventure contemplated by the policy, plus the charges of insurance upon the whole:The 
insurable value, in the case o f a steamship, includes also the machinery, boilers, and coals and 
engine stores if owned by the assured, and, in the case o f a ship engaged in a special trade, the 
ordinary fittings requisite for that trade:
(2)In insurance on freight, whether paid in advance or otherwise, the insurable value is the gross 
amount o f the freight at the risk o f the assured, plus the charges o f insurance:
(3)In insurance on goods or merchandise, the insurable value is the prime cost o f the property 
insured, plus the expenses o f and incidental to shipping and the charges o f insurance upon the 
whole:
(4)In insurance on any other subject-matter, the insurable value is the amount at the risk o f the 
assured when the policy attaches, plus the charges o f insurance.
D is c l o s u r e  a n d  R e p r e s e n t a t io n s
17. Insurance is uberrimce f id e i
A contract o f  marine insurance is a contract based upon the utmost good faith, and, if the utmost 
good faith be not observed by either party, the contract may be avoided by the other party.
18. Disclosure by assured
(1)Subject to the provisions o f this section, the assured must disclose to the insurer, before the 
contract is concluded, every material circumstance which is known to the assured, and the 
assured is deemed to know every circumstance which, in the ordinary course o f business, ought 
to be known by him. If the assured fails to make such disclosure, the insurer may avoid the 
contract.
(2)Every circumstance is material which would influence the judgment o f a prudent insurer in 
fixing the premium, or determining whether he will take the risk.
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(3)In the absence o f inquiry the following circumstances need not be disclosed, namely:—
(a)Any circumstance which diminishes the risk;
(b)Any circumstance which is known or presumed to be known to the insurer. The insurer is 
presumed to know matters o f common notoriety or knowledge, and matters which an insurer in 
the ordinary course o f his business, as such, ought to know;
(c)Any circumstance as to which information is waived by the insurer;
(d)Any circumstance which it is superfluous to disclose by reason o f any express or implied 
warranty.
(4) Whether any particular circumstance, which is not disclosed, be material or not is, in each case, 
a question o f fact.
(5)The term “circumstance” includes any communication made to, or information received by, 
the assured.
19. Disclosure by agent effecting insurance
Subject to the provisions o f the preceding section as to circumstances which need not be 
disclosed, where an insurance is effected for the assured by an agent, the agent must disclose to 
the insurer—
(a)Every material circumstance which is known to himself, and an agent to insure is deemed to 
know every circumstance which in the ordinary course o f business ought to be known by, or to 
have been communicated to, him; and
(b)Every material circumstance which the assured is bound to disclose, unless it come to his 
knowledge too late to communicate it to the agent.
20. R epresentations pending negotiation of contract
(1)Every material representation made by the assured or his agent to the insurer during the 
negotiations for the contract, and before the contract is concluded, must be true. If it be untrue the 
insurer may avoid the contract.
(2)A representation is material which would influence the judgment o f a prudent insurer in fixing 
the premium, or determining whether he will take the risk.
(3)A representation may be either a representation as to a matter o f fact, or as to a matter of 
expectation or belief.
(4)A representation as to a matter o f fact is true, if it be substantially correct, that is to say, if the 
difference between what is represented and what is actually correct would not be considered 
material by a prudent insurer.
(5)A representation as to a matter o f expectation or belief is true if  it be made in good faith.
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(6)A representation may be withdrawn or corrected before the contract is concluded.
(7) Whether a particular representation be material or not is, in each case, a question of fact.
21. W hen contract is deemed to be concluded
A contract o f marine insurance is deemed to be concluded when the proposal o f the assured is 
accepted by the insurer, whether the policy be then issued or not; and, for the purpose o f showing 
when the proposal was accepted, reference may be made to the slip or covering note or other 
customary memorandum of the contract. . .
Annotations:
Words repealed as to instruments made or executed after 1.8.1959 by Finance Act 1959 (c. 58), 
Sch. 8 Pt. II
T h e  P o l ic y
22. Contract must be embodied in policy
Subject to the provisions o f any statute, a contract o f marine insurance is inadmissible in 
evidence unless it is embodied in a marine policy in accordance with this Act. The policy may be 
executed and issued either at the time when the contract is concluded, or afterwards.
Annotations:
S. 22 excluded by Marine and Aviation Insurance (War Risks) Act 1952 (c. 57), s. 7(1) and 
Finance Act 1959 (c. 58), s. 30(6)(7)
23. W hat policy must specify
A marine policy must specify—
(1)The name o f the assured, or o f some person who effects the insurance on his behalf:
(2)— (5 ) .. .
Annotations:
S. 23(2)-(5) repealed as to instruments made or executed after 1.8.1959 by Finance Act 1959 (c. 
58), Sch. 8 Pt. II
24. Signature o f insurer
(1)A marine policy must be signed by or on behalf o f the insurer, provided that in the case of a 
corporation the corporate seal may be sufficient, but nothing in this section shall be construed as 
requiring the subscription o f a corporation to be under seal.
(2) Where a policy is subscribed by or on behalf o f two or more insurers, each subscription, 
unless the contrary be expressed, constitutes a distinct contract with the assured.
25. Voyage and time policies
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(1)Where the contract is to insure the subject-matter “at and from,” or from one place to another 
or others, the policy is called a “voyage policy,” and where the contract is to insure the 
subject-matter for a definite period o f time the policy is called a “time policy.” A contract for 
both voyage and time may be included in the same policy.
(2) . . .
Annotations:
S. 25(2) repealed as to instruments made or executed after 1.8.1959 by Finance Act 1959 (c. 58), 
Sch. 8 Pt. II
26. Designation of subject-m atter
(1)The subject-matter insured must be designated in a marine policy with reasonable certainty.
(2)The nature and extent o f the interest o f the assured in the subject-matter insured need not be 
specified in the policy.
(3)Where the policy designates the subject-matter insured in general terms, it shall be construed 
to apply to the interest intended by the assured to be covered.
(4)In the application o f this section regard shall be had to any usage regulating the designation of 
the subject-matter insured.
27. Valued policy
(1)A policy may be either valued or unvalued.
(2)A valued policy is a policy which specifies the agreed value o f the subject-matter insured.
(3)Subject to the provisions o f this Act, and in the absence o f fraud, the value fixed by the policy 
is, as between the insurer and assured, conclusive o f the insurable value o f the subject intended to 
be insured, whether the loss be total or partial.
(4)Unless the policy otherwise provides, the value fixed by the policy is not conclusive for the 
purpose o f determining whether there has been a constructive total loss.
28. Unvalued policy
An unvalued policy is a policy which does not specify the value o f the subject-matter insured, but, 
subject to the limit o f the sum insured, leaves the insurable value to be subsequently ascertained, 
in the manner herein-before specified.
29. Floating policy by ship or ships
(1)A floating policy is a policy which describes the insurance in general terms, and leaves the 
name o f the ship or ships and other particulars to be defined by subsequent declaration.
(2)The subsequent declaration or declarations may be made by indorsement on the policy, or in 
other customary manner.
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(3)Unless the policy otherwise provides, the declarations must be made in the order o f dispatch 
or shipment. They must, in the case o f goods, comprise all consignments within the terms o f the 
policy, and the value o f the goods or other property must be honestly stated, but an omission or 
erroneous declaration may be rectified even after loss or arrival, provided the omission or 
declaration was made in good faith.
(4)Unless the policy otherwise provides, where a declaration o f value is not made until after 
notice o f  loss or arrival, the policy must be treated as an unvalued policy as regards the 
subject-matter o f that declaration.
30. Construction of terms in policy
(1)A policy may be in the form in the First Schedule to this Act.
(2)Subject to the provisions o f this Act, and unless the context o f the policy otherwise requires, 
the terms and expressions mentioned in the First Schedule to this Act shall be construed as 
having the scope and meaning in that schedule assigned to them.
31. Premium to be arranged
(1)Where an insurance is effected at a premium to be arranged, and no arrangement is made, a 
reasonable premium is payable.
(2)Where an insurance is effected on the terms that an additional premium is to be arranged in a 
given event, and that event happens but no arrangement is made, then a reasonable additional 
premium is payable.
D o u b l e  In s u r a n c e
32. Double insurance
(1)Where two or more policies are effected by or on behalf o f the assured on the same adventure 
and interest or any part thereof, and the sums insured exceed the indemnity allowed by this Act, 
the assured is said to be over-insured by double insurance.
(2)Where the assured is over-insured by double insurance—
(a)The assured, unless the policy otherwise provides, may claim payment from the insurers in 
such order as he may think fit, provided that he is not entitled to receive any sum in excess o f the 
indemnity allowed by this Act;
(b)Where the policy under which the assured claims is a valued policy, the assured must give 
credit as against the valuation for any sum received by him under any other policy without regard 
to the actual value o f the subject-matter insured;
(c)Where the policy under which the assured claims is an unvalued policy he must give credit, as 
against the full insurable value, for any sum received by him under any other policy:
(d)Where the assured receives any sum in excess o f the indemnity allowed by this Act, he is 
deemed to hold such sum in trust for the insurers, according to their right o f contribution among 
themselves.
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33. Nature o f warranty
(1)A warranty, in the following sections relating to warranties, means a promissory warranty, that 
is to say, a warranty by which the assured undertakes that some particular thing shall or shall not 
be done, or that some condition shall be fulfilled, or whereby he affirms or negatives the 
existence o f a particular state o f facts.
(2)A warranty may be express or implied.
(3)A warranty, as above defined, is a condition which must be exactly complied with, whether it 
be material to the risk or not. If  it be not so complied with, then, subject to any express provision 
in the policy, the insurer is discharged from liability as from the date o f the breach o f warranty, 
but without prejudice to any liability incurred by him before that date.
34. When breach of warranty excused
(1)Non-compliance with a warranty is excused when, by reason o f a change o f circumstances, the 
warranty ceases to be applicable to the circumstances o f the contract, or when compliance with 
the warranty is rendered unlawful by any subsequent law.
(2)Where a warranty is broken, the assured cannot avail himself o f the defence that the breach 
has been remedied, and the warranty complied with, before loss.
(3)A breach o f warranty may be waived by the insurer.
35. Express w arranties
(1)An express warranty may be in any form of words from which the intention to warrant is to be 
inferred.
(2)An express warranty must be included in, or written upon, the policy, or must be contained in 
some document incorporated by reference into the policy.
(3)An express warranty does not exclude an implied warranty, unless it be inconsistent therewith.
36. W arranty of neutrality
(1)Where insurable property, whether ship or goods, is expressly warranted neutral, there is an 
implied condition that the property shall have a neutral character at the commencement of the 
risk, and that, so far as the assured can control the matter, its neutral character shall be preserved 
during the risk.
(2)Where a ship is expressly warranted “neutral” there is also an implied condition that, so far as 
the assured can control the matter, she shall be properly documented, that is to say, that she shall 
carry the necessary papers to establish her neutrality, and that she shall not falsify or suppress her 
papers, or use simulated papers. If  any loss occurs through breach o f this condition, the insurer 
may avoid the contract.
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37. No implied warranty of nationality
There is no implied warranty as to the nationality o f a ship, or that her nationality shall not be 
changed during the risk.
38. W arranty o f good safety
Where the subject-matter insured is warranted “well” or “in good safety” on a particular day, it is 
sufficient if it be safe at any time during that day.
39. W arranty o f seaworthiness of ship
(1)In a voyage policy there is an implied warranty that at the commencement o f the voyage the 
ship shall be seaworthy for the purpose o f the particular adventure insured.
(2) Where the policy attaches while the ship is in port, there is also an implied warranty that she 
shall, at the commencement o f the risk, be reasonably fit to encounter the ordinary perils o f the 
port.
(3)Where the policy relates to a voyage which is performed in different stages, during which the 
ship requires different kinds o f or further preparation or equipment, there is an implied warranty 
that at the commencement o f each stage the ship is seaworthy in respect o f such preparation or 
equipment for the purposes of that stage.
(4)A ship is deemed to be seaworthy when she is reasonably fit in all respects to encounter the 
ordinary perils o f the seas o f the adventure insured.
(5)In a time policy there is no implied warranty that the ship shall be seaworthy at any stage of 
the adventure, but where, with the privity o f the assured, the ship is sent to sea in an unseaworthy 
state, the insurer is not liable for any loss attributable to unseaworthiness.
40. No implied warranty that goods are seaworthy
(1)In a policy on goods or other moveables there is no implied warranty that the goods or 
moveables are seaworthy.
(2)In a voyage policy on goods or other moveables there is an implied warranty that at the 
commencement o f the voyage the ship is not only seaworthy as a ship, but also that she is 
reasonably fit to carry the goods or other moveables to the destination contemplated by the 
policy.
41. W arranty of legality
There is an implied warranty that the adventure insured is a lawful one, and that, so far as the 
assured can control the matter, the adventure shall be carried out in a lawful manner.
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42. Implied condition as to commencement o f risk
(1)Where the subject-matter is insured by a voyage policy “at and from” or “from” a particular 
place, it is not necessary that the ship should be at that place when the contract is concluded, but 
there is an implied condition that the adventure shall be commenced within a reasonable time, 
and that if  the adventure be not so commenced the insurer may avoid the contract.
(2)The implied condition may be negatived by showing that the delay was caused by 
circumstances known to the insurer before the contract was concluded, or by showing that he 
waived the condition.
43. Alteration of port of departure
Where the place o f departure is specified by the policy, and the ship instead o f sailing from that 
place sails from any other place, the risk does not attach.
44. Sailing for different destination
Where the destination is specified in the policy, and the ship, instead o f sailing for that 
destination, sails for any other destination, the risk does not attach.
45. Change of voyage
(1)Where, after the commencement o f the risk, the destination o f the ship is voluntarily changed 
from the destination contemplated by the policy, there is said to be a change o f voyage.
(2)Unless the policy otherwise provides, where there is a change o f voyage, the insurer is 
discharged from liability as from the time o f change, that is to say, as from the time when the 
determination to change it is manifested; and it is immaterial that the ship may not in fact have 
left the course o f voyage contemplated by the policy when the loss occurs.
46. Deviation
(1)Where a ship, without lawful excuse, deviates from the voyage contemplated by the policy, 
the insurer is discharged from liability as from the time o f deviation, and it is immaterial that the 
ship may have regained her route before any loss occurs.
(2)There is a deviation from the voyage contemplated by the policy—
(a)Where the course o f the voyage is specifically designated by the policy, and that course is 
departed from; or
(b) Where the course o f the voyage is not specifically designated by the policy, but the usual and 
customary course is departed from.
(3)The intention to deviate is immaterial; there must be a deviation in fact to discharge the 
insurer from his liability under the contract.
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47. Several ports o f discharge
(1)Where several ports o f discharge are specified by the policy, the ship may proceed to all or 
any o f them, but, in the absence o f any usage or sufficient cause to the contrary, she must proceed 
to them, or such o f them as she goes to, in the order designated by the policy. If she does not 
there is a deviation.
(2) Where the policy is to “ports o f discharge,” within a given area, which are not named, the ship 
must, in the absence o f any usage or sufficient cause to the contrary, proceed to them, or such of 
them as she goes to, in their geographical order. If  she does not there is a deviation.
48. Delay in voyage
In the case o f a voyage policy, the adventure insured must be prosecuted throughout its course 
with reasonable dispatch, and, if without lawful excuse it is not so prosecuted, the insurer is 
discharged from liability as from the time when the delay became unreasonable.
49. Excuses for deviation or delay
(1)Deviation or delay in prosecuting the voyage contemplated by the policy is excused—
(a)Where authorised by any special term in the policy; or
(b) Where caused by circumstances beyond the control o f the master and his employer; or
(c)Where reasonably necessary in order to comply with an express or implied warranty; or
(d) Where reasonably necessary for the safety o f the ship or subject-matter insured; or
(e)For the purpose o f saving human life, or aiding a ship in distress where human life may be in 
danger; or
(f) Where reasonably necessary for the purpose o f obtaining medical or surgical aid for any 
person on board the ship; or
(g) Where caused by the barratrous conduct o f the master or crew, if  barratry be one o f the perils 
insured against.
(2)When the cause excusing the deviation or delay ceases to operate, the ship must resume her 
course, and prosecute her voyage, with reasonable dispatch.
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50. When and how policy is assignable
(1)A marine policy is assignable unless it contains terms expressly prohibiting assignment. It 
may be assigned either before or after loss.
(2)Where a marine policy has been assigned so as to pass the beneficial interest in such policy, 
the assignee o f the policy is entitled to sue thereon in his own name; and the defendant is entitled 
to make any defence arising out o f the contract which he would have been entitled to make if  the 
action had been brought in the name of the person by or on behalf o f whom the policy was 
effected.
(3)A marine policy may be assigned by indorsement thereon or in other customary manner.
51. Assured who has no interest cannot assign
Where the assured has parted with or lost his interest in the subject-matter insured, and has not, 
before or at the time o f so doing, expressly or impliedly agreed to assign the policy, any 
subsequent assignment o f the policy is inoperative:
Provided that nothing in this section affects the assignment o f a policy after loss.
T h e  P r e m iu m
52. When premium payable
Unless otherwise agreed, the duty o f the assured or his agent to pay the premium, and the duty of 
the insurer to issue the policy to the assured or his agent, are concurrent conditions, and the 
insurer is not bound to issue the policy until payment or tender o f the premium.
53. Policy effected through broker
(1)Unless otherwise agreed, where a marine policy is effected on behalf o f the assured by a 
broker, the broker is directly responsible to the insurer for the premium, and the insurer is 
directly responsible to the assured for the amount which may be payable in respect o f losses, or 
in respect o f returnable premium.
(2)Unless otherwise agreed, the broker has, as against the assured, a lien upon the policy for the 
amount o f the premium and his charges in respect o f effecting the policy; and, where he has dealt 
with the person who employs him as a principal, he has also a lien on the policy in respect o f any 
balance on any insurance account which may be due to him from such person, unless when the 
debt was incurred he had reason to believe that such person was only an agent.
54. Effect o f receipt on policy
Where a marine policy effected on behalf o f the assured by a broker acknowledges the receipt of 
the premium, such acknowledgement is, in the absence o f fraud, conclusive as between the 
insurer and the assured, but not as between the insurer and broker.
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Loss a n d  A b a n d o n m e n t
55. Included and excluded losses
(1)Subject to the provisions o f this Act, and unless the policy otherwise provides, the insurer is 
liable for any loss proximately caused by a peril insured against, but, subject as aforesaid, he is 
not liable for any loss which is not proximately caused by a peril insured against.
(2)In particular—
(a)The insurer is not liable for any loss attributable to the wilful misconduct o f the assured, but, 
unless the policy otherwise provides, he is liable for any loss proximately caused by a peril 
insured against, even though the loss would not have happened but for the misconduct or 
negligence o f the master or crew;
(b)Unless the policy otherwise provides, the insurer on ship or goods is not liable for any loss 
proximately caused by delay, although the delay be caused by a peril insured against;
(c)Unless the policy otherwise provides, the insurer is not liable for ordinary wear and tear, 
ordinary leakage and breakage, inherent vice or nature o f the subject-matter insured, or for any 
loss proximately caused by rats or vermin, or for any injury to machinery not proximately caused 
by maritime perils.
56. Partial and total loss
(1)A loss may be either total or partial. Any loss other than a total loss, as hereinafter defined, is 
a partial loss.
(2)A total loss may be either an actual total loss, or a constructive total loss.
(3)Unless a different intention appears from the terms o f the policy, an insurance against total 
loss includes a constructive, as well as an actual, total loss.
(4)Where the assured brings an action for a total loss and the evidence proves only a partial loss, 
he may, unless the policy otherwise provides, recover for a partial loss.
(5)Where goods reach their destination in specie, but by reason o f obliteration o f marks, or 
otherwise, they are incapable o f identification, the loss, if any, is partial, and not total.
57. Actual total loss
(1)Where the subject-matter insured is destroyed, or so damaged as to cease to be a thing o f the 
kind insured, or where the assured is irretrievably deprived thereof, there is an actual total loss.
(2)In the case o f an actual total loss no notice o f abandonment need be given.
58. M issing ship
Where the ship concerned in the adventure is missing, and after the lapse o f a reasonable time no 
news of her has been received, an actual total loss may be presumed.
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59. Effect of transhipment, &c
Where, by a peril insured against, the voyage is interrupted at an intermediate port or place, under 
such circumstances as, apart from any special stipulation in the contract o f affreightment, to 
justify the master in landing and reshipping the goods or other moveables, or in transhipping 
them, and sending them on to their destination, the liability o f the insurer continues, 
notwithstanding the landing or transhipment.
60. Constructive total loss defined
(1)Subject to any express provision in the policy, there is a constructive total loss where the 
subject-matter insured is reasonably abandoned on account o f its actual total loss appearing to be 
unavoidable, or because it could not be preserved from actual total loss without an expenditure 
which would exceed its value when the expenditure had been incurred.
(2)In particular, there is a constructive total loss—
(i) Where the assured is deprived o f the possession o f his ship or goods by a peril insured against, 
and (a) it is unlikely that he can recover the ship or goods, as the case may be, or (b) the cost o f 
recovering the ship or goods, as the case may be, would exceed their value when recovered; or
(ii)In the case o f damage to a ship, where she is so damaged by a peril insured against that the 
cost of repairing the damage would exceed the value o f the ship when repaired.
In estimating the cost o f repairs, no deduction is to be made in respect o f general average 
contributions to those repairs payable by other interests, but account is to be taken o f the expense 
o f future salvage operations and o f any future general average contributions to which the ship 
would be liable if repaired; or
(iii)In the case o f damage to goods, where the cost o f repairing the damage and forwarding the 
goods to their destination would exceed their value on arrival.
61. Effect o f constructive total loss
Where there is a constructive total loss the assured may either treat the loss as a partial loss, or 
abandon the subject-matter insured to the insurer and treat the loss as if  it were an actual total 
loss.
62. Notice o f abandonm ent
(1)Subject to the provisions o f this section, where the assured elects to abandon the 
subject-matter insured to the insurer, he must give notice o f abandonment. If  he fails to do so the 
loss can only be treated as a partial loss.
(2)Notice o f abandonment may be given in writing, or by word o f mouth, or partly in writing and 
partly by word o f mouth, and may be given in any terms which indicate the intention o f the 
assured to abandon his insured interest in the subject-matter insured unconditionally to the 
insurer.
(3)Notice o f abandonment must be given with reasonable diligence after the receipt o f reliable 
information o f the loss, but where the information is o f a doubtful character the assured is entitled 
to a reasonable time to make inquiry.
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(4) Where notice o f abandonment is properly given, the rights o f the assured are not prejudiced by 
the fact that the insurer refuses to accept the abandonment.
(5)The acceptance o f an abandonment may be either express or implied from the conduct o f the 
insurer. The mere silence of the insurer after notice is not an acceptance.
(6)Where notice o f abandonment is accepted the abandonment is irrevocable. The acceptance of 
the notice conclusively admits liability for the loss and the sufficiency o f the notice.
(7)Notice o f abandonment is unnecessary where, at the time when the assured receives 
information o f the loss, there would be no possibility o f benefit to the insurer if  notice were given 
to him.
(8)Notice o f abandonment may be waived by the insurer.
(9) Where an insurer has re-insured his risk, no notice o f abandonment need be given by him.
63. Effect o f abandonm ent
(1)Where there is a valid abandonment the insurer is entitled to take over the interest o f the 
assured in whatever may remain o f the subject-matter insured, and all proprietary rights 
incidental thereto.
(2)Upon the abandonment o f a ship, the insurer thereof is entitled to any freight in course of 
being earned, and which is earned by her subsequent to the casualty causing the loss, less the 
expenses of earning it incurred after the casualty; and, where the ship is carrying the owner’s 
goods, the insurer is entitled to a reasonable remuneration for the carriage o f them subsequent to 
the casualty causing the loss.
P a r t ia l  L o s s e s  ( in c l u d in g  S a l v a g e  a n d  G e n e r a l  A v e r a g e  a n d
P a r t ic u l a r  C h a r g e s )
64. Particular average loss
(1 )A particular average loss is a partial loss o f the subject-matter insured, caused by a peril 
insured against, and which is not a general average loss.
(2)Expenses incurred by or on behalf o f the assured for the safety or preservation o f the 
subject-matter insured, other than general average and salvage charges, are called particular 
charges. Particular charges are not included in particular average.
65. Salvage charges
(1)Subject to any express provision in the policy, salvage charges incurred in preventing a loss by 
perils insured against may be recovered as a loss by those perils.
(2)“Salvage charges” means the charges recoverable under maritime law by a salvor 
independently o f contract. They do not include the expenses o f services in the nature o f salvage 
rendered by the assured or his agents, or any person employed for hire by them, for the purpose 
o f averting a peril insured against. Such expenses, where properly incurred, may be recovered as
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particular charges or as a general average loss, according to the circumstances under which they 
were incurred.
66. G eneral average loss
(1)A general average loss is a loss caused by or directly consequential on a general average act. It 
includes a general average expenditure as well as a general average sacrifice.
(2)There is a general average act where any extraordinary sacrifice or expenditure is voluntarily 
and reasonably made or incurred in time of peril for the purpose o f preserving the property 
imperilled in the common adventure.
(3)Where there is a general average loss, the party on whom it falls is entitled, subject to the 
conditions imposed by maritime law, to a rateable contribution from the other parties interested, 
and such contribution is called a general average contribution.
(4)Subject to any express provision in the policy, where the assured has incurred a general 
average expenditure, he may recover from the insurer in respect o f the proportion o f the loss 
which falls upon him; and, in the case o f a general average sacrifice, he may recover from the 
insurer in respect o f the whole loss without having enforced his right o f contribution from the 
other parties liable to contribute.
(5)Subject to any express provision in the policy, where the assured has paid, or is liable to pay, a 
general average contribution in respect o f the subject insured, he may recover therefor from the 
insurer.
(6)In the absence o f express stipulation, the insurer is not liable for any general average loss or 
contribution where the loss was not incurred for the purpose o f avoiding, or in connexion with 
the avoidance of, a peril insured against.
(7) Where ship, freight, and cargo, or any two o f those interests, are owned by the same assured, 
the liability o f the insurer in respect o f general average losses or contributions is to be determined 
as if those subjects were owned by different persons.
M e a s u r e  o f  I n d e m n it y
67. Extent o f liability  o f insurer for loss
(1)The sum which the assured can recover in respect o f a loss on a policy by which he is insured, 
in the case o f an unvalued policy to the full extent o f the insurable value, or, in the case of a 
valued policy to the full extent o f the value fixed by the policy is called the measure of 
indemnity.
(2) Where there is a loss recoverable under the policy, the insurer, or each insurer if  there be more 
than one, is liable for such proportion o f the measure o f indemnity as the amount o f his 
subscription bears to the value fixed by the policy in the case o f a valued policy, or to the 
insurable value in the case o f an unvalued policy.
68. Total loss
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Subject to the provisions o f this Act and to any express provision in the policy, where there is a 
total loss o f the subject-matter insured,—
(1)If the policy be a valued policy, the measure o f indemnity is the sum fixed by the policy:
(2)If the policy be an unvalued policy, the measure o f indemnity is the insurable value o f the 
subject-matter insured.
69. Partial loss o f ship
Where a ship is damaged, but is not totally lost, the measure o f indemnity, subject to any express 
provision in the policy, is as follows:—
(1)Where the ship has been repaired, the assured is entitled to the reasonable cost of the repairs, 
less the customary deductions, but not exceeding the sum insured in respect o f any one casualty:
(2)Where the ship has been only partially repaired, the assured is entitled to the reasonable cost 
o f such repairs, computed as above, and also to be indemnified for the reasonable depreciation, if 
any, arising from the unrepaired damage, provided that the aggregate amount shall not exceed the 
cost o f repairing the whole damage, computed as above:
(3)Where the ship has not been repaired, and has not been sold in her damaged state during the 
risk, the assured is entitled to be indemnified for the reasonable depreciation arising from the 
unrepaired damage, but not exceeding the reasonable cost o f repairing such damage, computed as 
above.
70. Partial loss o f freight
Subject to any express provision in the policy, where there is a partial loss o f freight, the measure 
of indemnity is such proportion o f the sum fixed by the policy in the case o f a valued policy, or 
o f the insurable value in the case o f an unvalued policy, as the proportion o f freight lost by the 
assured bears to the whole freight at the risk o f the assured under the policy.
71. Partial loss o f goods, m erchandise, &c
Where there is a partial loss o f goods, merchandise, or other moveables, the measure of 
indemnity, subject to any express provision in the policy, is as follows:—
(1)Where part o f the goods, merchandise or other moveables insured by a valued policy is totally 
lost, the measure o f indemnity is such proportion o f the sum fixed by the policy as the insurable 
value o f the part lost bears to the insurable value o f the whole, ascertained as in the case o f an 
unvalued policy:
(2) Where part o f the goods, merchandise, or other moveables insured by an unvalued policy is 
totally lost, the measure o f indemnity is the insurable value o f the part lost, ascertained as in case 
o f total loss:
(3)Where the whole or any part o f the goods or merchandise insured has been delivered damaged 
at its destination, the measure o f indemnity is such proportion o f the sum fixed by the policy in 
the case o f a valued policy, or o f the insurable value in the case o f an unvalued policy, as the 
difference between the gross sound and damaged values at the place o f arrival bears to the gross 
sound value:
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(4)“Gross value” means the wholesale price, or, if there be no such price, the estimated value, 
with, in either case, freight, landing charges, and duty paid beforehand; provided that, in the case 
o f goods or merchandise customarily sold in bond, the bonded price is deemed to be the gross 
value. “Gross proceeds” means the actual price obtained at a sale where all charges on sale are 
paid by the sellers.
72. Apportionm ent o f valuation
(1)Where different species o f property are insured under a single valuation, the valuation must be 
apportioned over the different species in proportion to their respective insurable values, as in the 
case o f an unvalued policy. The insured value o f any part o f a species is such proportion o f the 
total insured value o f the same as the insurable value o f the part bears to the insurable value of 
the whole, ascertained in both cases as provided by this Act.
(2) Where a valuation has to be apportioned, and particulars o f the prime cost o f each separate 
species, quality, or description o f goods cannot be ascertained, the division o f the valuation may 
be made over the net arrived sound values o f the different species, qualities, or descriptions of 
goods.
73. General average contributions and salvage charges
(1)Subject to any express provision in the policy, where the assured has paid, or is liable for, any 
general average contribution, the measure o f indemnity is the full amount o f such contribution, if 
the subject-matter liable to contribution is insured for its full contributory value; but, if such 
subject-matter be not insured for its full contributory value, or if only part o f it be insured, the 
indemnity payable by the insurer must be reduced in proportion to the under insurance, and 
where there has been a particular average loss which constitutes a deduction from the 
contributory value, and for which the insurer is liable, that amount must be deducted from the 
insured value in order to ascertain what the insurer is liable to contribute.
(2)Where the insurer is liable for salvage charges the extent o f his liability must be determined on 
the like principle.
74. Liabilities to third parties
Where the assured has effected an insurance in express terms against any liability to a third party, 
the measure o f indemnity, subject to any express provision in the policy, is the amount paid or 
payable by him to such third party in respect o f such liability.
75. General provisions as to measure of indemnity
(1)Where there has been a loss in respect o f any subject-matter not expressly provided for in the 
foregoing provisions o f this Act, the measure o f  indemnity shall be ascertained, as nearly as may 
be, in accordance with those provisions, in so far as applicable to the particular case.
(2)Nothing in the provisions o f this Act relating to the measure o f indemnity shall affect the rules 
relating to double insurance, or prohibit the insurer from disproving interest wholly or in part, or 
from showing that at the time o f the loss the whole or any part o f the subject-matter insured was 
not at risk under the policy.
76. Particular average warranties
202
(1)Where the subject-matter insured is warranted free from particular average, the assured cannot 
recover for a loss o f part, other than a loss incurred by a general average sacrifice, unless the 
contract contained in the policy be apportionable; but, if the contract be apportionable, the 
assured may recover for a total loss o f any apportionable part.
(2)Where the subject-matter insured is warranted free from particular average, either wholly or 
under a certain percentage, the insurer is nevertheless liable for salvage charges, and for 
particular charges and other expenses properly incurred pursuant to the provisions o f the suing 
and labouring clause in order to avert a loss insured against.
(3)Unless the policy otherwise provides, where the subject-matter insured is warranted free from 
particular average under a specified percentage, a general average loss cannot be added to a 
particular average loss to make up the specified percentage.
(4)For the purpose o f ascertaining whether the specified percentage has been reached, regard 
shall be had only to the actual loss suffered by the subject-matter insured. Particular charges and 
the expenses o f and incidental to ascertaining and proving the loss must be excluded.
77. Successive losses
(1)Unless the policy otherwise provides, and subject to the provisions o f this Act, the insurer is 
liable for successive losses, even though the total amount o f such losses may exceed the sum 
insured.
(2)Where, under the same policy, a partial loss, which has not been repaired or otherwise made 
good, is followed by a total loss, the assured can only recover in respect o f the total loss:
Provided that nothing in this section shall affect the liability o f the insurer under the suing and 
labouring clause.
78. Suing and labouring clause
(1)Where the policy contains a suing and labouring clause, the engagement thereby entered into 
is deemed to be supplementary to the contract o f insurance, and the assured may recover from the 
insurer any expenses properly incurred pursuant to the clause, notwithstanding that the insurer 
may have paid for a total loss, or that the subject-matter may have been warranted free from 
particular average, either wholly or under a certain percentage.
(2)General average losses and contributions and salvage charges, as defined by this Act, are not 
recoverable under the suing and labouring clause.
(3)Expenses incurred for the purpose o f averting or diminishing any loss not covered by the 
policy are not recoverable under the suing and labouring clause.
(4)It is the duty o f the assured and his agents, in all cases, to take such measures as may be 
reasonable for the purpose o f averting or minimising a loss.
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R ig h t s  o f  In s u r e r  o n  P a y m e n t
79. Right o f subrogation
(1)Where the insurer pays for a total loss, either o f the whole, or in the case o f goods o f any 
apportionable part, o f the subject-matter insured, he thereupon becomes entitled to take over the 
interest o f the assured in whatever may remain o f the subject-matter so paid for, and he is thereby 
subrogated to all the rights and remedies o f the assured in and in respect o f that subject-matter as 
from the time o f the casualty causing the loss.
(2)Subject to the foregoing provisions, where the insurer pays for a partial loss, he acquires no 
title to the subject-matter insured, or such part o f it as may remain, but he is thereupon 
subrogated to all rights and remedies o f the assured in and in respect o f  the subject-matter insured 
as from the time o f the casualty causing the loss, in so far as the assured has been indemnified, 
according to this Act, by such payment for the loss.
80. Right o f contribution
(1)Where the assured is over-insured by double insurance, each insurer is bound, as between 
himself and the other insurers, to contribute rateably to the loss in proportion to the amount for 
which he is liable under his contract.
(2)If any insurer pays more than his proportion o f the loss, he is entitled to maintain an action for 
contribution against the other insurers, and is entitled to the like remedies as a surety who has 
paid more than his proportion o f the debt.
81. Effect o f under insurance
Where the assured is insured for an amount less than the insurable value or, in the case o f a 
valued policy, for an amount less than the policy valuation, he is deemed to be his own insurer in 
respect of the uninsured balance.
R e t u r n  o f  P r e m iu m
82. Enforcem ent o f return
Where the premium or a proportionate part thereof is, by this Act, declared to be returnable,—
(a)If already paid, it may be recovered by the assured from the insurer; and
(b)If unpaid, it may be retained by the assured or his agent.
83. Return by agreem ent
Where the policy contains a stipulation for the return o f the premium, or a proportionate part 
thereof, on the happening o f a certain event, and that event happens, the premium, or, as the case 
may be, the proportionate part thereof, is thereupon returnable to the assured.
84. Return for failure o f consideration
(l)W here the consideration for the payment o f the premium totally fails, and there has been no 
fraud or illegality on the part o f the assured or his agents, the premium is thereupon returnable to 
the assured.
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(2) Where the consideration for the payment o f the premium is apportionable and there is a total 
failure o f any apportionable part o f the consideration, a proportionate part o f the premium is, 
under the like conditions, thereupon returnable to the assured.
(3)In particular—
(a) Where the policy is void, or is avoided by the insurer as from the commencement o f the risk, 
the premium is returnable, provided that there has been no fraud or illegality on the part of the 
assured; but if  the risk is not apportionable, and has once attached, the premium is not returnable:
(b)Where the subject-matter insured, or part thereof, has never been imperilled, the premium, or, 
as the case may be, a proportionate part thereof, is returnable:
Provided that where the subject-matter has been insured “lost or not lost” and has arrived in 
safety at the time when the contract is concluded, the premium is not returnable unless, at such 
time, the insurer knew o f the safe arrival.
(c) Where the assured has no insurable interest throughout the currency o f the risk, the premium is 
returnable, provided that this rule does not apply to a policy effected by way o f gaming or 
wagering;
(d) Where the assured has a defeasible interest which is terminated during the currency o f the risk, 
the premium is not returnable;
(e) Where the assured has over-insured under an unvalued policy, a proportionate part of the 
premium is returnable;
(f)Subject to the foregoing provisions, where the assured has over-insured by double insurance, a 
proportionate part o f the several premiums is returnable:
Provided that, if  the policies are effected at different times, and any earlier policy has at any time 
borne the entire risk, or if  a claim has been paid on the policy in respect o f the full sum insured 
thereby, no premium is returnable in respect o f that policy, and when the double insurance is 
effected knowingly by the assured no premium is returnable.
M u t u a l  In s u r a n c e
85. M odification o f Act in case o f mutual insurance
(1)Where two or more persons mutually agree to insure each other against marine losses there is 
said to be a mutual insurance.
(2)The provisions o f this Act relating to the premium do not apply to mutual insurance, but a 
guarantee, or such other arrangement as may be agreed upon, may be substituted for the 
premium.
(3)The provisions o f this Act, in so far as they may be modified by the agreement o f the parties, 
may in the case o f mutual insurance be modified by the terms o f the policies issued by the 
association, or by the rules and regulations o f the association.
(4)Subject to the exceptions mentioned in this section, the provisions o f this Act apply to a 
mutual insurance.
205
S u p p l e m e n t a l
86. Ratification by assured
Where a contract o f marine insurance is in good faith effected by one person on behalf of another, 
the person on whose behalf it is effected may ratify the contract even after he is aware of a loss.
87. Implied obligations varied by agreem ent or usage
(1)Where any right, duty, or liability would arise under a contract o f marine insurance by 
implication o f law, it may be negatived or varied by express agreement, or by usage, if the usage 
be such as to bind both parties to the contract.
(2)The provisions o f this section extend to any right, duty, or liability declared by this Act which 
may be lawfully modified by agreement.
88. Reasonable tim e, &c. a question of fact
Where by this Act any reference is made to reasonable time, reasonable premium, or reasonable 
diligence, the question what is reasonable is a question o f fact.
89. Slip as evidence
Where there is a duly stamped policy, reference may be made, as heretofore, to the slip or 
covering note, in any legal proceeding.
90. Interpretation of terms
In this Act, unless the context or subject-matter otherwise requires,—
“Action” includes counter-claim and set off:
“Freight” includes the profit derivable by a shipowner from the employment o f his ship to carry 
his own goods or moveables, as well as freight payable by a third party, but does not include 
passage money:
“Moveables” means any moveable tangible property, other than the ship, and includes money, 
valuable securities, and other documents:
“Policy” means a marine policy.
91. Savings
(l)Nothing in this Act, or in any repeal effected thereby, shall affect—
(a)The provisions o f the Stamp Act 1891, or any enactment for the time being in force relating to 
the revenue;
(b)The provisions o f the Companies Act 1862, or any enactment amending or substituted for the 
same;
(c)The provisions o f any statute not expressly repealed by this Act.
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(2)The rules o f the common law including the law merchant, save in so far as they are 
inconsistent with the express provisions o f this Act, shall continue to apply to contracts of marine 
insurance.
92., 93.. . 
Annotations:
Ss. 92, 93, Sch. 2 repealed by Statute Law Revision Act 1927 (c. 42)
94. Short title
This Act may be cited as the Marine Insurance Act 1906.
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SCHEDULES l(s.30)
The S.G. Form
FORM OF POLICY
BE IT  KNOW N T H A T ..............................as well i n ..................own name as for and in
the name and names o f all and every other person or persons to whom the same doth, may, or
shall appertain, in part or in all doth make assurance and c a u se ........................................and them,
and every o f them, to be insured lost or not lost, at and from..........................
Upon any kind o f goods and merchandises, and also upon the body, tackle, apparel, 
ordnance, munition, artillery, boat, and other furniture, o f and in the good ship or vessel called
the ................whereof is master under God, for this present voyage, ........................ or whosoever
else shall go for master in the said ship, or by whatsoever other name or names the said ship, or 
the master thereof, is or shall be named or called; beginning the adventure upon the said goods 
and merchandises from the loading thereof aboard the said ship.
upon the said ship, &c.
and so shall continue and endure, during her abode there, upon the said ship, &c. And 
further, until the said ship, with all her ordnance, tackle, apparel, &c., and goods and 
merchandises whatsoever shall be arrived at.......................
upon the said ship, &c., until she hath moored at anchor twenty-four hours in good safety; 
and upon the goods and merchandises, until the same be there discharged and safely landed. And 
it shall be lawful for the said ship, &c., in this voyage, to proceed and sail to and touch and stay 
at any ports or places whatsoever
without prejudice to this insurance. The said ship, &c., goods and merchandises, &c., for 
so much as concerns the assured by agreement between the assured and assurers in this policy, 
are and shall be valued at......................
Touching the adventures and perils which we the assurers are contented to bear and do 
take upon us in this voyage: they are o f the seas, men o f war, fire, enemies, pirates, rovers, 
thieves, jettisons, letters o f mart and countermart, surprisals, takings at sea, arrests, restraints, and 
detainments o f all kings, princes, and people, o f what nation, condition, or quality soever, 
barratry o f the master and mariners, and o f all other perils, losses, and misfortunes, that have or 
shall come to the hurt, detriment, or damage o f the said goods and merchandises, and ship, &c., 
or any part thereof. And in case o f any loss or misfortune it shall be lawful to the assured, their 
factors, servants and assigns, to sue, labour, and travel for, in and about the defence, safeguards, 
and recovery o f the said goods and merchandises, and ship, &c., or any part thereof, without 
prejudice to this insurance; to the charges whereof we, the assurers, will contribute each one 
according to the rate and quantity o f his sum herein assuredAnd it is especially declared and 
agreed that no acts o f the insurer or insured in recovering, saving, or preserving the property 
insured shall be considered as a waiver, or acceptance o f abandonment. And it is agreed by us, 
the insurers, that this writing or policy o f assurance shall be o f as much force and effect as the 
surest writing or policy o f assurance heretofore made in Lombard Street, or in the Royal 
Exchange, or elsewhere in London. And so we, the assurers, are contented, and do hereby 
promise and bind ourselves, each one for his own part, our heirs, executors, and goods to the 
assured, their executors, administrators, and assigns, for the true performance o f the premises, 
confessing ourselves paid the consideration due unto us for this assurance by the assured, at and 
after the rate o f...........................
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IN W ITN ESS whereof we, the assurers, have subscribed our names and sums assured in
London.
N.B.— Com, fish, salt, fruit, flour, and seed are warranted free from average, unless 
general, or the ship be stranded— sugar, tobacco, hemp, flax, hides and skins are warranted free 
from average, under five pounds per cent., and all other goods, also the ship and freight, are 
warranted free from average, under three pounds per cent, unless general, or the ship be stranded.
Rules for construction of policy
The following are the rules referred to by this Act for the construction o f a policy in the above or 
other like form, where the context does not otherwise require:—
1. Lost or not lost
Where the subject-matter is insured “lost or not lost,” and the loss has occurred before the 
contract is concluded, the risk attaches unless, at such time the assured was aware o f the loss, and 
the insurer was not.
2. From
Where the subject-matter is insured “from” a particular place, the risk does not attach until the 
ship starts on the voyage insured.
3. At and from [Ship]
(a)Where a ship is insured “at and from” a particular place, and she is at that place in good safety 
when the contract is concluded, the risk attaches immediately.
(b)If she be not at that place when the contract is concluded, the risk attaches as soon as she 
arrives there in good safety, and, unless the policy otherwise provides, it is immaterial that she is 
covered by another policy for a specified time after arrival.
(c)Where chartered freight is insured “at and from” a particular place, and the ship is at that place 
in good safety when the contract is concluded the risk attaches immediately. If  she be not there 
when the contract is concluded, the risk attaches as soon as she arrives there in good safety.
(d)Where freight, other than chartered freight, is payable without special conditions and is 
insured “at and from” a particular place, the risk attaches pro rata as the goods or merchandise 
are shipped; provided that if there be cargo in readiness which belongs to the shipowner, or 
which some other person has contracted with him to ship, the risk attaches as soon as the ship is 
ready to receive such cargo.
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4. From the loading thereof
Where goods or other moveables are insured “from the loading thereof,” the risk does not attach 
until such goods or moveables are actually on board, and the insurer is not liable for them while 
in transit from the shore to the ship.
5. Safely landed
Where the risk on goods or other moveables continues until they are “safely landed,” they must 
be landed in the customary manner and within a reasonable time after arrival at the port of 
discharge, and if they are not so landed the risk ceases.
6. Touch and stay
In the absence o f any further licence or usage, the liberty to touch and stay “at any port or place 
whatsoever” does not authorise the ship to depart from the course o f her voyage from the port o f 
departure to the port o f  destination.
7. Perils of the seas
The term “perils o f the seas” refers only to fortuitous accidents or casualties o f the seas. It does 
not include the ordinary action o f the winds and waves.
8. Pirates
The term “pirates” includes passengers who mutiny and rioters who attack the ship from the 
shore.
Annotations:
Sch. 1 rules 8, 10 amended by Public Order Act 1986 (c. 64, SIF 39:2), s. 10(2)
9. Thieves
The term “thieves” does not cover clandestine theft or a theft committed by any one o f the ship’s 
company, whether crew or passengers.
10. Restraint of princes
The term “arrests, &c., o f kings, princes, and people” refers to political or executive acts, and 
does not include a loss caused by riot or by ordinary judicial process.
Annotations:
Sch. 1 rules 8, 10 amended by Public Order Act 1986 (c. 64, SIF 39:2), s. 10(2)
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11. Barratry
The term “barratry” includes every wrongful act wilfully committed by the master or crew to the 
prejudice o f the owner, or, as the case may be, the charterer.
12. All other perils
The term “all other perils” includes only perils similar in kind to the perils specifically mentioned 
in the policy.
13. Average unless general
The term “average unless general” means a partial loss o f the subject-matter insured other than a 
general average loss, and does not include “particular charges.”
14. Stranded
Where the ship has stranded, the insurer is liable for the excepted losses, although the loss is not 
attributable to the stranding, provided that when the stranding takes place the risk has attached 
and, if the policy be on goods, that the damaged goods are on board.
15. Ship
The term “ship” includes the hull, materials and outfit, stores and provisions for the officers and 
crew, and, in the case o f  vessels engaged in a special trade, the ordinary fittings requisite for the 
trade, and also, in the case o f a steamship, the machinery, boilers, and coals and engine stores, if 
owned by the assured.
16. Freight
The term “freight” includes the profit derivable by a shipowner from the employment o f his ship 
to carry his own goods or moveables, as well as freight payable by a third party, but does not 
include passage money.
17. Goods
The term “goods” means goods in the nature o f merchandise, and does not include personal 
effects or provisions and stores for use on board.
In the absence o f any usage to the contrary, deck cargo and living animals must be insured 
specifically, and not under the general denomination o f goods.
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SCHEDULE 2 (s.92)
Annotations:
Ss. 92, 93, Sch. 2 repealed by Statute Law Revision Act 1927 (c. 42)
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